National Library
of Canada

Canadian Theses Service

Ottawa, Canada
K1A 0N4

Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada

Services des thèses canadiennes

CANADIAN THESES

THÈSES CANADIENNES

NOTICE

The quality of this microfiche is heavily dependent upon the quality of the original thesis submitted for microfilming. Every effort has been made to ensure the highest quality of reproduction possible.

If pages are missing, contact the university which granted the degree.

Some pages may have indistinct print especially if the original pages were typed with a poor typewriter ribbon or if the university sent us an inferior photocopy.

Previously copyrighted materials (journal articles, published tests, etc.) are not filmed.

Reproduction in full or in part of this film is governed by the Canadian Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-30.

AVIS

La qualité de cette microfiche dépend grandement de la qualité de la thèse soumise au microfilmage. Nous avons tout fait pour assurer une qualité supérieure de reproduction.

S'il manque des pages, veuillez communiquer avec l'université qui a conféré le grade.

La qualité d'impression de certaines pages peut laisser à désirer, surtout si les pages originales ont été dactylographiées à l'aide d'un ruban usé ou si l'université nous a fait parvenir une photocopie de qualité inférieure.

Les documents qui font déjà l'objet d'un droit d'auteur (articles de revue, examens publiés, etc.) ne sont pas microfilmés.

La reproduction, même partielle, de ce microfilm est soumise à la Loi canadienne sur le droit d'auteur, SRC 1970, c. C-30.

THIS DISSERTATION
HAS BEEN MICROFILMED
EXACTLY AS RECEIVED

LA THÈSE A ÉTÉ
MICROFILMÉE TELLE QUE
NOUS L'AVONS REÇUE

NL-339 (r.86/06)

Canada

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FRENCH-ENGLISH SUBCULTURAL SEGMENTATION: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSOCIATIONAL POLITICS IN QUEBEC

by

(C) CHRISTOPHER C. COOPER

A THESIS

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF

MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

EDMONTON, ALBERTA

SPRING 1987

Permission has been granted to the National Library of Canada to microfilm this thesis and to lend or sell copies of the film.

The author (copyright owner) has reserved other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without his/her written permission.

L'autorisation a été accordée à la Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de microfilmer cette thèse et de prêter ou de vendre des exemplaires du film.

L'auteur (titulaire du droit d'auteur) se réserve les autres droits de publication; ni la thèse ni de longs extraits de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés ou autrement reproduits sans son autorisation écrite.

ISBN 0-315-37680-5

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

RELEASE FORM

NAME OF AUTHOR: CHRISTOPHER C. COOPER

TITLE OF THESIS: FRENCH-ENGLISH SUBCULTURAL SEGMENTATION: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSOCIATIONAL POLITICS IN QUEBEC

DEGREE: MASTER OF ARTS

YEAR THIS DEGREE GRANTED: SPRING 1987

Permission is hereby granted to **THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA LIBRARY** to reproduce single copies of this thesis and to lend or sell such copies for private, scholarly or scientific research purposes only.

The author reserves other publication rights, and neither the thesis nor extensive extracts from it may be printed or otherwise reproduced without the author's written permission.

CHRISTOPHER C. COOPER
(Student's signature)

1104 - 625 THE WEST MALL
(Student's permanent address)

ETOBICOKE, ONTARIO

Date: 21 NOVEMBER 1986

THE UNIVERSITY OF ALBERTA

FACULTY OF GRADUATE STUDIES AND RESEARCH

The undersigned certify that they have read, and recommend to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research for acceptance, a thesis entitled FRENCH-ENGLISH SUBCULTURAL SEGMENTATION: AN ANALYSIS OF CONSOCIATIONAL POLITICS IN QUEBEC submitted by CHRISTOPHER C. COOPER in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of MASTER OF ARTS

Garth Stevenson
(Supervisor)

Ken Norrie

Gurston Dacks

Date: 14 November 1986

To my mother, my father and
Sheila, who wanted this
as much as I did

ABSTRACT

The theory of consociational democracy is primarily concerned with explaining the existence of those deviant cases of fragmented but stable societies. In its most popular manifestation, the theory emphasizes the internal conditions under which the elites in "segmented pluralist" societies make efforts, deliberate or otherwise, to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation. Two other variables have been shown to be empirically related to political stability: a society's historical political traditions and its pattern of social structure. The task of this thesis is to test the "exportability" of consociational theory by way of examining in detail the nature of these conditions in a selected society. As a response, in part, to the suggestion that consociational politics may be found at the provincial level as well as federally in Canada, the study aims to illustrate the extent to which this mechanism for conflict management has been realized in the socially segmented province of Quebec. In the main, the thesis argues that, by virtue of the economic strength and cultural dominance of English in Canada and North America, English Quebeckers have for the most part been able to obtain an effective "politics of accommodation" with the province's French majority. Relations between the subcultures are considered here in light of the institutionalization of the more salient dimensions of social

cleavage--linguistic, religious, ethnic--which has served to limit contacts, and hence strain and hostility, particularly at the mass level. What the study finds is that, in the face of escalating _Québécois_ nationalism, the accommodation declined gradually from its height in the mid-1930s to its apparent end forty years later. Coincident with this decline, however, were certain changes in the social and cultural orientations of the subgroups, changes which may very well enhance the prospects for a renewal of the French-English _entente_ in the 1980s and beyond.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

In some small measure here I wish to express my indebtedness and gratitude to those whose encouragement and assistance made possible the preparation of this thesis. First, I am deeply grateful to my supervisor, Dr. Garth Stevenson, for, among other things, contributing to my knowledge of French-English relations in Quebec and, more generally though no less importantly, to my development as a student. The manuscript has been much improved as a result of the comments and reasoned criticisms of the other members of my examination committee, Drs. Gurston Dacks and Ken Munro. I also wish to express a special word of thanks to Drs. Kenneth McRoberts and Donald Smiley of York University and Steven B. Wolinetz of Memorial University, who provided me with useful unpublished material and suggested interesting approaches for the application of consociational theory in the present context. My appreciation further extends to the interviewees and other discussants in Montreal and Toronto for the privilege of their insights; to Audrey Bell-Hiller and Alice Lau of the Department of Political Science for their kind and always thoughtful assistance during each stage of my lengthy M.A. program; and to Ann Lencz, at Rogers, Bereskin and Parr in Toronto, and Dennis Anaka and Patricia Steeves, at the Edmonton branch of Olivetti Canada, for generosity far exceeding my expectations. Finally, stimulating discussions with Ashraf Hasan, my good friend and confidant in Edmonton, provided me with a much-needed source of inspiration.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTION 1

A. Contextual Framework 2

B. Methodology 10

C. Notes 19

II. THE CONSOCIATIONAL PARADIGM 23

A. Dimensions and Characteristics 30

B. The Origins of Consociational Theory . 33

C. Conditions Conducive to Consociational Democracy 55

D. Applications to the Quebec Context ... 61

E. Notes 103

III. CONSOCIATIONALISM AS AN UNDERLYING CHARACTERISTIC OF POLITICAL CULTURE 115

A. Theoretical Perspective 115

B. Quebec's Historical Political Tradition 119

C. Demography and the Transition to Mass Politics 155

D. Notes 168

IV. CONSOCIATIONALISM AS A PATTERN OF SOCIAL STRUCTURE 174

A. Theoretical Perspective 174

B. The Quebec Case 179

i. Historical Context 181

ii. The Pattern of "Mutually Self-Satisfying, Self-Segregated Institutions" 189

C. Notes 216

Chapter Page

V. CONSOCIATIONALISM AS A PATTERN OF ELITE BEHAVIOUR 221

A. Theoretical Perspective 221

B. Quebec's Political and Economic Elite . 225

i. Socioeconomic Perspective 225

C. "Commitment to Maintaining the System" 267

D. Summary and Conclusions 307

E. Notes 318

BIBLIOGRAPHY 325

LIST OF TABLES

Table	Description	Page
1.1	Composition of the Population of Quebec by Largest Ethnic-Origin Groups, 1931-1971	15
2.1	Size of Consociational "States" by Population, Selected Years, 1931-1971	72
2.2	Composition of the Population of Quebec by Ethnic Origin, Census Years 1931-1981	86
4.1	Population of French, of Non-French and of Other Origins, Montreal, 1851 Census	193
4.2	Ethnic Composition of Montreal, 1871-1971	194
4.3	Regional Distribution of English-Speaking Quebeckers: Selected Years, 1861-1981	198
4.4	British and French Residential Segregation From Other Ethnic Groups	203
5.1	Educational Institutions Attended by Members of the 1936 Duplessis Cabinet	233
5.2	Educational Institutions Attended by Members of the 1976 Bourassa Cabinet	235
5.3	Educational Institutions Attended by Members of Quebec's Economic Elite, 1935	244
5.4	Educational Institutions Attended by Members of Quebec's Economic Elite, 1975	255

LIST OF FIGURES

Page

Description

Figure

1. Typology of Democratic Regimes 24

I. INTRODUCTION

> Deep religious and class divisions separate distinct, isolated, and self-contained population groups. Social communication across class and religious boundary lines is minimal. Each group has its own ideology and its own political organizations: political parties, labor unions, employers' associations, farmers' groups, newspapers, radio and television organizations, and schools--from kindergarten to university. Such a socially and ideologically fragmented system would appear to be highly conducive to dissension and antagonism instead of consensus and cooperation, to ideological tension and extremism instead of pragmatism and moderation, and to governmental immobilism alternating with revolutionary upsets rather than evolutionary change.[1]
>
> Arend Lijphart

Analyses of this apparent "paradox" of strong social fragmentation combined with political stability and governmental efficiency have, like Lijphart's, been confined primarily to what Kenneth D. McRae has termed the "four 'classic' cases of consociationalism among developed Western democracies, namely, the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland," which, until the late 1960s, "remained virtual *terrae incognitae* to most political scientists."[2] Since then, however, the consociational concept's normative-prescriptive and empirical implications, raised in earlier analyses,[3] have been elaborated further in studies aimed at testing the concept's *explanatory* and *predictive* dimensions. As one might expect, such studies concerned themselves with determining, in particular: how far consociational systems are the product of historical political traditions or that of deliberate contemporary design; the conditions conducive to the formation of successful patterns of institutionalized segmentation; the ways in which such patterns may in turn provide the conditions favourable to co-operation between segmental leaders; and, ultimately, the chances that such co-operation will either persist or collapse.[4] While focussing not on any one particular element, we shall, within the corpus of this thesis, endeavour to draw together these primary concerns in an attempt to determine, with reference to the nature and degree of social and political segmentation in the province of Quebec, the extent to which consociational patterns are adaptable outside the countries of origin.

A. Contextual Framework

As far as the consociational model's "exportability" is concerned it has been noted that, apart from the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland, a few of the countries known to display consociational "traits" are Luxembourg, Colombia, and Uruguay. Although Cyprus, Lebanon, Malaysia, and, to a lesser extent, Nigeria, have at one time or another been identified as "relatively successful" examples of consociational democracies, it is obvious that the first two states no longer fit this category.[5] Another notable example of an attempt to ascertain "whether consociational patterns may be successfully transplanted to other settings" is McRae's assessment of the Canadian case, which reveals that the larger (federal) political system suffers from several significant shortcomings vis-à-vis both the consociational model and other working consociational systems. To be sure, these shortcomings, he suggests, result not so much from any specific institutional arrangements as from a reluctance on the part of political leaders to relinquish or otherwise modify certain majoritarian attitudes rooted deeply in the politcal culture. Indeed, such attitudes represent for McRae the "Achilles heel of the Canadian political system," and the "damnosa hereditas of Anglo-American democracy and Lockean political theory and liberal society, though in fairness one must note [their] all too frequent appearance in other political traditions also." Still, in view of the fact that elites play a vital role in consociational systems, and given the extent to which the attitudes and behaviour of Canadian political leaders have tended to militate against the establishment and maintenance of an effective politics of accommodation--especially in response to the long-standing tensions between the English majority and the French minority--McRae concludes that the "Canadian political system, even at its best, must be viewed as a very imperfect example of consociational democracy."[6]

Concurring with McRae in his assessment of the Canadian system as an unpromising setting for consociational politics are, among others, Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz, who view the political parties in plural societies in terms of their potential to be the organized manifestations of the different segments. Here they find the consociational theory to be totally unsatisfactory as a way of dealing with politicized cleavages, arguing that political parties are not totally consistent as institutions of power or as policy-makers. Given these shortcomings, Engelmann and Schwartz contend that whereas European political scientists duly acknowledge the prominant role political parties play in the aggregation of segmental interests in fragmented societies, they (the authors) "would particularly question those who have adapted the consociational theory to Canadian politics, and in the process, downgraded or even omitted the role of political parties in the accommodation of interests at the elite level."[7] Significant among "those" analysts alluded to by Engelmann and Schwartz are S.J.R. Noel and Robert V. Presthus. In an attempt to delineate the ways in which accommodation between governmental and private (particularly interest group) elites--acting within both "nation-saving" and social resource-allocating contexts--encourages democratic stability in Canada, Presthus, for example, argues that Canada "fits nicely" into the category of consociational societies, inasmuch as its "political culture . . . is generally regarded as one of limited national integration, inspired mainly by tensions between its French- and English-Canadian segments, deep-seated regional discontinuities, and a multi-party system which tends to aggravate some of the other cleavages."[8] For his part, however, Lijphart settles on an "average" of these two views, thereby placing Canada, like Israel, in his category of "semiconsociational democracies," situated "approximately in between the centrifugal and consociational types."[9]

Notwithstanding this debate, however, it has been argued, alternatively, that, by virtue of its high degree of decentralization, the system of federalism in Canada, like that in Switzerland, for example, can have the effect of reducing, significantly, levels of inter-segmental tension by way of offering more "sites" for the resolution of differences. Indeed, likening them to the Swiss cantons, McRae observes that, in and of themselves, the Canadian provinces can provide a tangible institutional framework for the articulation and aggregation of local and regional interests. In addition to the prospects of intra-provincial reconciliation, moreover, such interests, once politicized, also may be accommodated at the federal level, or via the various mechanisms of federal-provincial and interprovincial relations.[10]

As such, arguments in favour of interpreting the consociational model (as formulated by Lijphart) in terms of the provinces' potentially accommodative atmosphere would appear to hold much promise, particularly when couched in terms of the structure of social and political segmentation in Canada. Indeed, Lijphart himself maintains that, inasmuch as it has the effect of contributing to an appreciably more homogeneous country of provinces by way of its embodiment in the federal system, segmental (read provincial) autonomy is the "strongest consociational feature of Canadian democracy."[11] Still, while this argument could be applied to most federal systems--that is, provided their constituent units approximate prevailing segmental boundaries--McRae warns that "in Canada, however, one should not assume an automatic coincidence of provincial and subcultural boundaries, and even the nature of the cleavages [linguistic, religious, ethnic, and the like] themselves deserve closer analysis than it has up to now." It bears noting, moreover, that this caveat turns on the highly valid assumption that, "in terms of value systems, life styles, and general cultural patterns, it seems likely--though we lack sufficient evidence to argue more strongly--that we would find greater differences within provinces than between them, and that interregional variations in Canada would be found to be significantly lower by most criteria than in many countries in Europe."[12]

Thus, in light of the fact that provincial boundaries have not been found to coincide fully with, say, linguistic or religious cleavages in Canada, it would appear to be more appropriate to view the provinces--excepting Quebec, as we shall see--not so much as autonomous subcultures in themselves, but primarily in terms of the possibility, however remote, that they may provide alternate "staging points" for the mobilization of subcultural interests in the event of malfunction at the federal level. On this basis, moreover, McRae asserts that even though some of them (New Brunswick in particular, and Ontario and Manitoba, whose linguistic minorities are now substantially weaker) have displayed an increasingly receptive atmosphere since the mid-1960s, the provinces have fared little better than the federal government at accommodating the interests of diverse cultural-linguistic groups. However, by virtue of the way in which province, language, and religion are linked, interrelated, and representative of the cultural hegemony of Canada's French minority, Quebec, as the immediate and obvious exception, constitutes the most promising site. This is perceived to be so, we contend, in light of the sociocultural dynamics which result from the strong English presence in Quebec. Indeed, by way of comparing Quebec province with other sites, McRae notes that "while the bargaining power of the minority in Quebec remains strong . . . that of the French-speaking linguistic minorities in the other provinces becomes significantly weaker and more precarious." Of course, this position of strength is balanced substantially by the "concentration of French-Canadian interest on Quebec [especially] during the 1960s."[13]

Of particular importance here is the fact that McRae couches his argument in terms of the post-World War I emergence, on both the federal and provincial sides, of a "tacit 'Quebec reserve' theory," which holds that:

> French-Canadian leaders played only minor roles in broad federal issues while Quebec politics remained a world apart. Such an accommodation was possible as long as Quebec life remained traditional and politically passive, but under the impact of modernization it pointed directly to the gradual separation of the two political systems.14

Moreover, the importance of the provinces--Quebec in particular--as "reserves" for the accommodation of sub-cultural interests is illustrated further by way of the parallels Herman Bakvis draws between the blocs in the Netherlands and the provinces in Canada, which, as is suggested elsewhere, have grown in influence and autonomy largely as a result of their rights and powers, their leadership, and their institutional frameworks. Significantly, Bakvis notes that: "Institutions and institutional boundaries in Canada have the effect of creating a number of linguistic minorities who feel themselves aggrieved, and of reinforcing one very large natural solidarity group (French Canadians in Quebec) who have a strong sense of grievance." Still, his treatment of the provinces runs counter to ours, particularly insofar as he claims that they "are the closest we have to the blocs or pillars of the smaller West European democracies," and that they maintain "identities [which] are now so strongly rooted that it is better to recognize them and to institutionalize them even further."[15]

Indeed, adopting as it does French-English relations within Quebec as its focal point, this thesis is, in part, a response to McRae's suggestion that patterns of social segmentation and consociational politics can be found (albeit on a limited basis) at the provincial level as well as federally. Indeed, in maintaining that further provincial studies along the same lines as Janice Staples's analysis of the evolution and subsequant erosion of consociationalism in Manitoba[16] might well be instructive, McRae writes: "The political processes and underlying public attitudes in the Manitoba case and in similar issues in other provinces deserve closer study than they have had hitherto, because whether religious and especially linguistic accommodation is possible--or impossible--at the provincial level has major implications for the future of the Canadian federation as a whole."[17] Thus to the extent that an examination of the establishment, nature, and persistence of such accommodation contributes to our understanding of the crucial relations between Canada's two main cultural-linguistic groups, it shall here be argued that, at the provincial level, only the English-speaking minority in Quebec--economically strong and reinforced by the dominance of English culture in Canada and North America--has been able to obtain a fully effective politics of accommodation. Still, as McRae notes, even this group has been made to feel "increasingly insecure in the face of escalating Quebec nationalism since 1960."[18] While New Brunswick has in recent years also adopted a style of government and politics which conforms well to consociational norms, our aim, as stated, is solely to examine the Quebec case.

B. Methodology

The first point to be noted when outlining the methodology to be employed concerns the study's time frame, which shall encapsulate the forty-year period following the rise to power of Maurice Duplessis' first Union Nationale administration in 1936. Contending here that the initial twenty-four years of this period represented the final phase in the long-established tradition in Quebec politics whereby the government and the anglophone-dominated business sector maintained a close symbiotic relationship, it bears noting that, even with Adélard Godbout's Liberal interregnum between 1939 and 1944, the Union Nationale constituted the dominant force in Quebec politics until 1960, when the party was defeated a second time by the Liberals, this time under the leadership of Jean Lesage. What passes among some observers as being perhaps the most anomalous aspect of the party's lengthy tenure, however, is the fact that despite opposition by its members to the industrialization and economic expansion envisaged by the Liberal Party under the reins of Louis-Alexandre Taschereau and his contemporary, M. Godbout, in the 1920s and 1930s, the Union Nationale, upon assuming power, adopted policies founded on an economic philosophy closely akin to the liberalism espoused by those former administrations. Here, by way of implementing a program which served effectively to repudiate the one based on social and economic reform on which his party had been elected to office ~~in~~ 1936, M. Duplessis managed startlingly to transform the Union Nationale from, in Herbert F. Quinn's words, a party of "*radical* nationalism to a party of *conservative* nationalism." As a result, the anglophone corporate elite continued to dominate the economy in open collaboration with what proved to be a party of "unrestricted 'free enterprise,'" in spite of the party's initial pledge to the electorate to "destroy '*la dictature économique*' and to bring about greater participation in and control over the Quebec economy by the French Canadian."[19] In addition, our task is to show that while this highly accommodative relationship was based in earlier times on what Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate refer to as an "acknowledged specialization of responsibilities" and a "mutual respect for the ability of the other to control affairs firmly within its particular sphere of influence,"[20] its decline began to be obvious soon after the advent of the *neo-nationalist* ideology that was to characterize Quebec's so-called *Révolution tranquille* of the 1960s. Indeed, centred not so much on French Canada as a whole as on the smaller "collectivity" of Quebec, and operationalized by a "new," more active and interventionist francophone bureaucratic elite, this ideology provided the impetus for both the deposition of the anglophone business elite from atop Quebec's economic hierarchy and, as McRoberts and Posgate suggest, the economic *rattrapage* "by [*Québécois*] themselves within exclusively [*Québécois*] institutions."[21] Finally, we associate the collapse of the traditional

English-French/business-government alliance with the end of the forty-year period under review--its apparent death knell being sounded with the election to office of the avowedly separatist Parti Québécois on 15 November 1976.

A further methodological consideration to be noted concerns the theoretical point of departure from which this study embarks upon its examination of French-English relations in Quebec. Given, as we shall see, the powers of the implicit normative assumptions underlying the conceptualization of the consociational paradigm in (1) explaining political stability in segmented systems where one would otherwise have expected instability and (2) in predicting the success of certain conditions of social structure and mass political culture in facilitating over-arching inter-elite co-operation, this study follows closely McRae's three-point categorization of the prevalent points of view on the consociational democracy theme, as suggested by the existing literature. As such, consociationalism is approached here from the standpoints of:

> 1) An underlying characteristic of the political culture arising from historical circumstances that may antedate the period of mass politics;
>
> 2) A pattern of social structure, emphasizing the degree of cultural and linguistic segmentation in the society itself; and
>
> 3) a pattern of elite behaviour and elite-mass relationships, emphasizing the processes of decion-making and inter-segmental conflict regulation.22

Hence, succeeding chapters will be concerned with applying these approaches to the Quebec context. Specifically, Chapters III, IV, and V will, each following a brief theoretical exposition, examine, respectively, the historical political circumstances in Quebec which paved the way for a tradition of inter-segmental co-operation; Quebec's pattern of institutional "self-segregation" along cultural and linguistic cleavage lines; and the extent to which these cleavage structures provide clearly defined channels for the articulation of subcultural interests within both elite-mass and inter-elite relationships. Chapter V also examines in closer detail the social and political forces which impinge upon the nature of business-government relations between Quebec's English and French elites, those who occupy positions of consequence within both corporate and public-sector institutions. Last, the chapter concludes the thesis by outlining in summary form the decline of consociational politics in Quebec--that is, from its apogee in the late 1930s and early 1940s to its collapse in the mid-Seventies--and by examining the prospects for a renewal of the "bonne entente" between the English and French subcultures, particularly in view of the potential impact on Quebec politics by new and present forces: the English-rights groups.

In this thesis the "subcultures" will be defined in two ways. First, where they are dealt with individually, they will be viewed in terms of the criterion of ethnicity. Given the general nature of pre- and especially post-War patterns of immigration, however, defining the subcultures in this manner does, as one can well imagine, produce a large number of groups. Thus given the rather limited scope of this analysis, we shall confine ourselves to a consideration of only the five most significant groups. These include the French, those of British-Isles origin (i.e., the English, Irish, Scottish, and Welsh), Jews, Italians, Germans and Poles. Accounting for the extra group here is that fact that, as Table 1.1 indicates, the Germans and the Poles alternated in fifth place during the period under review. Also of interest to note is the fact that the Jewish group, long the most significant "other" group in Quebec, fell from third to fourth place numerically between 1951 and 1961.

Second, and more generally, the subcultures will be defined in terms of their language of use, whether English or French. For here we find that while the French have always constituted the largest portion of the population in Quebec, the early non-francophone immigrant community--including Jews, German, Poles, Ukranians and Russians--integrated most fully with the Quebec anglophone community. For instance, the Jews, the most numerous pre-Depression immigrant group, came, during successive generations, overwhelmingly to adopt English as their primary language of communication. This is well illustrated by the fact that whereas only 252 out of 60,000 Jews had English as their mother tongue in 1931, the first figure had by 1971

TABLE 1.1

COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF QUEBEC BY
LARGEST ETHNIC-ORIGIN GROUPS, 1931-1971

ORIGIN	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971
French	2,270,059	2,695,032	3,327,128	4,241,354	4,759,355
British[1]	432,726	452,887	491,818	567,057	640,040
Jewish	60,087	66,277	73,019	74,677	115,990
Italian	24,845	28,051	34,165	108,552	169,655
Other[2]	86,538	89,635	129,551	267,571	342,725
TOTALS	2,874,255	3,331,882	4,055,681	5,259,211	6,027,765

[1] Includes those of English, Irish, Scottish, Welsh, and other British-Isles origins.

[2] The largest ethnic group within this category for each census year, exluding those of native-Indian heritage, was: 1931, German: 10,616; 1941, Polish: 10,036; 1951, Polish: 16,998; 1961, German: 39,457; 1971, German: 53,870.

Adapted from: Census of Canada, 1931, Vol. 2, Table 31
Census of Canada, 1941, Vol. 1, Table 33
Census of Canada, 1951, Vol. 1, Table 32
Census of Canada, 1961, Vol. 1.2, Table 35
Census of Canada, 1971, Vol. 1.3, Table 3

increased to 73,000 out of a total Jewish population of some 116,000. While essentially similar to that of their predecessors, the actions of later non-francophone immigrant arrivals to Quebec reflected much more of the sense of ambivalence and ambiguity common to such groups. For one thing, the Italians and the Greeks, for example, tended to retain their mother tongues for longer periods of time. Evidence of this can be gleaned from the fact that of the 170,000 Italians in Quebec in 1971, only 15,000 had adopted English as their mother tongue. In comparative terms, the figures for 1931 were 25,000 and 725 respectively. As well, these groups tended to establish a greater degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the anglophone community. Indeed, the Italians in particular, like the Irish to a certain degree before them, had closer social and cultural ties and a higher rate of intermarriage with the majority French community. Still, after World War II, they nevertheless tended to send their children primarily to English-language Catholic schools. This tendency was, to a large extent, indicative of these immigrants' desire to achieve a degree of upward economic mobility, and to this end their attitudes and behaviour did not differ markedly from those of the economically dominant anglophones, whose leadership on economic and political matters they tended to follow.[23]

Finally from the perspective of methodology, it is, we believe, prudent to both note and heed Bakvis's caveat that "no model should be applied uncritically to the Canadian situation,"[24] or, for that matter, to any other national or subnational situation. For his part, however, Brian Barry makes certain allusions to the effect that an indiscriminate application of models and theories--particularly those of the consociational type--to the Canadian situation preceded Bakvis's warning. Indeed, in his analysis of the "dangers" involved in both the application of consociational theory and the adoption of consociational practices, Barry notes:

> The model of "consociational democracy" is no longer regarded in Anglo-Saxon countries as a curiosity but may be in danger of being accepted too uncritically as a model for the resolution of divisions within a society. This argument is applied in particular to the cases of Canada and Northern Ireland, to suggest that the effect of attempting to introduce consociational practices might make matters worse.25

Still, it should be clear, as Robert Presthus argues, that "not every condition of consociational society nor every facet of accommodation theory will fit the Canadian milieu. Theories rarely function in this way."[26] Consequently, it is commonplace that when exploring the normative and empirical implications of particular theoretical constructs, analysts find it necessary at least to tinker with a given theory's fundamental components--the better, that is, to have them fit the situation in question. Thus, just as S.J.R. Noel recognized the need to make "certain adjustments" to the consociational model before applying it to the Canadian context,[27] so too does the undertaking of this analysis dictate subjecting the model to a certain degree of "fine tuning." By way of rendering the necessary adjustments, the following chapter takes a closer look at the concept of consociational democracy, analysing in the process its social, political, and theoretical dimensions, defining characteristics, origins, facilitating factors, and its shortcomings.

C. Notes

1. Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 1.

2. Kenneth D. McRae, "Introduction," in McRae, ed., Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), pp. 2, 3, 13. It is, here, important to note Lijphart's claim that:

> "These countries are now retreating from their high point of consociational development. They reached their apogee of sharp plural divisions and close elite co-operation in the late 1950s and have been declining since then--not, it is worth emphasizing, as a result of the failure of consociational democracy, but because consociationalism by its very success has begun to make itself superfluous."

Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 1-2.

3. See, in particular, the articles by Val R. Lorwin (pp. 147-87), Hans Daalder (188-236), and Frederick C. Engelmann (266-83) in Robert A. Dahl, Political Opposition in Western Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966). For further analyses of the socio-political segmentation in the four "classic" consociational systems, see the articles by Lorwin (pp. 33-69 and 179-206), Arend Lijphart (70-89), and Daalder (107-24) in McRae, Consociational Democracy. See also Lorwin, "Constitutionalism and Controlled Violence in the Modern State: The Case of Belgium," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Historical Association, San Francisco, 1965.

4. Other useful analyses which focus upon these concerns include Arend Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration," Canadian Journal of Political Science 4 (March 1971): 1-14; Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme: A Review Article," World Politics 26, 4 (July 1974): 604-21; and Adriano Pappalardo, "The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique," European Journal of Political Research 9 (1981): 365-90.

5. With the sole exception of Luxembourg, which "had to be omitted . . . on the pragmatic ground that it suffers from a dearth of adequate data for analysis" (p. 5), Lijphart examines the consociational traits of these countries in his

Democracy in Plural Societies, Chaps. 5 and 6 passim.

6. McRae, "Epilogue," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, pp. 300, 301. It is worth noting that McRae's conclusions stem from his analysis of "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," ibid., pp. 238-61.

7. Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz, Canadian Political Parties: Origin, Character, Impact (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1975), p. 290. For other critical views of the application of the consociational model to the Canadian context, see John Meisel, Cleavages, Parties, and Values in Canada (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1974), pp. 36-37; Brian Barry, "The Consociational Model and its Dangers," European Journal of Political Research 3, 4 (December 1975): 393-412; and Steven B. Wolinetz, "The Politics of Non-Accommodation in Canada: Misapplications of Consociational Models and Their Consequences for the Study of National Integration and Political Stability," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, London, Ontario, 1978.

8. Robert V. Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973), p. x. See also S.J.R. Noel, "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation: Interpretations of Canadian Federalism," in J. Peter Meekison, Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality 3rd ed. (Toronto: Methuen, 1971), pp. 64-83; and idem, "Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, pp. 262-68.

9. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 129 (italics added).

10. See McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, pp. 239, 240, 253. For analyses of the nature and machinery of the concept of "executive federalism," see, for instance, Donald V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Eighties, 3rd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1980), Chap. 4; and Garth Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity, rev. ed. (Toronto: Gage Publishing Limited, 1982), pp. 190-97.

11. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 124. For a general analysis of other significant consociational elements in Canada, as well as for a comparison of Switzerland and Canada in their positions as the "most decentralized of the West European and North American federal states," see ibid., pp. 119-29. See also Juan J. Linz's brief evaluation in his "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalism Against the State," in Shmuel N.

Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan, eds., *Building States and Nations: Analyses by Region* (London and Beverly Hills: Sage, 1973), pp. 92-94.

12. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, p. 240.

13. Ibid., pp. 240, 253; see also "Epilogue," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, p. 300.

14. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, p. 259.

15. Herman Bakvis, *Federalism and the Organization of Political Life: Canada in Comparative Perspective* (Kingston, Ontario: Brown and Martin, 1981), p. 83 (italics added). See also Alan C. Cairns, "The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism," Presidential Address to the Canadian Political Science Association, Fredericton, June 1977, reprinted in *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 10, 4 (December 1977): 695-725.

16. See Janice Staples, "Consociationalism at Provincial Level: The Erosion of Dualism in Manitoba, 1870-1890," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 288-99.

17. Editors note to Part IV: Applications and Illustrations: Canada, in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, p. 237.

18. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, *Consociational Demcoracy*, p. 254.

19. Herbert F. Quinn, *The Union Nationale: Quebec Nationalism From Duplessis to Levesque*, 2nd enl. ed. (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1979), pp. xiii, 77, 101 (italics added). For an interesting and highly useful collection of essays and newspaper and magazine articles which examine critically the political phenomenon that was *Duplessisme*, see Cameron Nish, ed. and trans., *Quebec in the Duplessis Era, 1935-1959: Dictatorship or Democracy?* (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970). See also Pierre Laporte, *le Vrai visage de Duplessis* (Montréal: Les Editions de l'Homme, 1960); Gérard Bergeron, *Du duplessisme à Trudeau et Bourassa* (Montréal: Parti pris, 1971); Robert Rumilly, *Maurice Duplessis et son temps*, t. I et II (Montréal: Fides, 1973); Bernard Saint-Aubin, *Duplessis et son époque* (Montréal: la Presse, "Jadis et naguère," 1979); and Gérard Boismenu, *Le duplessisme: Politique économique et rapports de force, 1944-1960* (Montréal: Presses de l'Université de Montréal, 1981).

20. Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis*, rev. ed. (Toronto: McClelland

and Stewart, 1980), p. 74. For further accounts of the closeness of this relationship, see, for instance, Conrad M. Black, *Duplessis* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1976), Chap. 18; and John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), pp. 92, 311, 546-48.

21. McRoberts and Posgate, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis*, p. 102. For an excellent analysis of the period of the "Quiet Revolution" and for a discussion of the "new ideology of the Quebec state," see ibid., Chap. 6. For first-hand accounts of the attitudes of the proponents of this ideology concerning this new, positive *Quebébécois* nationalism, see Charles Taylor, "Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia: A Case Study," *Queen's Quarterly* 72 (Spring 1965): 150-68; and Erwin C. Hargrove, "Nationality, Values, and Change: Young Elites in French Canada," *Comparative Politics* 2 (April 1970): 473-99.

22. See McRae, "Introduction," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 5-13.

23. See Michael B. Stein, "Changing Anglo-Quebecer Self-Consciousness," in Gary Caldwell and Eric Waddell, eds., *The English of Quebec: From Majority to Minority Status* (Québec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1982), p. 111; Ronald Rudin, *The Forgotten Quebecers: A History of English-Speaking Quebec, 1759-1981* (Québec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1985), p. 33; Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos and Dominique Clift, *The English Fact in Quebec*, Second Edition (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984), Chapt. 10; Jeremy Boissevain, *Les Italiens de Montréal: l'adaptation dans une société pluraliste* (Ottawa: Information Canada, 1971), Chapt. IV; and John Parisella, "Pressure Group Politics: A Case Study of the St. Léonard School Crisis," unpublished M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1972.

24. Bakvis, *Federalism and the Organization of Political Life*, p. 65.

25. Barry, "The Consociational Model and its Dangers," p. 393 (italics added). For an interesting "philological excursion" into the nature of "consociational democracy" and "elite accommodation," two concepts he considers to be "theory-laden," see Barry, "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy," *British Journal of Political Science* 5, 4 (October 1975): 477-81.

26. Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics*, p. 19.

27. See S.J.R. Noel, "Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, p. 265.

II. THE CONSOCIATIONAL PARADIGM

> Consociationalism is an alternative to majoritarian politics. . . . [The antimajoritarian "rules of the game"] explicitly legitimize politics based on communal pluralism and the attempt to strike accommodative bargains that will leave no group a winner at the expense of another. The emphasis is on peaceful communal coexistence and the maintenance of communal plural societies on a consensual basis, rather than on reduction or elimination of politically significant communal solidarities or domination of minorities by majorities.1
>
> Milton J. Esman

One type of a four-fold typology of democratic regimes--the result of a cross-tabulation of the structures of society (plural or homogeneous) and the behaviour of elites (coalescent or adversarial)--the consociational model is in essence a classificatory device based on a number of complex socio-political dimensions which may, in and of themselves, determine the potential for and maintenance of political stability. The four-fold scheme itself (see figure 1) corresponds in part to Gabriel A. Almond's typology of democratic systems; the "centrifugal" and "centripital" types, in particular, being substituted by Arend Lijphart for the "Continental European" and "Anglo-American" types, respectively, "in order to avoid any unintended geographical connotation."[2] Although we shall at present be concerned with cells A and C, preliminary definitions of the typology's fundamental elements are nonetheless in order.

FIGURE 1

TYPOLOGY OF DEMOCRATIC REGIMES

		STRUCTURE OF SOCIETY	
		Homogeneous	Plural
ELITE BEHAVIOUR	Coalescent	A Depoliticized Democracy: ("Post-Industrial" Systems) Scandinavia prior to the 1970s	C Consociational Democracy: The Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, Switzerland
	Adversarial	B Centripetal Democracy: (Almond's Anglo-American Political System's) U.S., Britain prior to the 1970s	D Centrifugal Democracy: Weimar Germany, Fourth Republic France, Italy

(Based on Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), Fig. 2, p. 106; and Steven B. Wolinetz, "The Politics of Non-Accommodation in Canada: Misapplications of Consociational Models and Their Consequences for the Study of National Integration and Political Stability," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, London, Ontario, 1978, Fig. 1, p. 3.)

First, democracy shall here be defined in terms of Robert A. Dahl's notion of a "polyarchy"--that is, societies with only some approximation to the democratic ideal. In view of the nature of this study, moreover, it bears noting a problem analysts encounter when defining consociationalism within the context of democracy in general. Here, in his attempt to ascertain the extent to which analytical distinctions are, in the existing literature, made between "consociationalism" and "democracy", Hans Daalder observes a tendency on the part of proponents of "consociational democracy" to "take democracy for granted, and only seek to specify the particular features of the consociational subtype of general democracy." For his part, Daalder recommends that "one should attempt to disentangle more clearly the properties of consociationalism on the one hand and democracy on the other," for "just as there may be democracies that are and others that are not consociational, so consociational societies need not be democratic, though some are." Hence: "There would . . . seem to exist an imperative need for comparative study--of consociational systems (democratic or not), and of democratic systems (consociational or not)--if one is to get a closer grip on the specific character of consociationalism on the one hand and democracy on the other, as a prelude to a fuller understanding of their interaction."[3]

Second, the term plural shall be used to denote those societies in which political divisions, functions, and social institutions follow or concern salient and intense lines of cleavage, whether of a linguistic, religious ideological, cultural, racial, socioeconomic, or regional nature. As such, the groups of the population bounded by these and other cleavages will be referred to as the _segments_ or _subcultures_ of a plural society. It is somewhat paradoxical, however, that, as Kenneth McRae notes, "the most fully institutionalized cleavage in terms of segmented social structures _need not_ be the cleavage of greatest salience or intensity, as we may recall from the example of Belgium in the 1960s when language differences became more intense than traditional formally institutionalized cleavages."[4]

Finally, _stability_ shall be used as a synonym for regime continuity, a term which combines ideas encountered frequently in the literature on comparative politics: system maintenance, civil order, legitimacy, and governmental effectiveness.[5]

Significantly, the four types in the typology of democratic regimes represent not only different combinations of social pluralism and elite behaviour but different degrees of political stability. As the terminology would seem to suggest, and as will be made apparent at a later stage, the _centrifugal_ type of democracy is unstable, whereas the _centripetal_ and _consociational_ types represent eminently stable regimes. Combining as it does the stabilizing features of both the centripetal and consociational types, depoliticized democracy should display the greatest level of stability. That it does not, however, is mainly the result of the destabilizing effects of opposition to the insufficiently democratic quality of this type of regime. One way in which this so-called "neodemocratic" opposition causes political instability in depoliticized democracies is by spurring the search for ways in which to reintroduce an adversarial pattern of politics, a move which would entail a shift from depoliticized to centripital democracy. Of course, such a change produces a favourable outcome when it maintains the democratic nature of the regime. Alternatively, the neodemocratic opposition may take the form of radical demands for participatory democracy, or of direct extraparliamentary action. These demands may, however, lead to the overloading of the decision-making process and to further reductions in the level of governmental effectivenes.

Based initially on the observations of a number of eminent scholars involved in analysing the major political developments at the time, the depoliticized type represents the kind of democratic regime toward which the Western democracies appeared to be moving in the early 1960s. Described by such terms as the "New Europe" and, in North American, the "New America" (or "interest-group liberalism") and the "democratic Leviathan," depoliticization denoted a trend seemingly toward a lessening of ideological and religious tensions and a simultaneous increase in coalescent decision-making. For instance, Ernst B. Haas envisioned the typical democracy of the New Europe being ruled by way of a "grand-coalition," insofar as the "clustering of affections and expectations" within separate segments of populations seemed to be "a thing of the past."[6] Comparatively speaking, the depoliticized and consociational types are similar, particularly to the extent that they meet with much the same criticisms. Yet, unlike consociational democracy, the depoliticized type lacks the justification that coalescent behaviour is indispensable in order to manage the severe cleavages of a plural society. Here Theodore Lowi condemns the trend in American democracy toward interest-group liberalism (a philosophy, favoured especially during the Kennedy Administration, which has the leading "interests" in society represented by well-placed officials and advocates in the interior processes of policy formation) for its tendency to result in "an oligopolistic situation" and in "the atrophy of institutions of popular control."[7] For his part, moreover, Dahl predicted, in 1966, that an increasingly important source of conflict in Western democracies would be the nature of the so-called democratic Leviathan. In support of this contention, he argued that "many young people, intellectuals, and academics reject the democratic Leviathan . . . because, in their view, it is not democratic enough: this new Leviathan is too remote and bureaucratized, too addicted to bargaining and compromise, too much an instrument of political elites and technicians with whom they feel slight identification."[8]

In spite of such criticisms, however, it is important to emphasize that the four-fold typology as a whole is neither a static nor a purely descriptive theoretical construct. This is well illustrated by the fact that as it links the independent variables of the plural or nonplural character of society and of elite behaviour to the dependent variable of political stability, changes in the independent variables will be seen to affect the degree of stability of the democracy under consideration. Since one of the variables in this relationship is political stability, the typology indicates which "types" are inherently more likely to persist--the centripetal and consociational regimes--and which are more likely to collapse--the centrifugal and depoliticized regimes. Indeed, the fact that the trend toward depoliticized democracy was quick to lose its appeal has been explained with reference to the inherent instability of depoliticized regimes and by empirical evidence which cites the unexpectedly slow disappearance of old cleavages and the emergence of new ones. Viewed in diagramatical terms, moreover, the horizontal movement toward the left side of the typology was stopped and reversed. As we shall see, however, the typology does possess the capacity to indicate the direction in which the unstable centrifugal type is likely to develop--that is, into consociational democracy if the conditions are favourable, and into a nondemocratic regime otherwise.

A. Dimensions and Characteristics

Significant among the theoretical dimensions of the consociational model are, as adumbrated in the preceding chapter: (1) a given society's historical political tradition of diversity and accommodation (an important underlying characteristic of its political culture); (2) the society's patterns of social structure and actions (in particular, a segmental or subcultural orientation along cleavage lines, and a raison d'être for maintaining such segmentation on, for instance, an organizational or institutional level); and, most importantly, (3) the attitudes and modes of behaviour of the society's elites (i.e., coalescent rather than adversarial). Hence, when viewed both in isolation and in terms of its importance relative to the others, as well as in light of the fact that political parties, interest groups, media of communication, schools, and voluntary associations tend to be organized along lines of segmental cleavage, each of these dimensions becomes of much significance when elucidating the crucial inter- and intra-segmental relationships characteristic of plural societies.

As such, the consociational paradigm represents a subtype of the models/theories of political stability, which are themselves classified under the general rubric of theories of political integration. Yet whereas, generally, political integration presupposes the existence of cultural homogeneity--both of which in turn are prerequisites for political stability--proponents of the consociational model, by making an explicit distinction between elite political culture and mass political culture, advance the view that political stability can be achieved and maintained in segmented societies if the leaders of the subcultures engage "voluntaristically," "rationally," and "purposively," in co-operative efforts to counteract the centrifugal tendencies of cultural fragmentation. Viewed in comparative terms, moreover, consociational theory differs from other theories of political integration--federalism, nationalism and national unification, and political development and nation-building, for example--not only in its refutation of the thesis that cultural fragmentation necesarily leads to conflict, but also in its insistence that distinct lines of cleavage among the subcultures may actually help rather than hinder their peaceful co-existence.[9]

Further, this conception of the consociational "solution" is complemented by three basic elements of administration, which, along with the key characteristic of "overarching" co-operation at the elite level--by way of what Haas refers to as a grand coalition (or "cartel") of the leaders of significant segments of the plural society--entail deviations from the principle of pure majority rule. As expounded by Lijphart, these additional elements consist of: (1) the mutual veto or "concurrent majority" rule, which serves as an additional protection of vital minority interests; (2) proportionality as the standard of political representation, civil service appointments, and allocation of public funds; and (3) a high degree of autonomy for each segment to conduct its own internal affairs. It bears noting here that these administrative characteristics are derived from Dahl's list of the six principal ways in which intersubcultural conflicts are dealt with, namely: (1) violence and repression; (2) secession or separation; (3) mutual veto; (4) autonomy; (5) proportional representation; and (6) assimilation. For his part, however, Lijphart argues that whereas the "first, second, and last of the six possibilities are outcomes predicted by the majority of theories of political integration and stability" (with "violence and repression" and "secession or separation" representing the failure of integration, while "assimilation" represents the successful integration of divergent subcultures into a common culture), the third, fourth, and fifth possibilities together characterize the consociational solution. In other words, consociational democracy aims towards guaranteeing "as much autonomy for the different subcultures as possible, overarching collaboration by the subcultural elites in which each elite group possesses a veto over crucial decisions--Calhoun's doctrine of concurrent majority rather than the majority principle--and proportional representation in decision-making bodies."[10] In light of the fact that it reduces contacts, and hence strain and hostility among the subcultures at the mass level, it has been suggested that segmental autonomy is, in particular, a vital characteristic of consociational systems.[11] Thus in accordance with its crucial import, autonomy will in this study be treated as the foremost "social" aspect of consociationalism.

B. The Origins of Consociational Theory

In identifying the intellectual origins of the concept of consociationalism, it is important to note that although the term "consociational" saw its first modern-day application in the context of David E. Apter's work on the emerging African nations,[12] its typological coining is attributed to Arend Lijphart, following from the way in which he introduced the term in his "constructive effort to refine and build onto" Almond's "classic typology of political systems, first introduced in 1956."[13]

Indeed, highly influential in the comparative analysis of democratic polities, Almond's typology is theoretically significant insofar as it establishes a relationship between political culture and social structure on the one hand and political stability on the other. Further, at the empirical level, Almond distinguishes three types of Western democractic political systems: the Anglo-American systems (exemplified by Britain and the United States), whose cultural homogeneity and "overlapping" memberships are conducive to stable and effective government; the Continental European systems (France under the Third and

Fourth Republics, postwar Italy, and Germany under the Weimar Republic), whose separate subcultures and segmentation (marked by "reinforcing" memberships) led to unstable and ineffective (immobiliste) government; and a third category consisting of Austria, Switzerland, Scandinavia, and the Low Countries. Initially, Almond's classification of the types of political systems consisted of four categories:

> . . . the Anglo-American (including some members of the Commonwealth), the Continental European (exclusive of the Scandinavian and Low Countries), the pre-industrial, or partially industrial political systems outside the European-American area, and the totalitarian political systems. This classification will not include all the political systems in existence today, but it comes close to doing so. It will serve the purpose of . . . bringing out the essential differences between these political systems.14

It is not until his later writings, however, that Almond opts for the three-fold typology of Western democracies and the criteria on which it is based. In addition to noting that Almond's subsequent terms of reference vary considerably, Lijphart points up the fact that

> despite his geographically derived terminology, Almond does not use geographical location as an additional criterion for distinguishing between the Anglo-American and Continental European types of democracy. In fact, in the same article in which he proposes the typology ["Comparative Political Systems"], he specifically rejects any regional classification because it "is based not on the properties of the political systems, but on their contiguity in space" [p. 392], which is an irrelevent criterion.15

Yet whereas Almond fails to render a detailed analysis of the countries that comprise this third category, save to say that they combine the political characteristics (i.e., stability and effectiveness) of the first category with the socio-cultural characteristics (i.e., separate subcultures and segmentation) of the second, Lijphart, in elaborating Almond's typology, labels these "deviant cases" of fragmented but stable political systems "consociational democracies."[16]

Given the fact that it packs a significant amount of additional theoretical baggage, the counter-typology put forth by Lijphart and elaborated by subsequent proponents of the theory of consociational democracy--Hans Daalder, Gerhard Lehmbruch, Val R. Lorwin, Rodney P. Stiefbold, and Jürg Steiner, for example--qualifies as a major contribution to and a firm reference point in the literature on the comparative analysis of political systems. Indeed, as Daalder has observed, an "extensive body of theoretical writing" sprang up following the first discuss~~ions of~~ the consociational democracy theme in an international environment, that being during the Brussels Congress of the International Political Science Association in September, 1976. It was here, Daalder notes, that Lijphart presented his "Typologies of Democratic Systems," and Lehmbruch gave a paper on "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies." Moreover, the appearance of these "pioneering" works were to give way quickly to what Daalder referred to less than a decade later as an "incipient school" of adherents to the theory of consociational democracy, the members of which engaged actively in citing and commenting upon each other's work. In essence, what these theorists were eventually to formulate was, according to Daalder, a model which, "against prevailing normative views, based mainly on American or British perspectives," presented a "formidable challenge to existing democractic regimes, and to widely held beliefs on the conditions of effective and stable democractic rule."[17]

For purposes of continuity, we shall, on the theoretical level, be concerned mainly with the consociational model as formulated by Lijphart. It is important to emphasize, however, that although his, in particular, has the imprimatur of such noted specialists in the field of comparative politics as Almond, James S. Coleman, and Lucien W. Pye, Lijphart's does not stand alone as a singular conceptualization of consociationalism. Indeed, inasmuch as it served to focus attention on the political processes and patterns of social structure peculiar to certain of the long neglected smaller West European democracies during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the introduction of the consociational model brought important implications to bear upon both the formation and application of comparative political theory. This in turn led to the formulation of a number of variations (primarily of a terminological nature) on the consociational democracy theme. For instance, these variations fall under such headings as "*segmented*" *pluralism*, to be distinguished from the more familar pluralism of American political literature, which is itself characterized by "overlapping" and "crosscutting" memberships; "*concordant*" *democracy*, which emphasizes the way in which elite decisions are reached by mutual agreement rather than by majority rule; "*proportional*" *democracy*, which denotes the balanced distribution of appointments and patronage amongst coalition leaders; "*contractarian*" *democracy*, which is a specific reference to the pattern of conflict regulation during the post-World War II reconstruction of the Austrian political system; the *politics of communalism*, referring to a form of "segmented pluralism," which is defined as a pattern of competitive group solidarities within the same political system, and is based on ethnic, linguistic, racial, or religious identities; and the *politics of elite accommodation*, the term initially used by Lijphart to describe the pattern of politics in the Netherlands.[18] Claiming that "consociational democracy" or "consociationalism" are perhaps the most convenient generic terms with which to describe the phenomenon of fragmented but stable democracies, McRae argues that the significance of these variations in terminology is not to be discounted:

> Far from being simply exchangeable synonyms, they have different overtones and resonances. They call attention to the fact that different analysts have emphasized different aspects of the political

> systems of the countries concerned, and in this way they constitute a first step towards more systematic distinctions.19

To begin with, the consociational model originates from similar propositions of pluralist theory--that is, the "overlapping memberships" proposition formulated by Arthur F. Bently and David B. Truman, and the "crosscutting cleavages" proposition of Seymour Martin Lipset--which hold that social cleavages are moderated if different cleavages crosscut or overlap, but become conflict-laden if they cumulatively reinforce one another.[20] Overlapping memberships and crosscutting cleavages are, on this basis, seen as being characteristic of homogeneous political cultures, whereas reinforcing cleavages (i.e., no overlapping between distinct subcultures) are indicative of systems with fragmented political cultures.

Their parenthetical presentation here notwithstanding, Almond makes two important points regarding the concept of political culture in general. First, since patterns of orientation to politics and concomitant political action may, and usually do, extend beyond the boundaries of political systems, political culture, Almond claims, does not coincide with a given political system or, for that matter, society. Second, although it is related to it, "political culture" is not synonymous with the "general culture." Indeed, owing to the fact that it "involves cognition, intellection, and adaptation to external situations, as well as the standards and values of the general culture," political orientation (i.e., political culture) is an autonomous and differentiated part of the general culture. The utility of the concept of political culture and its meaning, furthermore, are perhaps best conveyed by way of a comparative-empirical illustration. Here Almond argues that the United States, Britain, and several of the Old Commonwealth countries have a common political culture, but represent separate and different kinds of political systems. At the same time, he maintains that while they constitute individual political systems, Continental West European states include several different political cultures which extend beyond national borders. "In other words," Almond states, "they are political systems with fragmented political cultures."[21]

Viewed in the context of this comparision of political cultures, then, the above propositions of pluralist theory maintain, specifically, that in systems displaying patterns of overlapping memberships and crosscutting cleavages, the psychological cross-pressures which result from an individual's memberships in different groups with diverse interests and outlooks leads to moderate, middle-of-the-road attitudes. Moreover, in these systems (exemplified by Almond's Anglo-American "type," which is characterized by a "homogeneous, secular political culture" and a "highly differentiated" role structure, in which governmental agencies, political parties, interest groups, and the media of communication perform specialized functions and are autonomous, although (interdependent), cross-pressures operate not only at the mass level but at the elite level as well--that is, as Lijphart notes, providing the "leaders of social groups with heterogeneous and overlapping memberships . . . find it necessary to adopt moderate positions."[22] Thus, given the fact that such moderation is essential to political stability, Lipset argues that "the chances for stable democracy are enhanced to the extent that groups and individuals have a number of crosscutting, politically relevant affiliations."[23]

Conversely, in systems rent by sharp, reinforcing cleavages--that is, systems characterized by what Almond refers to as a "fragmentation of political culture" involving separate "political subcultures," within which roles are "embedded in the subcultures and tend to constitute separate subsystems of roles"[24]--the cross-pressures that are vital to political moderation and stability will be absent. Exemplified by Almond's Continental European type, these systems, like the Anglo-American, point up the empirical relationship that exists between political culture and social structure insofar as the achievement of political stability is concerned. It has been suggested here that the fragmented political cultures and poorly differentiated role structures of the Continental European systems make for an ideological style of politics, an erosion of democratic legitimacy and stability, immobilism in policy making, "the 'ever-present threat of what is often called the "Caeseristic" breakthrough' [movements of charismatic nationalism which "break through" the boundaries of the political subcultures and overcome immobilism through coercive action and organization], and even a lapse into totalitarianism as a result of this immobilism."[25] In such an extreme form, the hardening of cleavage lines also is likely to lead to the outbreak of civil war, as was indeed the case of the Austrian Lager (camps or subcultures) in 1934, which paved the way for the annexation by Nazi Germany in 1938.[26] Thus the ability of complex societies to avoid revolution, degeneration, and decay and thereby maintain their stability may, as Truman believes, result "in large measure because of the fact of multiple memberships."[27]

Although the subject will be pursued in greater detail in Chapter III, it is worthwhile noting here that at least up until the 1960s, "group life" in Quebec was characterized by the marked absence of the moderating cross-pressures which result from multiple memberships, particularly, it seems, because of the influence of traditional elitist conceptions of leadership on the cultural attitudes of members of the French-Canadian subculture. Indeed, as Presthus argues, the inculcation of deferential attitudes in French Canada, which were considerably strengthened by the continuity and cohesion among the major agents of socialization--the Church, state, and family--created a "cultural exclusiveness" which, in turn, tempered group life. Thus it was that, "as with most fragmented political cultures, group memberships tend[ed] to be concentrated within the French subculture, thereby exacerbating the cleavege between French- and English-Canada by obviating any moderating effect that overlapping might bring."[28] Further, Presthus maintains that English-Canadian conceptions of leadership were similarly characterized by somewhat of a spontaneous acceptance of authority and hierarchy by rank-and-file members of society. Such conceptions were, he notes, "likely to be affected by British societal models, including what has been called 'The Old Tory Theory of Authority: the tendency both in British government and British voluntary associations to delegate inordinately wide powers to leaders almost as a matter of form, which affords such leaders a wide range of manoeuvre when they come face to face in negotiation.'"[29] Hence, the implications of these conditions for the process of elite accommodation, he claims, are patent.

While the Anglo-American and Continental European political systems clearly are of importance as far as the formulation of theory and the comparative-empirical analysis undertaken by the consociationalists is concerned, it is with Almond's imprecisely-defined third category that they are primarily interested. By and large, the former systems are seen to be significant to the extent that their distinctive characteristics combine to give substance to the third type, which in Almond's typology is insufficiently delineated. As noted earlier, Almond goes merely so far as to claim that the third category displays the political stability of the Anglo-American systems and the segmented social structure of the Continental European systems and thus stands somewhere "in between" the two. Still, it has been argued that the inadequate attention afforded the third type represents "the only major weakness in Almond's otherwise theoretically rich, well-integrated, and economically formulated typology. . . ."[30] Here Almond excludes the smaller European polities--particularly the Scandinavian nations and the Low Countries--from the category of Continental European democracies, while Switzerland and Austria go unmentioned. He does, to be sure, subsequently set up the "in between" category for Scandinavia and the Low Countries, but it is not until his later writings that Almond specifies more fully the ways in which this third type of political system differs from the other two.[31] Presently, this distinction will become apparent when we consider the number of parties at work within the different political systems and the extent to which these parties are successful at aggregating and articulating the interests of their constituencies, given prevailing patterns of political culture and social structure.

Of particular note here is the fact that, in addition to being linked with the overlapping memberships theories, Almond's typology converges with the so-called traditional dichotomous classification of democratic polities according to the number of parties operating in the system--that is, the two-party versus multiparty systems typology. To begin with, it has been asserted that this typology is commonly used to distinguish not only between party systems but between political systems as well, a fact which is borne out by Sigmund Neumann's claim that

> these different party systems have far-reaching consequences for the voting process and even more so for governmental decision-making. . . . A classification along this line [according to the number of parties], therefore, proves to be quite suggestive and essential.[32]

Similarly, Maurice Duverger concludes that "the distinction between single-party, two-party, and multiparty systems tends to become the fundamental mode of classifying contemporary regimes."[33] Further--and more importantly--the proponents of this classification maintain that there exists a close relationship between the number of parties in a political system and the system's democratic stability. In this regard, Duverger argues that not only do two-party systems "seem to correspond to the nature of things" (owing to their accurate reflection of the natural duality of public opinion), but, because they are moderate in nature, they tend to be more stable than multiparty systems. Moreover, Duverger notes that while the demagogy of parties in a two-party system is curtailed by way of a "decrease in the extent of political divisions," politics in multiparty systems are characterized by a "general 'extremization' of opinion," which results from an "aggravation of political divisions and the intensification of differences."[34] Likewise, Neumann argues that, unlike a two-party system, a multiparty system "does not hold great promise of effective policy formation" because it lacks a "unifying and centralizing order."[35]

For his part, Almond uses a measure of the extent of their success in performing the interest aggregation function as a test of the viability of the different political systems. Indeed, viewing it as the primary and distinguishing function of political parties in modern developed democracies, Almond situates interest aggregation in what he refers to as the "middle range of processing" (in between the input and output stages), as its task is to transform articulated interests "into a relatively small number of alternatives." Yet, although the two-party systems appear on the surface to be ideally suited to carrying out this task, while multiparty systems appear to be less efficient aggregators, Almond's initial reaction was to dismiss any idea of a congruence between his Anglo-American type and two-party systems and his Continental European type and multiparty systems. As he saw it:

> The commonly used distinction between one-party, two-party, and multi-party systems simply get nowhere in distinguishing the essential properties of the totalitarian, the AngloAmerican, and the Continental European systems. For the structure we call party in the totalitarian system is not a

> party at all; the two parties of the Anglo-American system are organized manifestations of a homogeneous political culture; and the multi-parties of Continental European systems in some cases are and in some cases are not the organized manifestations of different political cultures.36

Subsequently, however, Almond acknowledges (albeit implicitly) the congruence between that part of his typology which deals with democratic systems and the typology based on the number of parties. Here he agrees that:

> . . . Some party systems aggregate interests much more effectively than others. The _number of parties_ is a factor of importance. Two-party systems which are responsible to a broad electorate are usually forced toward aggregative policies. . . [whereas] the presence of a large number of fairly small parties makes it increasingly likely that each party will merely transmit the interests of a special subculture or clientele with a minimum of aggregation.37

Still, the nature of the cleavage structures in some societies makes difficult or otherwise pre-empts the aggregation of segmental interests at the party level, regardless of the number of parties operating within the system. For instance, in Canada, as Lijphart notes, education and the media of communication are, owing to their high degree of pluralism, "obvious candidates for linguistically separate organization." That education is a provincial responsibility, moreover, "points up the significant fact that the Canadian linguistic cleavage is mainly institutionalized by the federal system, as in Belgium after 1970 and in Switzerland."[38] Thus, as John

Meisel argues, the structure of Canadian federalism, as well as the relative salience of the cleavages within the system itself, tends toward negating the aggregation function properly performed by political parties and interest organizations. Indeed:

> Canada's most serious cleavage by far, that between the French and English cultures, although spilling over provincial boundaries, has very largely (but not entirely) become a matter for provincial-federal and inter-provincial negotiations in which the government of Quebec, of whatever stripe, speaks most loudly for the interests of French Canada. Canada's primary cleavage is thus institutionalized to a very high degree outside the party system or, at best, in a manner only indirectly related to it.39

Finally, Almond makes known his desire that the aggregation structures be differentiated from both the decision-making and interest articulation structures. In terms of the general role played by parties, moreover, Almond argues that not only do those in the competitive two-party systems perhaps most easily secure and maintain this differentiation, they also possess the potential to perform effective interest aggregation and to contribute to the condition he calls "proper boundary maintenance"--two functions which are both directly related to democratic stability and characteristic of the Anglo-American type of democracy.

At this juncture, Almond's scheme converges with the separation-of-powers doctrine formulated by the authors of the Federalist Papers; a doctrine which, in Lijphart's words, "is also concerned with democratic stability--particularly with the probability that an initially democratic regime will maintain its true democratic nature." Moreover, Lijphart notes that this connection between the separation-of-powers theory and Almond's functional approach is particularly important when viewed in the context of political stability, "because one of the criteria distinguishing Almond's Anglo-American and Continental European types is role structure: the degree to which the roles are autonomous--or _separate_."[40]

This distinction is perhaps best illustrated when one considers the differences between the separation-of-powers doctrine and Almond's scheme. First, in his approach, Almond applies the idea of separation of powers not only to the three formal branches of government (the executive, legislative, and judicial), but extends it to the informal political substructures (the parties, interest groups, and media of communication), and he places much more emphasis on the latter (the input structures) than he does on the former (the output structures). Second, from a terminological perspective, Almond translates powers into functions. Consequently, separation becomes boundary maintenance, and both separation of powers, according to the _Federalist Papers_, and proper boundary maintenance _between political functions_ may, on a theoretical level at least, be seen to contribute to the stability of democratic systems.

For his part, Lijphart undertakes to apply Almond's formulation at the empirical level. Adopting Almond's terminology in his comparative examination of democratic systems, Lijphart finds that in Britain, representative of the Anglo-American type, there is "*effective* boundary maintenance . . . among the subsystems of the polity," while in France, a prime example of the Continental European type, he found "poor boundary maintenance . . . among the various parts of the political system." By way of accounting for this difference, Lijphart observed further that the political system in France, unlike that in Britain, is comprised of parties and interest groups which "do not constitute *differentiated*, *autonomous* political subsystems. They *interpenetrate* one another," especially, it would seem, within the Catholic, socialist, and communist subcultures. A further distinction to be made between the Anglo-American and Continental European systems relates to the degree of autonomy enjoyed by their respective media of communication. Here Lijphart finds that the United States, Britain, and the Old Commonwealth nations have "to the greatest extent autonomous and differentiated media of communication," whereas France and Italy "have a 'press' which tends to be dominated by interest groups and political parties."[41]

As far as the third type of political systems is concerned--that is, the category comprised of the smaller European democracies which, as Lijphart notes, also happen to be those states "largely forgotten in the post-World War II shift in scholarly attention from the major European nations to non-Western areas"--Lijphart argues that its existence calls into question the previously hypothesized congruence "between the Continental European and multiparty type and democratic stability."[42] Indeed, it was just such doubtfulness that caused one observer--while claiming that the only "irrefutable argument in favor of the two-party system" is that "it has the great merit of focusing responsibility"--to reject the notion that "multipartism breeds instability and is the parent of governmental weakness," citing Switzerland and Scandinavia, both of which are multiparty systems, as examples of the world's most stable democracies.[43] Given, therefore, that the highly competitive parties in two-party systems like the Anglo-American democracies are capable of giving rise to a large measure of political stability by way of contributing to both effective interest aggregation and boundary maintenance between political functions, and that the presence of a large number of small parties in multiparty systems such as the Continental European polities is primarily conducive to a minimum of aggregation and poor substructural differentiation and, hence, instability, how is one to account for the apparent stability of the third type when, as Lijphart observes, its systems generally display both "considerable interpenetration of parties, interest groups, and the media of communication" and a level of subsystem autonomy as limited as that in the Continental European systems?[44]

In attempting to deal with this question, Almond, for example, distinguishes, albeit somewhat tentatively, between the so-called "crisis" or "immobilist" multiparty systems of France and Italy and the "working" multiparty systems of Scandinavia and the Low Countries. That the latter are termed working multiparty systems is, according to Almond, indicative of the fact that some, though not all, of the parties--the Scandinavian Socialist parties and the Belgian Socialist and Catholic parties, for instance--appear to be broadly aggregative.[45] Still, as Lijphart argues, this criterion (the extent of aggregation) does not distinguish satisfactorily between the working multiparty systems and the crisis/immobilist systems. Here he states that, "if one calls the Belgian Catholic party broadly aggregative, the Italian Christian Democrats surely also have to be regarded as such. On the other hand, none of the Dutch and Swiss parties can be called broadly aggregative."[46] Significantly, the basic difference between these two interpretations lies in the fact that instead of using the extent of aggregation performed by political parties as the operational indicator of the degree of subsystem autonomy, as Almond does, Lijphart finds it more useful to examine both the system's role structure and political culture dirctly. In doing so Lijphart found first that, as alluded to earlier, the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Austria, among the so-called "in between" democracies, maintain a level of subsystem autonomy at least as limited as that in the Continental European systems, whereas the Scandinavian states, like the Anglo-American countries, display a high degree of subsystem autonomy.

Moreover, Lijphart's examination of the second criterion for distinguishing between the working multiparty systems and the immobilist systems--political culture--yields a similar set of conclusions as well as evidence of further inaccuracies in Almond's typology. Here Lijphart points out that Almond errs in his initial inclusion of Scandinavia in the category of countries whose socio-cultural make-up is characterized by separate subcultures and segmentation. To be sure, Almond does at a later stage note that the political culture in Scandinavia and the Low Countries is "more homogeneous and fusional of secular and traditional elements"[47] than in the Continental European systems, and later still he and Sidney Verba mention the Scandinavian nations together with England, the United States, and the Old Commonwealth countries as having "homogeneous political cultures."[48] Still, although Lijphart agrees that this is clearly true for the Scandinavian countries, he nonetheless argues that "a homogeneous political culture is not at all characteristic either of the working multiparty systems in Switzerland and the Low Countries or of the two-party Austrian system." The Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal _familles spirituelles_ (spiritual families) of Belgium and Luxembourg, the Catholic, Calvinist, Socialist, and Liberal _zuilen_ (pillars or vertical groupings) of the Netherlands, and the Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal-National Lager (camps) of Austria--these are, Lijphart notes, subcultures which are "quite similar to the subcultures characteristic of Almond's Continental European type." These subcultures belong, moreover, to countries with "even more thoroughly fragmented political cultures than France, Italy, or Weimar Germany, with a solid network of interpenetrating groups and communications media within each subculture and with even less flexibility and overlapping membership between different subcultures."[49]

Thus based on his analysis of the two criteria of role structure and political culture, Lijphart reduces Almond's typology from a three-fold to a dichotomous formulation. Consequently, Lijphart classifies the Western democracies into broad but clearly defined categories in which, on the one hand, the Scandinavian nations are grouped with the Anglo-American and Old Commonwealth countries while, on the other hand, the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Austria fall into the category of "other" European democracies, which includes France, Italy, and Weimar Germany.

In the end, however, Lijphart is forced to conclude that a system's political stability cannot be predicted solely on the basis of the two variables of role structure and political culture. He is, for the most part, drawn to this conclusion out of a belief that the second category of the above two-fold typology has become too broad, especially insofar as it comprises both highly stable systems, such as Switzerland and Holland, and such highly unstable systems as Weimar Germany and the French Third and Fourth Republics. Lijphart attempts to rationalize this view with reference to the theory of crosscutting cleavages, the propositions of which would in this instance lead one to expect the Low Countries, Switzerland, and Austria, with subcultures divided one from the other by mutually reinforcing cleavages, to exhibit a high degree of political immobilism and instability. The fact that they do not, however, has, as noted earlier, led Lijphart to both label these "deviant" cases of fragmented but stable democracies "consociational democracies," and to employ deviant case analysis in search of additional relevant variables to account for the stability of these democracies. In this particular case he cites as a third explanatory variable the behaviour of political elites--that is, co-operation by the leaders of the different groups which transcends segmental or subcultural cleavages at the mass level. To be sure, the leaders of rival subcultures may engage in the kind of competitive behaviour which serves only to aggravate mutual tensions and political instability. Lijphart, however, is optimistic that such leaders "may also make _deliberate efforts to counteract the immobilizing and unstabilizing effects of cultural fragmentation_."[50] Thus it is that by way of such overarching co-operation at the elite level, a country can, according to Claude Ake, "achieve a degree of political stability quite out of proportion to its social homogeneity."[51]

C. Conditions Conducive to Consociational Democracy

Judged in terms of the foregoing, consociational democracies are, in the main, considered to be those plural or deeply fragmented societies in which elite co-operation--coalescent and concordant rather than competitive behaviour--is chiefly responsible for counteracting the centrifugal tendencies taken to be part and parcel of segmented societies. Although we shall in this study view it as but one of three main elements,[52] there is general agreement within the consociational democracy "school" that the essential characteristic of consociationalism is not so much any particular institutional arrangement as joint and deliberate responses on the part of segmental leaders to the actual or potential instability of the system. In order, then, to work out and implement overarching, conflict-regulating compromises, and thereby turn states with tendencies toward immobilism and instability into more stable systems, elites must possess certain key behavioural attributes, which include the ability to recognize the dangers inherent in social and political fragmentation. Further, it is argued that the extent to which a given set of elites possesses such an awareness is dependent upon their degree of commitment to maintaining the system; a commitment which, one assumes, is in large measure based on a vested interest in preserving the existing political and social order--i.e., power and influence for the elites in a plural society characterized ideally by a high level of institutional segmentation and a clearly defined structure of cleavages--within an atmosphere marked by mutual understanding and the absence of segmental strife. This in turn places the onus upon the elites of the rival groups to somehow transcend subcultural cleavages so as to forge a working relationship, the aim of which is to develop appropriate solutions for accommodating the divergent demands and interests of their respective groups of followers.[53]

More specifically, if consociational democracy is to succeed elites must, first, make themselves aware of the deleterious effects caused by subcultural cleavages within the system. Indeed, to the extent that applications of consociationalism are facilitated at later critical periods, the acquiring of such an awareness is at no time more important than at the crucial stages of the initial establishment of consociational practices. Of course, it is, empirically speaking, easier to assess the probability of continued success of a fully established consociational democracy than it is to predict the chance of success that a fragmented system would have were it to attempt consociationalism. An examination of the institutional arrangements and the operational code of inter-elite accommodation in existing consociational democracies, for example, can reveal the level of commitment to co-operation they represent, as well as how effective they have been in solving the problems caused by fragmentation. Once the precedent has been set and consociational methods become firmly established in systems adopting these methods for the first time, however, inter-elite co-operation becomes habitual, in the sense that it no longer represents a deliberate departure from prior competitive responses to political challenges. As will become apparent in the following chapter, the retransmission of consociational norms may, according to Lehmbruch, constitute an important part of the "political socialization of elites," especially as such norms "acquire a strong degree of persistence through time."[54]

Second, elites must display a willingness to engage in concerted efforts aimed at impeding and reversing the system's disintegrative tendencies, thereby increasing its level of stability. A high degree of inter-elite solidarity is not, to be sure, a necessary prerequisite for the application of democratic norms and institutions to the relations between antagonistic groups. Yet without at least a minimum commitment to system maintenance, elites are not likely even to attempt to redress segmental differences, much less adopt consociational modes of behaviour.

Third, in order to transform the preceding behavioural preconditions into effective consociational action, elites must endeavour to establish contacts and patterns of communication across cleavage lines. In order to do so, the leaders must possess the ability to break through the barriers to mutual understanding--at least at the elite level--which result from strong subcultural differences. In the event that shared antagonisms prove insurmountable at both the mass and the elite levels, however, attempts at establishing consociational practices are likely to meet with failure.

The last of these preconditions concerns the ability of the elites to develop both institutional arrangements and "rules of the game" for the accommodation of subcultural differences. This precondition is not only perhaps the most important of the four, it is also the most difficult to satisfy inasmuch as certain consociational solutions may produce undesirable side effects. It will be remembered that *proportionality* and the *mutual veto*, for example, are two of the basic elements of consociational administration. As a prevalent rule of the game, proportionality can be instrumental in solving the problems often associated with the making of government appointments and with the allocation of resources among the subcultures. Still, basing patterns of recruitment to the civil service on one's membership in a particular subculture rather than on the criterion of individual talent may tend to compromise administrative efficiency. An even more serious problem is inherent in the second rule--the mutual veto or "concurrent majority" rule--which serves ordinarily to induce the leading members of the different subcultures to participate in grand coalitions. If it is not handled with the utmost care and restraint, however, this rule is likely to produce the very immobilism and instability that consociational practices are designed to avoid.

It is indicative of the crucial nature of leadership in consociational democracies that each of these four prerequisites deals, to a greater or lesser extent, with the attitudes and behaviour of elites. As such, consociational theory mollifies Stanley Hoffmann's complaint that "efforts at theory have produced a glut of typologies and models of political systems, often at a level of abstraction that squeezes out the role and impact of political leaders."[55] As noted earlier, the concept of consociational democracy emphasizes the role of the elite in an attempt to explain the achievement of political stability in systems displaying centrifugal tendencies. Yet, while the explanatory power of the consociational type of democracy is quite considerable, its predictive power is much less so, primarily as a result of the fact that elite behaviour, owing to its somewhat secretive nature, is more elusive and therefore less susceptible to empirical generalization than mass phenomena. It has been noted that it is more difficult to predict whether an unstable democracy can or will become more stable by way of the adoption of consociational practices than it is to predict the continued success of an established consociational democracy. This is so, we conclude, because the achievement of stability in the first case would entail a deliberate change in elite behaviour.

Still, an increase in the predictive power of the consociational type becomes evident when we broaden our frame of reference to include those conditions of social structure and mass political culture which conduce to consociational democracy--that is, in the sense that they pave the way for the establishment of overarching inter-elite co-operation. Thus based on the parameters of consociational democracy as defined in this study, such conditions may be seen to govern not only inter-subcultural relations at the elite level but inter-subcultural relations at the mass level and elite-mass relations within each subculture as well. An overview of the existing literature, which examines the most striking institutional features and modes of individual and group behaviour of the so-called classic cases of consociational democracy--the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland--reveals that the list of favourable conditions includes: (1) a relatively low total load on the system; (2) the existence of external threats to the system; (3) a multiple balance of power among the subcultures; (4) distinct lines of cleavage between the subcultures; (5) a moderate level of national attachment; and (6) popular approval of the principle of government by elite cartel. Having identified these conditions it becomes apparent that certain hypotheses and alternative criteria can be formulated for evaluating the chances for, and explaining the achievement of, stability in other segmented, polarized, and divided societies. It is perhaps inevitable, moreover, that since the consociational model serves first and foremost as an empirical explanation of political stability in a set of small European democracies, its weaknesses, both real and alleged, will be made manifest when consociationalism is applied as a normative example to plural societies elsewhere in the world.

D. Applications to the Quebec Context

Although the suggestion that Canada as a whole is representative of a consociational democracy has, in the past, gained some currency, few scholars presently are of the opinion that the Canadian political system can satisfactorily be characterized by the general criteria which define consociational systems. With reference to the work done by McRae, for example, it has been established that, in Canada, an important structural (as distinct from institutional or behavioural) precondition, namely, the sufficient coincidence of subcultural and provincial boundaries, fails to obtain. According to Lijphart, an ideal situation occurs when the subcultures are geographically concentrated. Here, he notes, "a federal pattern of government in which the internal political boundaries coincide with the subcultural cleavages can be an eminently suitable consociational device." Given such a situation, moreover, "the central government is then the site for the overarching accommodation among the elites of the different subcultures."[56] In a similar vein, Michael B. Stein argues that, "if ethnic and linguistic differences are present [in polyethnic and multilingual federalisms] . . . the political leaders of the distinctive communities will "bargain" for sufficient autonomy for themselves and their followers to prevent the establishment of a system more centralized than a federal union."[57]

The problem, according to McRae, stems largely from the fact that the primary lines of segmentation in Canada are distorted by "the reinforcing but not completely overlapping effects of province, language, and religion."[58] When such lines of cleavage are identified with any precision, however, one may find that there are, among other things, greater differences within the provinces than between them. As such, a strong basis exists upon which to criticize applications of the consociational model to the Canadian system--particularly those which assume an automatic coincidence between subcultural and provincial or regional boundaries. Indeed, this is the perspective from which we approach Noel's view, which holds that "the term 'subculture' could be interpreted in a number of ways--it could be taken, for example, to refer to English Canada and French Canada, or to a number of distinct regions such as the Maritimes, Quebec, Ontario, and the West--but most usefully as 'province'".[59] Yet while we disagree with the basic thrust of Noel's argument, it should be emphasized that we reject only that part of his analysis in which he substitutes provinces and regions for subcultures in the consociational model.

From a comparative perspective, McRae, for his part, finds it "difficult to see the ten provinces--or even the four or five regions of Canada--as distinctive _familles spirituelles_ or _Weltanschauungsgruppen_ analogous to the European _zuilen_ or _Lager_, that is, as blocs embodying distinctive, enduring, and possibly clashing value systems."[60] Likewise, Steven B. Wolinetz is unequivocal in his belief that

> [the] provinces are not the eqivalents of subcultures. Though, to be sure, there are pronounced regional variations across Canada, Canadian provinces . . . are neither as culturally distinct nor as antagonistic as the religious or linguistic subcultures in segmented societies like the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria, or Switzerland.61

Still, to the extent that they are partially autonomous political units, and despite the fact that they have for the most part fared little better than the larger federal level at conforming to consociational norms, the provinces may be seen to offer a convenient forum for the expression and accommodation of segmental differences. Nowhere is this more evident than in Quebec, the province both McRae and Wolinetz exempt from their critiques, and single out as being perhaps the most viable site within which to undertake such accommodation. Thus given the concentration within its borders of the culturally distinct and historically antagonistic English- and French-speaking subcultures--whose demographic relationship represents a dramatic reversal of the Canadian norm--it is our belief that the province of Quebec constitutes a better, more ideal case than is Canada in which to apply consociational analysis.

Prior to examining the socio-cultural elements which make Quebec, in our estimation a suitable case for consociational analysis, it is important to consider certain characteristics peculiar to Quebec politics, particularly in light of the province's unique position within the Canadian federal system. For instance, it bears noting here that while it clearly is not a sovereign entity in the same sense as the recognized consociational democracies, Quebec is, as one of the provinces within the Canadian federation, almost "semisovereign." While the powers of all the provinces have increased steadily since the 1950s, what distinguishes Quebec from the others is the extent to which the processes of politicization and statism, part and parcel of the modernization of political life in the province, have centred upon the provincial rather than the federal level as the principal locus of decision-making power. Indeed, as McRoberts and Posgate have argued:

> The politicization of Québécois has involved a concern with politics primarily within Quebec, as opposed to the larger Canadian political system. The new statism has secured for the Quebec government a greater range of powers and resources

> than is exploited by any other provincial government; it has also led to demands for a much more powerful Quebec state.62

Yet while Quebec may possess the economic and social capacity to break with the Canadian federation, it lacks the collective will to do so, in spite of both the deeply rooted sense of national identification shared by the province's francophone element and the péquistes' openly avowed objective of some form of "sovereignty-association" within the Canadian federal context, if not outright independence. Still, despite the fact that a good number of Quebeckers are disposed to maintaining the federal order in its present form, the francophone identity has in large measure retained its meaning and significance. This is seen to be true to the extent that the French-Canadian collectivity remains preoccupied with its long-standing tradition of cultural defense and preservation; a preoccupation fuelled, moreover, by the belief held by many francophones that theirs is a conquered nation, and maintained in spite of the fact that, as Wolinetz notes, "many [English] Canadians regard Quebec as a co-equal partner in a bilingual and bi-cultural confederation." Although Quebec may indeed have entered Confederation as "an equal or near-equal partner, over time, francophones [particularly members of those groups residing outside Quebec] have ended up in . . . subordinate position[s]"[63] vis-à-vis English Canadians. Consequently, as Lijphart has observed, francophones have tended more recently to interpret such federal policies as "multiculturalism"--announced in 1971 as an attempt to pay greater attention to the cultural interests of Canadians of neither British nor French extraction--more as potential dangers "to the status of French as one of the two dominant languages and cultures than as . . . welcome move[s] towards a multiple balance of power."[64]

Such a state of affairs has, however, served to make the francophone identity more meaningful. Historically, deficiencies in the level of accommodation engaged in by the federal government and its other provincial counterparts have instilled in the collective psyche a "fortress mentality,"[65] by way of which francophones rationalize their view of Quebec--especially its clerical institutions--as the sole protector and preserver of the distinct French language and culture against the ever-present threat of assimilation into an English-Canadian nation. It is by way of alluding to this and other threats to the French-Canadian heritage that McRae writes: ". . . if the image of a famille spirituelle can no longer do justice to Quebec's diversity, the image of a Lager, a defensive complex in a hostile environment, is not inappropriate."[66] Moreover, the persistence of the francophone identity through to contemporary times has, in the words of McRoberts and Posgate, meant that

> when Quebec Francophones seek to resolve their grievances through political processes, they will look to governmental institutions manned by fellow francophones, the Government of Quebec, just as in

> the distant past they looked to the institutions of the Church. More fundamentally, . . the persistence of the Francophone identity means that many of the demands that Québécois will be led to make on government can be better dealt with by the Government of Quebec, than by the Government of Canada.67

Thus having established that the traditional orientation of French-Canadian interests has tended considerably more towards the Quebec government than to the federal government, it follows almost naturally that one should ask: In what direction has Quebec's anglophone population turned in order to have its grievances redressed and its demands met? More generally, by what means has it managed to survive in a predominantly French-speaking enclave, whose majority element has for the most part regarded the anglophone presence with a level of hostility equal to, if not actually exceeding, that met by their francophone concitoyennes in the English-speaking provinces?

Given the strength of their former and continued presence in the social and business communities of Montreal and the so-called Eastern Townships--a presence reinforced, then as now, by the cultural and economic hegemony of English in Canada as a whole--one may safely assume at the outset that Quebec anglophones have, over time, been able to look with relative ease to either Quebec City or Ottawa to have their particular interests accommodated. This assumption may be seen to hold true when we consider that the historical basis of this accommodation rests not merely on the presence of anglophones in the province's principal commercial centres but, more importantly, on their erstwhile control of the Quebec economy. In fact, "in the decades after Confederation," as Garth Stevenson has written, "the Montreal-based and predominantly anglophone bourgeoisie dominated not only the Quebec economy but the entire Canadian economy." With its financial, industrial, railway, and shipping interests and activities under federal jurisdiction, moreover, this bourgeoisie "was strong enough to survive and indeed to benefit from the tendency toward concentration, centralization, and monopoly that characterized the Canadian economy in the early decades of the twentieth century."[68] It is largely on this basis, then, that the anglophone minority has been able to establish and maintain an effective politics of accommodation within Quebec, whereas its French-speaking counterparts have not for the most part had equivalent opportunities to develop similar sets of relationships within the English-speaking provinces.

Without a doubt, the nature and durability of the "English fact in Quebec"--a phrase or concept modelled on the earlier French fact in Canada, and popularized by Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos and Dominique Clift--is among the foremost traditional issues at the root of the tensions, conflict, and division of French and English. Sensing "a sort of folkloric echo today in letters to the editors of Canadian newspapers and on various open-line radio shows," Arnopoulos and Clift note that "the tensions between the two language communities seem to have retained much of their original causes and of their early manifestations."[69] The francophones' quest to wrest control of the Quebec economy from the hands of the anglophone business elite, thereby fulfilling their pledge of becoming "Maîtres chez nous"; the anglophones' struggle to procure from seemingly intransigent political regimes the full protection of linguistic and cultural guarantees--these are among the contemporary incarnations of issues rooted in an historical rivalry which, to use Lord Durhams oft-quoted description of ethnic relations in mid-nineteenth century Lower Canada, originated from the fact of "two nations warring the bosom of a single state."[70] More and more, particularly after the early decades of the twentieth century, the resentment and animosity engendered by this rivalry led to the characterization of the relationship between the French and English as being one of respective intolerance. Such intolerance has, for the most part, resulted in the social polarization and continued mutual isolation under which both French and English have managed to co-exist within the same territory, while at the same time promoting, to a greater or lesser extent, their respective cultural and economic interests.

Thus it is that we view the common history and long association between the French and English in Quebec as a manifestation of Canadian "dualism," within which, in explicitly consociational terms, the "two solitudes" relate one to the other in a society whose organizations and institutions are founded largely on the concept of "interterritorial segmentation." By way of delineating those aspects of Quebec's internal dynamics which have, during the province's history, contributed to the persistence of such segmentation, we shall refer to the aforementioned conditions and characteristics which, when found together, should lead to similar outcomes--i.e., concordant elite behaviour and concomitant segmental harmony--in fragmented societies.

To begin with, it is important to call attention to a secondary yet highly significant factor which bears both direct and indirect implications upon whether plural societies will or will not achieve political stability via the consociational democracy route. To the extent that the four principal cases of consociational democracy are all small countries, there indeed seems to exist a strong empirical correlation between the size of a political system and its success at implementing consociational practices. In other words, the smaller the size of the state, the greater is the probability that consociational democracy will be established in the first place. What is more, as we shall see, is the fact that two of the six conditions directly favourable to consociational democracy, namely, the "elite-level" conditions comprised of a low total load on the system and responses to external threats to the system, are both more likely to obtain in small rather than in large states. Hypothetically bestowed here with "small state" status, Quebec, as Table 2.1 indicates, compares favourably with the smaller of the classic consociational systems as far as the element of size is concerned.

1. The extent to which a low total load is conducive to consociational democracy becomes apparent when we consider that the stability of a political system rests to a large degree on its achieving a balance between its capabilities and the demands, both domestic and foreign, placed on it. To be sure, any system is apt to be stable if its burdens are kept to a minimum. Yet such a minimization is nowhere more important than in consociational democracies, where the management of segmental divisions is at best a slow and cumbersome process, already requiring much of the leaders' time, energies, and skills. Where the element of size has an indirect effect on consociationalism, however, is in the realm of decision-making. Here small size increases the chances of consociational democracy by reducing the burdens of decision-making, thus rendering the state easier to govern. This, we contend, holds true for Quebec, given the province's commitment to securing full political and economic autonomy and the retreat from the burdens of federal-provincial and interprovincial relations that such a commitment entailed. Significantly, this retreat was perhaps most evident in Quebec's eschewal of federal-provincial

TABLE 2.1

SIZE OF CONSOCIATIONAL "STATES" BY POPULATION, SELECTED YEARS, 1931-1971*

"STATE"	YEAR	POPULATION
The Netherlands	1931	8,034,309
	1941	9,021,744
	1951	10,254,845
	1961	11,721,416
	1971	13,269,563
Belgium	1931	8,116,721
	1941	8,363,891
	1951	8,611,061
	1961	9,189,741
	1971	9,695,379
Austria	1931	6,719,060
	1941	6,831,647
	1951	6,934,000
	1961	7,009,000
	1971	7,456,403
Switzerland	1931	3,816,414
	1941	4,265,703
	1951	4,714,992
	1961	5,429,061
	1971	6,269,783
Quebec	1931	2,874,255
	1941	3,331,882
	1951	4,055,681
	1961	5,259,211
	1971	6,027,764

* The figures for non-census years, i.e., The Netherlands and Belgium: 1931, 1941, 1951; Austria: 1931, 1941; and Switzerland: 1931, represent estimates based on the latest official data available.

Adapted from: S.H. Steinberg and John Paxton, eds., The Statesman's Yearbook (London: Macmillan and Co., Ltd., 1960/61 to 1975/76); and B.R. Mitchell, European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 17-27.

cost-shared programs (with a consequent loss of federal funds) under the Duplessis administration, and the Lesage government's challenges to the established procedures of Canadian federalism, which included drives to secure from Ottawa both higher unconditional subsidies and the implementation of an "opting-out" arrangement allowing Quebec to participate "on a temporary basis" in federal programs without incurring financial loss.

Upon close inspection, such challenges would appear to belie Quebec's understanding of the relative merits of "co-operative federalism," whereby the performance of certain functions by the federal government reduces the load at the provincial level. Indeed, it is perhaps as a result of this that the strongly "nationalist" Lesage regime seems in retrospect to have displayed a unique sense of commitment to the existing federal order. This was revealed most starkly in the light of both its desire to have the procedures of interprovincial co-operation institutionalized and its "demands" that there be established regularized patterns of federal-provincial consultation. There remains, however, reason to believe that Quebec's dissatisfaction with the largely unstructured relations between the provinces and federal agencies was a reflection of its concern merely with emphasizing the power of its particular jurisdiction. Here Donald Smiley argues that the challenges posed by Quebec were for the most part predicated on a "basic distrust of the informal and segmented pattern of relations between the provinces and the federal government," especially insofar as such relations and their outcomes tended to compromise Quebec's assertion of its autonomy. Inasmuch as certain federal programs impinged upon what Quebec claimed to be its exclusively provincial jurisdictions of health, education, and social welfare, for example, it seems reasonable to suppose, as Smiley does, "that the thrust towards the co-ordination of policies on a jurisdiction-wide basis leads the officials so involved to minimize the uncertainties of the external environment by sustaining and enhancing the autonomy of these jurisdictions."[71] It was on this basis, at the March 1964 federal-provincial conference, that the Lesage administration succeeded in getting Ottawa to agree to Quebec's celebrated opting-out of the Canada Pension Plan in favour of its own pension scheme. Perhaps the most important corollary of the establishment of this pension scheme was, according to McRoberts and Posgate, the fact that

> Quebec secured a new source of funds at a time when it was having real difficulty in meeting the financial burden that political modernization had entailed. . . . Opting-out helped legitimize the idea that Quebec has special needs and responsibilities beyond those of the other provinces. On a *de facto* basis, Quebec had already acquired a "special status."72

2. Although the consociational type of democracy is established primarily as a response to the national emergencies created by *internal* divisions, it may also be built or reinforced on the basis of real or apparent

external threats affecting the interests of a large proportion of a society's elites and masses. Particularly in culturally segmented societies, the perception of an external threat may lead to the anticipation by the elite of possible encroachments on the integrity of the political unit. In such societies, as Lehmbruch reasons, "the pitting of one subculture against the other or territorial partition can serve as devices for domination by more powerful neighbors." Thus, fulfilling the "internal genetic" conditions for consociational democracy makes it "possible for the political elites to choose such strategies as to allow them to resist a disintegrative 'penetration' of the system."[73] As the experiences of the principal consociational systems make apparent, the crucial steps toward the establishment of such "strategies" were in fact taken during times of grave international crisis or specific threats to the nations' existence. For instance, the comprehensive and peaceful settlement of differences that paved the way for consociational democracy in the Netherlands was achieved as the First World War raged near its borders in 1917. Similarly, while the grand coalition government of the Austrian Second Republic was primarily a response to the civil strife of the First Republic, it was inaugurated, significantly, during the Allied occupation of Austria after the Second World War. While of a more gradual nature, the adoption of consociational practices in Belgium and Switzerland was also partly influenced by foreign threats. Indeed, although Belgian *unionisme* (consisting of grand coalitions composed of members of both the Catholic and Liberal parties) began in 1827--during the country's fight for independence--and became infrequent when the nation's existence appeared to be secure, it was resumed during the First World War, and was soon followed by the important step of admitting the Socialists to the consociational government. In Switzerland, however, the decision to admit the Socialists to the grand coalition was not taken until 1943-- during the Second World War--and was, as Lehmbruch notes, "a consequence of the rapproachment between the working-class movement and the bourgeois parties, accomplished in the 1930s under the pressure of the fascist threat to democratic government.[74] Likewise, as we shall see, instances of specific outside threats to the "nation's" existence are far from being foreign insofar as the Quebec experience is concerned.

Theoretically speaking, the correlation between the size postulate and the establishment of consociational democracy is, particularly in small states such as the above, largely attributable to the nature of both the *direct* and *indirect* forces which play upon a nation's *external* position vis-à-vis other and especially larger and more powerful nations. In terms of its *direct* effect the size principle hold[illegible]at small nations are more likely than are larger ones to be and feel threatened by other powers. To the extent that this study shall treat Quebec as a "nation" (albeit within a nation), external threats may be seen to act as a catalyst for consociational democracy, particularly insofar as the French perceive their language and culture to be threatened by the social and economic hegemony of the larger, "external" English-speaking element in Canada. Such feelings of vulnerability and insecurity have, however, provided strong incentives for the francophones to maintain a high degree of internal solidarity. Nor has such a perception reduced French-English relations within both Quebec and Canada to the level of civil war, a condition often symptomatic of cultural, linguistic, and religious strife elsewhere in the world. By way of accounting for the achievement of this political stability, G.F.G. Stanley notes:

> That civil strife in Canada has never degenerated into civil war has been due, in part at least, to the recognition by both peoples of the necessity of some *modus vivendi* and the recognition by both of the rights of the other. The recognition and definition of these rights is the basis of the entente, understanding, pact, compact, call it what you will, which is the foundation of our political unity. . . . The Anglo-French understanding which alone has made government possible within Canada has become sanctified by time and continued acceptance, until today it is looked upon by many as a convention of our constitution.[75]

Hence, subcultural autonomy, tempered by a measure of intersegmental co-operation and compromise, has served as the driving force behind this working arrangement. It is on this basis, moreover, that francophones have for the most part been able to stave off threats of assimilation and cultural disintegration, while at the same time maintaining their power to bargain on behalf of the French-speaking minority groups, particularly those in New Brunswick, Ontario, and Manitoba.

Further, a small state's limited power on the "international" scene, its tendency to abstain, whether by force or design, from an active foreign policy, and, consequently, its greater chance of avoiding difficult choices in this realm all arise as a result of the indirect effects of external threats. Inasmuch as the preservation of internal equilibrium presupposes a reduction of external demands on the political system (a factor also significant in reducing a system's total load), Lehmbruch argues that the consociational type of decision-making "seems to work in small states only."[76] Taking Lehmbruch to task in light of this assertion, Daalder questions "whether an active stance in international politics by larger states (with all its consequences for internal politics) is a matter of inescapable fate or political choice."[77] In response to this it may suffice to say that while one may question whether an inevitability exists with regard to the relationship between size and foreign policy activism, an overall tendency has been found to be abundantly clear: "large states do exhibit a higher level of international activity than small states."[78] Indicative of small states' limited power in the field of international politics is the fact that all four European consociational democracies have had a policy of neutrality forced upon them at one time or another by agreement (explicit or implicit) of major foreign powers. This foreign imposition, moreover, contrasts with the self-restraint practised by francophone elites, who, particularly during the 1960s, and by way of a deliberate abstinence from an active "foreign" policy with the rest of Canada and, to a lesser extent, the United States, focused, increasingly, nationalist sentiment on Quebec alone.[79] In both cases, however, a policy of neutrality, induced by external threats in one form or another, had the indirect effect of strengthening internal solidarity, thereby maximizing the chances for successful consociational democracy.

Finally. it bears noting that compared with their larger counterparts, small states are, internally, much more suitable sites within which to apply consociational practices, because, given their greater concentration within a smaller geographical area, elites in small states are more likely to know each other personally and to meet often. To be sure, as Jürg Steiner argues, the political elite in small states "is, compared to bigger states, relatively small." Still, "the probability is greater that the members of the political elite will interact relatively frequently." This in turn leads to a relatively high level of mutual goodwill, which directly enhances a spirit of co-operativeness and accommodation. By way of deliberately eschewing adversarial styles of decision-making in favour of more conciliatory modes, political leaders demonstrate their willingness "not to perceive politics as a zero-sum game, in which a strategy of "all-or-nothing" is applied. For the winners in such a game would forfeit the loser's goodwill, and this would entail high costs relative to the rewards to be gained."[80] It is worthwhile emphasizing, moreover, that while the better chances of achieving political stability that small, plural societies have are in part a result of their closely linked elites, the direct internal effect of small size on the possibilities of consociationalism is not linear. Principally, this applies to very small states, whose reservoir of political talent will be proportionate. Since consociational democracy works best under an exceptionally able, committed, and prudent leadership, small size is a favourable factor only to a certain limit.

3. That a multiple balance of power among the segments of a plural society is more conducive to consociational democracy than, say, a dual balance of power or a hegemony by one of the segments is due in large part to the fact that if one segment has a clear majority, its leaders may attempt to dominate rather than co-operate with the rival minority. Likewise, in a society with two segments of approximately equal size, the leaders of both segments may hope to win a majority and to achieve their aims by domination instead of by co-operation. Moreover, while the "power" which hangs in the balance here is interpreted primarily in terms of the

numerical strength of the segments which can, in a democracy, be expressed as electoral strength and in turn be translated into parliamentary seats, it may also be interpreted, as in the Quebec case, in terms of the influence of unequal economic power or the cultural predominance of one group over the other(s).

In sum, then, the concept of a multiple balance of power comprises two separate elements: (1) a balance, or an approximate equilibrium, among the segments, and (2) the presence of at least three different segments. Significantly, these conditions seem to imply, first, that the achievement of a viable consociationalism requires minority status on the part of all subcultures. In other words, the presence of a majority or near-majority segment in a plural society constitutes an unfavourable factor. Furthermore, the requirement of a "multiple" power configuration of "at least" three segments implies that there should preferably be as many groups as possible. To be sure, the more segments there are the smaller is the chance that one will have a clear majority status. Still, there remains no certainty as to whether or not one such group will come into existence. Thus it is that since co-operation among rival groups becomes more difficult as the number participating in negotiations increases, a society with relatively few segments, say three or four, constitutes a more favourable base for consociational democracy than one with relatively many segments, and a much more favourable base than either a highly fractionalized society or one characterized by a dual segmentation. Of the four principal consociational systems, Belgium, by virtue of its position as a "crossroads" of several West European cultures, perhaps illustrates best the complexities inherent in classifying plural societies in terms of the notion of multiple balance of power. Reference to the theory of crosscutting cleavages does, for analytical purposes, highlight certain of the background factors to be considered when developing such a classification.

In addition to what has been noted earlier, the theory of crosscutting cleavages holds that while conditions of perfectly crosscutting or coinciding cleavages rarely obtain, differences in the degree to which they crosscut can be of critical importance. Indeed, the way in which cleavages cut across one another not only affects the distribution of power among the segments, but, as a consequence, also affects the chances of co-operation or conflict among them. When there are two or more cleavages, moreover, crosscutting creates separate and often significant subcultures. In Belgium, the cleavage structure is primarily two dimensional, consisting as it does of the highly developed religious-ideological cleavage and the growing linguistic-cultural polarization around the century-long struggle for independence between the country's two major languages. As is much the same case in Quebec, both of Belgium's linguistic communities are afraid of being dominated by the other. Here the French-speaking Belgians (Waloons) fear the numerical superiority of the Germanic, Dutch-speaking Flemings, while the Flemings fear and resent the economic and cultural dominanace of the Walloons. In the province of Quebec the anglophones fear the numerical superiority of the francophones, while the French fear and resent the economic and cultural dominance of the English-speaking element in Canada. Yet, unlike Quebec, the Belgian case is complicated by the fact that the bipolar linguistic cleavage does not coincide with the subcultural divisions, which themselves are bounded by the Catholic, Socialist, and Liberal familles spirituelles. The inevitable crosscutting which takes place between language and, say, religious and class cleavages would, presumably, lead to the formation of "relatively many" minority segments. That this is not perceived to be the case is a result of the fact that, although the three traditional blocs have indeed suffered from the effects of linguistic cross-pressures, their organizational persistence has remained relatively strong. What is more is that whereas the religious-ideological differences on which subcultural segmentation is based are long established, understood, accepted, and tolerated, if not always respected, linguistic differences are bitter, intolerant, and reveal scant reciprocal understanding. Given, then, that the traditional system of verzuiling (that is, "pillarization" or, to use Lorwin's term, "segmented pluralism") is founded firmly on what is referred to as a "classic" tripartite Catholic-Socialist-Liberal base, the elements of which are, in decreasing order of magnitude, all minorities, a strong case can be made for situating Belgium in that category of plural societies which contain a "few," that is to say three, major segments. Finally, the Belgian case can be seen, from both empirical and analytical points of view, to be complicated further by the fact that the Catholic subculture is close to majority status. The extent to which this has been a significant factor in Belgian politics is noted by one analyst, who finds it striking that the most turbulent episodes in the development of the "royal question" (during the decade of the 1940s) and the second _guerre_ _scolaire_ (which raged during the 1950s) were preceded by electoral victories of the Catholic party.[81]

By contrast, the linguistic communities in Canada (and, by extension, Quebec) _do_ coincide with the country's "spiritual families," a conclusion which derives from the fact that virtually all francophones are Catholic and that English-speaking Protestants are much more numerous than English-speaking Catholics. As Lijphart notes, moreover, the coincidence of language and religious divisions is reinforced by the regional factor, "which is of great importance in Canada." Here,

> the French speakers are concentrated in the province of Quebec and in the areas contiguous to it. As a minority of about 30 percent of the total Canadian population, religiously homogeneous, and

> largely concentrated in one province, the French speakers are more clearly a segment in a plural society or a political subculture than the religiously heterogeneous English speakers, who are spread out over the remaining nine provinces.[82]

When viewed in terms of the concept of a multiple balance of power, however, the fact of the concentration of francophones in the province of Quebec presents somewhat of a unique case. Indeed, since the numerical strength of the French-speaking element has been balanced, historically, by the economic strength and cultural hegemony of the English in Canada, "balancing" the French-English dichotomy in Quebec in terms of the conditions governing the multiple balance of power principle requires the introduction of at least one other element. As alluded to earlier, this "third force" shall for our purposes consist of the ethnic minorities, whose percentage of the total Quebec population in 1971 (10.4), for example, equalled roughly that held by those of British origin (10.6). By 1981, however, the population of those of "other" ethnic origin was to have exceeded the British population by 2 per cent. (See Table 2.2). In light of this gradual turn of events, then, and the circumstances upon which it was predicated, subcultural relations in Quebec shall be perceived here not so much as involving a strict accommodation by the French of anglophone and "other" ethnic group interests, but will be viewed primarily as a relationship based on the "concessions" which accrue to these groups out of that which has evolved into a

TABLE 2.2

COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF QUEBEC, BY ETHNIC ORIGIN, CENSUS YEARS 1931-1981

CENSUS YEAR	ETHNIC ORIGIN				
	FRENCH	BRITISH	OTHER	MIXED	TOTALS
1931	2,270,059 (79.0)[a]	432,726 (15.0)	171,470 (6.0)		2,874,255 (100)
1941	2,695,505 (80.9)	453,140 (13.6)	183,237 (5.5)		3,331,882 (100)
1951	3,327,128 (82.0)	491,818 (12.0)	236,735 (6.0)		4,055,681 (100)
1961	4,241,111 (80.6)	567,060 (10.8)	451,040 (8.6)		5,259,211 (100)
1971	4,759,360 (79.0)	640,045 (10.6)	628,360 (10.4)		6,027,764 (100)
1981	5,105,670 (80.0)	487,385 (8.0)	648,055 (10.0)	127,955 (2.0)	6,369,065 (100)

[a] Percentages

Adapted from: Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos and Dominique Clift, *The English Fact in Quebec*, Second Edition (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984), Table 1, p. 230; and Jacques Henripin, "Quebec and the Demographic Dilemma of French Canadian Society," in Dale C. Thomson ed., *Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the Inside* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), Table 3, p. 160.

"palliative" style of politics. To be sure, palliative politics, which, according to Wolinetz, involves responding to demands and grievances "with patronage [concessions] and with policies which partially alleviate but do not really solve the problems raised," may in the long term prove counter-productive. Inasmuch as it entails the implementation of temporary, stopgap measures, however, this style of politics serves the useful short-term purpose of deflecting "the consideration of deeper underlying grievances."[83] As such, it is the hope in French Quebec that such concessions will serve to placate the English long enough to ensure the fulfilment of the francophones' broader aim: squeezing the English language out of public life.

Lessening our emphasis now on the concept of "elite accommodation (in its literal sense) as a defining characteristic of subcultural relations in Quebec is due in large part to the fact that it displays certain serious shortcomings, particularly when applied in a theoretical context. Indeed, while it shall be retained here as a synonym for coalescent and co-operative behaviour, elite accommodation, as Wolinetz notes, can be construed so broadly as to be considered "a characteristic of any political system in which (1) there are political differences, and (2) these differences are resolved neither by force nor command, but by some kind of compromise among political elites." Judged in these terms, moreover, "elite accommodation becomes a functional requisite of any political system and little more than a surrogate definition for politics." It follows, therefore, that since consociational democracies, say, are identified largely by the presence of elite accommodation, all democratic political systems could be categorized under the consociational rubric. Hence, in his critique of the application of consociational models to Canada, Wolinetz claims that

> any democratic or pluralist political system which is functioning and which has not degenerated into either an authoritarian rule or into civil war must have some means of reconciling or accommodating diverse interests. We can also assume that political elites (broadly defined) will be involved in this process and that in a federal system, provincial government officials will also be involved. That much should be obvious. What is not--and should not be--obvious is that the presence of accommodative mechanisms makes such a system a consociational democracy.[84]

Defined by Presthus as a process which, "confined to those who have the required substantive interest and political resources," involves the "routine, operational function of allocating social resources," elite accommodation is "an integral part of the larger process of national integration . . . in which policy decisions are the result of negotiation and consultation among the elites concerned."[85] Our main concern here, however, is that in its capacity as a theoretical construct, the concept of elite accommodation (thus defined) would appear to take for granted or otherwise overlook the question of the relative strength of the segments in plural societies; that is, whether such strength is, as noted earlier, interpreted in terms of the unequal distribution of economic power and so forth. Since there can be no denying that the French in Quebec are culturally, linguistically, and numerically predominant, one may very well ask: in what sense can there be said to exist an "accommodation" of interests between the French and English subcultures? Moreover, to the extent that "negotiation" takes place between these two groups, in what sense can it be said that the agreements reached are mutually advantageous?

Thus given that the rise in influence of the ethnic minorities in Quebec and their "collective" claims for power and equality constitute relatively recent phenomena, the focus of this study shall remain on the French and English subcultures. In the meantime, any reference to the ethnic minorities, known variously as the "new Canadians" or "Québécois de nouvelle souche," will be made tangentially--that is, in view of the ways in which their presence has influenced Quebec's primary social dynamic: French-English relations. For instance, we shall examine these relations in light of the fact that, up until 1976, each of the minority groups seems to have felt as close to the English Quebeckers as to any of the other small ethnic groups. In ethnic relations, one of the primary goals of the majority of "new Canadians" appears to have been to assimilate into English Quebec. As we shall see, the expansion of the English-speaking community resulting from this assimilation--which more than made up for the numbers lost by way of out-migration--led to the enactment of legislation by successive Quebec governments aimed at halting and reversing what was perceived to be a largely unexpected and potentially culturally divisive demographic trend. While immigration did indeed alter the ethnic mix of the province, and the Island of Montreal in particular, which, in 1971, for instance, contained roughly 35 per cent of the total Quebec population, the linguistic duality remained and was reinforced.[86] As such, it will be our contention that any conception of subcultural relations in Quebec must be conceived in light of the historical terms under which "trade-offs" and "concessions" were made between the French and English. On this basis, our analysis shall be couched in terms of the familiar concept of "cultural division of labour," which, according to its originator, concerns the two-fold distribution of certain "culturally-marked" groups within an occupational structure:

> The two defining parameters of the configuration of a cultural division of labour are its degree of hierarchy and its degree of segmentation. A cultural division of labour is hierarchical to the extent that . . . ethnic groups within it are differentially satisfied. A cultural division of labour is segmental to the extent that the ethnic groups within it are highly occupationally specialized.[87]

It will be shown in the following chapter that a clear cultural division of labour has been characteristic of French-English relations in Quebec for more than two centuries. By way of doing so, the relationship will be interpreted, first, in terms of the concessions which fell to the anglophones, given their occupation of the preferred position in the Quebec economy. Further, it will be shown that while institutionalization of formal (i.e., the Church, schools) and informal (i.e., commercial and other voluntary associations) spheres of activity along the lines of cultural and linguistic cleavage has led to the achievement of a general level of political stability in Quebec, it also has led to the reinforcing of "occupational specialization," insofar as such segmentation has hindered the cross-cultural distribution of economic roles. However, the growth since the 1960s in distinctly francophone economic institutions, linked in one form or another to the Quebec state; the emergence of both a new Québécois nationalism and policies for industrial nationalization; and improvement in the mobility of francophones into the upper levels of English-Canadian and American-owned corporate structures, with its attendant decline in the anglophone monopoly of these positions, has resulted in skewing the distribution of the benefits of economic development and political modernization toward the francophone side of the traditional division.[88]

4. By way of limiting mutual contact, clear and distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures in a plural society serve to reduce the chances that ever-present potential

antagonisms will erupt into actual hostilities and violence. While it has been established that close relations between the elites of the subcultures are essential, it is important to emphasize that their attempts to forge lasting solutions to segmental differences are more likely to be successful if contact, and hence conflict, at the mass level can be reduced. Significantly, if somewhat pessimistically, Lorwin captures the essence of the problem when he asserts that, "if meaningful personal contacts with people of other subcultures are few, so are the occasions for personal hostility."[89] As such, efforts to homogenize a fragmented system may in fact hinder rather than help the achievement of a stable, integrated system. Indeed, as David Easton argues, "greater success may be attained through steps that conduce to the development of a deeper sense of mutual awareness and responsiveness among encapsulated cultural units."[90]

On this basis, efforts to reduce mutual contact and concomitant conflict and hostility require, first and foremost, the minimization of overlapping memberships. While it helps to secure the retention by subcultural elites of the support and loyalty of their followers, such minimization would appear to contradict one of the theoretical premises of the overlapping memberships proposition--that mutual contacts between different people and groups foster mutual understanding. Distinguishing between essentially homogeneous societies, where increased contacts are likely to lead to further homogenization, and plural societies, where close contacts are likely to lead to strain and hostility, however, helps to resolve this discrepancy. By way of making this distinction himself, Walker Connor argues that

> increased contacts help to dissolve regional cultural distinctions within a country such as the United States. Yet, if one is dealing not with minor variations of the same culture, but with two quite distinct and self-differentiating cultures, are not increased contacts between the two apt to increase antagonisms?[91]

For his part, moreover, Karl W. Deutsch interprets the notion of overlapping memberships in terms of a balance between mutual transactions and cultural integration, in which, ideally, the volume and intensity of contacts does not exceed the commensurate degree of homogeneity. In other words, this proposition holds that "the number of opportunities for possible violent conflict will increase with the volume and range of transactions."[92]

In applying this proposition to Quebec and the larger Canadian polity we find that a minimization of the "volume and range of transactions" between the French and English subcultures has been influenced significantly by lines of cleavage other than those of an ethnic and linguistic nature. In addition to obvious differences in religion, which, during long periods of its early history, actually overshadowed the French-English division as Canada's predominant cleavage, the extent to which French and English constitute "two quite distinct and self-differentiating cultures" (Connor) can, according to McRae, be measured in terms of the "ideological gulf" that separates the two groups. In fact, "because of this ideological gulf . . . the relationship of French and English Canadians in historical perspective has been less of a confrontation of opposing forces than a co-existence of two solitudes."[93] At first glance, this view may appear to be paradoxical, because one tends to expect "a confrontation of opposing forces" where strong ideological differences exist. Still, this need not be the case, as Quincy Wright concludes in his analysis of the nature of conflict. Here he finds that the "ideologies accepted by different groups within a society may be inconsistent without creating tension." The possibilities for great tension arise, Wright notes, only when these groups "are in close contact."[94] For his part, McRae interprets the relative absence of "confrontation" in French-English relations with reference to the Hartzian "fragment" theory, which is rooted in comparative intellectual history. Applied to the present context, this theory holds that the French and English subcultures in Canada "arose from different phases of European ideological experience and constitute distinctive fragments of that experience, each with its own highly internalized value system and each insensitive to the values of the other."[95]

The societal mix of cultural "encapsulation" and ideological indifference tends, generally, to result in the organization of political and social institutions along the lines of segmental cleavage. In theoretical terms, these separate organizations entail a degree of segmental isolation that is eminently conducive to consociational democracy. The consociational "method" of segmental autonomy, for instance, can further substantially the development of organizational networks within each segment, thus making plural societies more thoroughly plural, as is the nature of consociational democracy. Still, there is one very important type of segmental isolation that consociational democracy cannot "create": isolation along geographical lines. In Canada, for example, segmental isolation of this sort is created directly by the federal system, which applies segmental autonomy of a provincial, regional, and territorial nature. On the first level in particular, federalism functions as a consociational method by way of which one segment is concentrated provincially and is separated from the other segments of the society. Thus, the history of French-English relations in Canada has been characterized not only by religious, linguistic, and ideological cleavage, but by a relatively high degree of geographical separation as well, viewed primarily in terms of Quebec's "isolation" from "the rest of Canada." Even where there was physical proximity (as within Quebec province itself), however, "substantial occupational differentiation," McRae writes, "tended to keep the groups apart."[96] Specifically, as the "crossroads" of the French and English subcultures, metropolitan Montreal has, as Arnopoulos and Clift claim, "for a generation . . . been the focus of tensions between the two linguistic communities," and is the geographical area where "the clash of mentalities and ideologies has been most bitter." On the whole, however, French and English have, "for two hundred years, . . shared the territory of Quebec but have maintained parallel lives with only minimal contacts."[97] Indeed, the economically-inclined English of Quebec have been and remain predominantly Montreal-based. Here census figures show that of the 797,000 anglophones residing in Quebec in 1976, 607,505 chose to make their homes in the Montreal area.[98] On the other hand, as Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington note, the proportion of the once agriculturally-inclined population of Quebec claiming French ancestry rises to over 90 per cent outside of the Montreal area, "and 77 per cent speak only French." In sum:

> This geographical homogeneity of both the French and non-French groups is important, for without it, it is unlikely that French Canada would have persisted as a cultural entity. As it is, the day-to-day contacts of most French Canadians are with their ethnic confrères, and while there is an occasional requirement for English, especially in Montreal, it is quite possible for many French-speaking Quebeckers to get along without ever speaking English or seeing an English person.99

5. While it is essential to the establishment and success of consociational democracy that elites display a commitment to maintaining the system, it also is helpful that some

degree of similar commitment exist at the mass level. By and large, such commitment is seen to manifest itself as a general sense of national attachment. Since national attachment may in some cases offset somewhat the unstabilizing effects of deep social cleavages, one might well hypothesize that a very strong nationalism is particularly conducive to consociational democracy. For instance, in Canada there is a strong francophone nationalism but, arguably, not a strong Canadian nationalism. Inversely, in Quebec, English residents identify primarily with the rest of Canada. By way of accounting for this, Arnopoulos and Clift note that since "slightly more than one third of the anglophone population was born outside the province, many do not have strong ties with Quebec."[100] Although nationalism is potentially a cohesive and stabilizing force, it can, as in the case of French and English Quebec, act instead as an additional cleavage by providing a loyalty to a "nation" that is not coterminous with the state.

How, then, is one to account for political stability in Quebec, in view of this strong divergence of subcultural attachment to the system as a whole, and given that strong nationalism is not necessarily conducive to consociational democracy? In the existing literature, two explanations have been advanced with particular reference to the principal cases. First, it is argued that these countries are stable politically in spite of their relatively weak nationalism.

Second, it is held that their stability is achieved partly because their nationalism is moderate in nature. Holding to the essence of the second view, we suggest that political stability in Quebec is influenced strongly by the way in which the divergent nationalisms balance one another. In other words, the strong French-Canadian nationalism is "moderated" by the weaker English-Canadian (read English-Quebec) nationalism. Inasmuch as it does exist, moreover, the anglophones' commitment to maintaining the system stems almost exclusively from their strong economic ties to and commercial interests in Quebec. Hence, the francophones' traditional accommodation of these interests may be seen to have resulted in large measure from what is referred to as "the widely held notion that the presence of the English community was indispensible if the French majority was to have viable economic relations with the rest of Canada and with the United States, or to sustain progress in science and technology."[101]

6. Whereas a multiple balance of power among the subcultures and distinct lines of cleavage between subcultures are two among the five factors dealt with thus far that are to a certain extent paradoxical, the sixth factor--popular approval of the principle of government by elite cartel--is so obvious as to be almost tautological. Its crucial nature, however, may be gleaned from the fact that segmental leaders in plural societies have the

difficult and important task of, on the one hand, reaching political accommodations with and making concessions to the leaders of other segments and, on the other hand, maintaining the confidence of their own rank and file. To this end, therefore, it is helpful if elites possess considerable independent power and secure positions of leadership.

Such conditions of what Eric A. Nordlinger terms "structured elite predominance," however, raise important questions as to the "democratic" quality of consociational democracy. To be sure, consociationalism (and the elite-level emphasis it entails) by its very nature requires that all nonelite groups play relatively passive and deferential roles. Yet, as Nordlinger points out, structured elite predominance does not "necessarily or even usually involve the subjugation of nonelites." On the contrary, elite predominance "is usually tempered with a good measure of responsiveness to nonelite wishes and demands. In open regimes nonelites generally set distinct outer limits to their leaders' demands and controls."[102] What is more perhaps is that consociational democracy is not incompatible with a considerable degree of participation in segmental organizations by nonelite members of society, provided, of course, that overlapping memberships in these organizations is kept to a minimum. In fact, Lorwin found that the segmented pluralism of the small European democracies he examined "on the whole, made for more, rather than less, partricipation in voluntary associations." In accounting for such increased political activity, he notes that, "all other things being equal, the more pluralism in an area of socioeconomic association, the larger number of posts to fill at all levels.[103] Thus, against critics of its apparent undemocratic nature, consociational theorists emphasize that the elitism of consociational democracy should not be compared with a theoretical--and naïve--ideal of equal power and participation by all citizens, but with the degree of elite predominance that is the norm in democratic regimes of all kinds.

Hence, on the basis their predominant positions, heavy demands are placed on elite groups, not only in their relation with one another, but with their followers as well. Here the term "followers" refers not only to the mass public but also to the middle-level group described as subelite political activists. Attempts to secure the approval of the mass public, which, for instance, tends generally to be rather passive and apolitical almost everywhere, do not present great dangers to the possibilities of elite accommodation. Yet, whereas elite-mass relations are for the most part trouble-free, difficulties are more likely to occur at the elite-subelite level. "In particular," Daalder writes, "there may be a severe strain on their [the elite groups'] relation with those secondary leadership groups (Val Lorwin once dubbed them Lumpenelites) who may have every incentive to mobilize sectional groups against their own top leaders by fanning hostile ideological sentiments within individual subcultures."[104] Such was the case in the Quebec of the 1960s, where ideological sentiments (albeit not of a "hostile" nature) in the form of a state-based nationalism were propounded by a new middle-class of francophone political and bureaucratic elites. Distinguishing themselves from the traditional liberal professional and clerical elites, and with a claim to power and status rooted in their monopoly of the specialized knowledge of the "modern" social sciences, this new elite itself desired to adapt French-Canadian institutions to social and economic development, seemingly as a response to the apparent recalcitrance of those traditional elites.[105] As we shall see, the emergence of this new elite and the measures they were to implement proved to be the harbingers of change in French-English relations in Quebec.

Still, the foregoing claims with respect to the presence of mechanisms conducive to coalescent elite behaviour and political stability in Quebec constitute hypotheses which warrant testing and empirical verification. As such, we turn our attention now to an analysis of the specific historical and contemporary circumstances and conditions under which subcultural elites in Quebec have been able to work out a relatively durable compact, based in large part on the dual principles of moderation and compromise. Insofar as it follows closely the fundamental precepts of consociational theory, such analysis as will result will, of course, take into consideration Quebec's own unique social and political characteristics.

E. Notes

1. Milton J. Esman, "Introduction," in Milton J. Esman, ed., Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 14-15.

2. Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977), p. 105. See also Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," Journal of Politics 18, 3 (August 1956): 391-409, reprinted without change in Gabriel A. Almond, Political Development: Essays in Heuristic Theory (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970), Chap. 1. For an interesting discussion of the four-fold typology in general, and of the consociational democracy/elite accommodation model in particular--with special reference to politics in the Austrian system during the period of the Great Coalition by one-party government--see Frederick C. Engelmann, "Consociationalism and Austrian Politics, 1966-77, Parties, Governments, Groups, Policies," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, London, Ontario, 1978, pp. 1-4. The discription of the typology which follows here is drawn from Lijphart, ibid., pp. 105-09.

3. Hans Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme: A Review Article," World Politics 26, 4 (July 1974): 617-18.

4. Kenneth D. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in Kenneth D. McRae, Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 238 (italics added).

5. Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 1-9, 231-49; Harry Eckstein, Divisions and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), p. 34, as cited by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 3-4; and J.T. Stevenson, "Consociationalist Models for Canada," in Stanley G. French, ed., Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation (Montreal: The Canadian Philosophical Association, 1979), p. 246.

6. Ernst B. Haas, "Technocracy, Pluralism and the New Europe," in Stephen R. Graubard, ed., A New Europe? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), p. 68.

7. Theodore Lowi, "The Public Philosophy: Interest-Group Liberalism," American Political Science Review 61, 1 (March 1967): 18, 23.

8. Robert A. Dahl, ed., Political Oppositions in Western

Democracies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 399-400.

9. See, Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 4 (March 1971): 1, 5, 9, 13.

10. Ibid., p. 10. See also John C. Calhoun, *A Disquisition on Government*, ed., C. Gordon Post (New York: Liberal Arts Press, 1953), pp. 28-52 passim; George Kateb, "The Majority Principle: Calhoun and His Antecedents," *Political Science Quarterly* 84, 4 (December 1969): 583-605; Jürg Steiner, "The Principles of Majority and Proportionality," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 98-106; and idem, *Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland*, rev. ed. (Chapel Hill, N.C.: Univeristy of North Carolina Press, 1974). For detailed explanations of the components of consociational administration, as well as for a closer look at the concepts of "grand coalition" and "elite cartel," see Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, pp. 25-44; see also Dahl, *Political Oppositions in Western Democracies*, pp. 358-59.

11. See Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration," p. 11.

12. See David A. Apter, *The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study of Bureaucratic Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961). Although consociational theory is applied primarily to Western systems, a number of specialists in the study of comparative politics have followed Apter's lead by incorporating this dimension into their analyses of the so-called developing states. For interesting examples of such analyses, see Sir W. Arthur Lewis, *Politics in West Africa* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965); Claude Ake, *A Theory of Political Integration* (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967); and Eric A Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 29 (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1972). It is worthwhile noting, moreover, that by virtue of its specific and detailed proposals, Lewis's approach has received the *imprimatur* of, among others, William G. Fleming, "American Political Science and African Politics," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 7, 3 (October 1969): 495-511. For his part, Lijphart reviews consociationalism in the Third World in general, with a brief look at the Lewis model in particular, in *Democracy in Plural Societies*, Chap. 5, esp. pp. 143-47; see also pp. 179-81, 216-17.

13. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 6. On the typology, see Gabriel A. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," *Journal of Politics* 18, 3 (August 1956): 391-409.

The term "consociational" is derived from Johannes Althusius' concept of *consociatio*, first adopted by him to analyze the development of a new polity in the "Low Countries"--Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands--in the early seventeenth century. See his *Politica methodice digesta*, 3rd ed. (Herbornae Nassoviorum, 1614 [Aalen, W. Germany: Scientia, 1961]). For useful short summaries of Althusius' analysis, see Otto Gierke, *Natural Law and the Theory of Society, 1500-1800*, vol. 1, ed. and trans. by Sir Ernest Barker (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1934), pp. 70-79; and Hans Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 107-8.

14. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," pp. 392-93.

15. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies*, p. 7; see also idem, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 72-73. Almond's later writings in this area include: "Political Systems and Political Change," *American Behavioural Scientist* 6 (June 1963); Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963); and Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1966).

16. Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, p. 75; see also pp. 70-71, 73-74.

17. Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," pp. 605-06, 609. Cf. Brian Barry, "The Consociational Model and its Dangers," *European Journal of Political Research* 3, 4 (December 1975): 393-412, in which he "question[s] whether the attitudes to which Daalder refers are really 'prevalent', at any rate in America or Britain themselves" (p. 393). See Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," *Comparative Political Studies* 1, 1 (April 1968): 3-44, reprinted in Lijphart, ed., *European Political Systems* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969); and Gerhard Lehmbruch, "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzerland, Austria, and Lebanon," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 90-97. Examples of important early works produced by the consociational theorists include: Rodney P. Stiefbold, "Elite-Mass Opinion Structure and Communication Flow in a Consociational Democracy (Austria)," paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, 1968; Jürg Steiner, "Non-Violent Conflict Resolution in Democratic Systems: Switzerland," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 13 (September 1969): 295-304; idem, "Conflict Resolution and Democratic Stability in Subculturally Segmented Political Systems," *Res Publica. Revue de l'institut belge de science politique* 11 (1969): 775-98; and the papers by Val R. Lorwin (pp. 33-69) and Daalder (107-24) in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*. For

later comparative and case studies by a variety of writers, see G. Bingham Powell, Jr., *Social Fragmentation and Political Hostility: An Austrian Case Study* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970); Lijphart, "Cleavages in Consociational Democracies: A Four-Country Comparison," paper presented at the Symposium on Comparative Analysis of Highly Industrialized Societies, Bellagio, Switzerland, 1971; James A. Dunn, Jr., "'Consociational Democracy' and Language Conflict: A Comparison of the Belgian and Swiss Experiences," *Comparative Political Studies* 5, 1 (April 1972): 3-39; and Frederick C. Engelmann and Mildred A. Schwartz, "Partisan Stability and Continuity of a Segmented Society: The Austrian Case," *American Journal of Sociology* 79 (1974): 948-66.

18. Studies which provide at least some reference to these variations on the consociational democracy are, in turn: *"segmented" pluralism*: Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 33-69; and Steifbold, "Political Change in a Stalemated Society: Segmented Pluralism and Consociational Democracy in Austria," in R. P. Stiefbold and N. J. Vig, eds., *Politics in Advanced Nations* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1974), pp. 425-77; *"concordant" democracy*: Lehmbruch, "Segmented Pluralism and Political Strategies in Continental Europe: Internal and External Conditions of 'Concordant Democracy,'" paper presented at the International Political Science Association Round Table, Torino, Italy, 1969; *"proportional" democracy*: Steiner, "The Principles of Majority and Proportionality"; and idem, *Amicable Agreement*; *"contractarian" democracy*: William T. Bluhm, *Building an Austrian Nation: The Political Integration of a Western State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973): the *politics of communalism*: Robert Melson and Howard Wolpe, "Modernization and the Politics of Communalism: A Theoretical Perspective," *American Political Science Review* 64, 4 (December 1970): 1112-30; Cynthia J. Enloe, *Ethnic Conflict and Political Development* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1973); and Milton J. Esman, "The Management of Communal Conflict," *Public Policy* 21 (Winter 1973): 49-78; and the *politics of accommodation*: Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968).

19. McRae, "Introduction," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, p. 4.

20. See Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," p. 606. See also David B. Truman, *The Governmental Process: Political Interests and Public Opinion* (New York: Knopf, 1951); Arthur F. Bently, *The Process of Government: A Study of Social Pressures*, 4th ed. (Evanston, Ill.: Principia Press of Illinois, 1955); and Seymour Martin Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (Garden City,

N.Y.: Doubleday, 1960). For a very interesting and useful comparative study of both the ways in which societal cleavages relate one to the other and the consequences for the intensity of feelings generated by the particular structure of cleavages and their expression in political terms in three selected countries, see Lijphart, "Linguistic Fragmentation and Other Dimensions of Cleavage: A Comparison of Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland," paper presented at the Ninth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Montreal, 1973; and idem, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 71-81.

21. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," pp. 396-97 (italics added).

22. Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 72. See also p. 70 and idem, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 9, 10, 11.

23. Lipset, Political Man, pp. 88-89, as quoted by Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 72.

24. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," pp. 398-99, 405-07, as quoted by Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, pp. 70-71 (italics omitted).

25. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," p. 408, as quoted by Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 71. See also Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," pp. 606-07.

26. For interesting accounts of the hostilities between the contending Lager--the organized and institutionally segmented Socialist, Christian-social conservative, and Nationalist subcultures and their respective political blocs--during the period of the Austrian First Republic (1918-1934), as well as for analyses of subsequent efforts to combat inter-bloc rivalries and overcome the existing cleavage structures, see, among others, Alfred Diamant, "The Group Basis of Austrian Politics," Journal of Central European Affairs 18 (1985): 134-55; Frederick C. Engelmann, "Haggling for the Equilibrium: The Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition, 1959," American Political Science Review 56 (1962): 615-62; idem, "Austria: The Pooling of Opposition," in Dahl, ed, Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, pp. 260-83; Diamant, "Austria: The Three Lager and the First Republic," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, pp. 150-56; and Peter G.J. Pulzer, "The Legitimizing Role of Political Parties: The Second Austrian Republic," ibid., pp. 157-78.

27. Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 168, as quoted by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 11.

28. Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, p. 49.

29. Ibid., pp. 48-49; and Harry Eckstein, Pressure Group Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1960), pp. 24-25.

30. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 14.

31. See, for example, Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," in Almond and James S. Coleman, eds., The Politics of the Developing Areas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 42.

32. Sigmund Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," in Neumann, ed., Modern Political Parties: Approaches to Comparative Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 402-03, as quoted by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 12.

33. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. by Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen, 1959), p. 393, as quoted by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 12.

34. Duverger, Political Parties, pp. 215 and 387-88, as quoted by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 12-13.

35. Neumann, "Toward a Comparative Study of Political Parties," p. 402, as quoted by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 13.

36. Almond, "Comparative Political Systems," p. 397; and idem, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," pp. 39 and 40, as quoted by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 13.

37. Almond and Powell, Comparative Politics, pp. 102-03, as quoted and italicized by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 13. Cf David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965), p. 257, where his term prior reconciliation (of points of view) appears to be synonymous with Almond's interest aggregation.

38. See Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 121. See also McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, pp. 245-47.

39. John Meisel, Cleavages, Parties and Values in Canada, Professional Papers in Contemporary Political Sociology, no. 06-003 (London: Sage, 1974), pp. 11, 13.

40. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 8-9.

41. See ibid., p. 9. Quoted material from Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," pp. 37-38 and 46 (italics added by Lijphart).

42. Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," p. 14; and idem, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 74.

43. See Leslie Lipson, The Democratic Civilization (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 352, as cited in Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," pp. 14-15 (italics mine).

44. See Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 74.

45. See Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," p. 42, as cited by Lijphart, Democracies in Plural Societies, p. 14.

46. Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 73.

47. Almond, "Introduction: A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics," p. 42, as quoted by Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 74.

48. Almond and Verba, The Civic Culture, pp. 28-29, as quoted by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 15.

49. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 15.

50. Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 75. See also, p. 74; and idem, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 16.

51. Claude Ake, A Theory of Political Integration (Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967), p. 113, as quoted by Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 75. Of course, as Lijphart notes, this possibility "exists not only in fragmented democracies, but also in fragmented predemocratic or nondemocratic systems" (ibid., fn. 15).

52. See page 12, above.

53. See Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," pp. 22-30; idem, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, pp. 79-85; Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," pp. 607-11, 615-18; Steven B. Wolinetz, "The Politics of Non-Accommodation in Canada,"

pp. 5-9, 12-21; and Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 47-52, and Chap. 3 passim. Unless noted to the contrary, explanations of both the behavioural prerequisites and the conditions conducive to consociational democracy, in this and the following section, are drawn from these sources.

54. Lehmbruch, "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 94.

55. Stanley Hoffmann, "Heroic Leadership: The Case of Modern France," in Lewis J. Edinger, ed., Political Leadership in Industrialized Societies: Studies in Comparative Analysis (New York: Wiley, 1967), p. 108.

56. Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration," p.10.

57. Micheal B. Stein, "Federal Political Systems and Federal Societies," World Politics 20, 4 (July 1968), as quoted by Lijphart, "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration," p. 10.

58. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 260.

59. Noel, "Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 265.

60. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 240.

61. Wolinetz, "The Politics of Non-Accommodation in Canada," p. 13.

62. McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1976), p. 205, as cited by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 124.

63. Wolinetz, "The Politics of Non-Accommodation in Canada," p. 26.

64. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 128.

65. The "fortress Quebec" thesis, put forth by Ramsey Cook, is similar in essence to the "Quebec reserve" theory propounded by McRae. For discussions of both see, Cook. "The Paradox of Quebec," in R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward, eds., Entering the Eighties: Canada in Crisis (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 56; and McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 259.

66. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 240.

67. McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1976), p. 207.

68. Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union, p. 87.

69. Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos and Dominique Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, Second Edition (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984), p. 13.

70. See Sir Reginald Coupland, The Durham Report: An Abridged Version With an Introduction and Notes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 15. G. F. G. Stanley notes that:

> "were [Lord Durham] writing in today's idiom, he might have preferred to substitute the word 'co-existing' for 'warring.' Certainly 'warring' is too strong and too inaccurate a word to describe what has been simply the political struggle on the part of the English-speaking population for supremacy, and on the part of the French-speaking population for survival."

Stanley, "The Federal Bargain: The Contractarian Basis of Confederation," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 275.

71. Donald V. Smiley, Canada in Question: Federalism in the Seventies, 2nd ed. (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976), pp. 77-78, 167-71. For a detailed description and analysis of Quebec-Ottawa relations during the Duplessis and Lesage years, see Smiley, "Constitutional Adaptation and Canadian Federalism since 1945," Documents of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, No. 4 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970).

72. McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), p. 113. For discussions of Quebec's goals during the 1960s and earlier, see ibid, pp. 87-90 and 111-14. An excellent, in-depth analysis of Quebec's applications of the opting-out formula, particularly as it was appled to the Canada Pension Plan, is to be found in Dale C. Thomson, Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984), pp. 186-89 and Chap. 19, esp. pp. 369-403.

73. Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International System," European Journal of Political Research 3, 4 (December 1975): 382; see also James Rosenau, "Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy," in R. Barry Farrell, ed., Approaches to Comparative and International Politics (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1966), p. 65.

74. Lehmbruch, "Consociational Democracy in the International System," p. 382.

75. Stanley, "The Contractarian Basis of Confederation," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, pp. 275-76.

76. Lehmbruch, "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 96.

77. Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," p. 611 (italics added).

78. Maurice A. East, "Size and Foreign Policy Behaviour: A Test of Two Models," World Politics 25, 4 (July 1973): 564, as cited by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 69-70. For a critique of the role and functioning of small states in the realm of international politics, see Peter R. Baehr, "Small States: A Tool for Analysis?" World Politics 27, 3 (April 1975): 456-66.

79. See McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), p. 96.

80. Jürg Steiner, "The Principles of Majority and Proportionality," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 100 (italics added). See also George Caspar Homans, Social Behaviour: Its Elementary Forms (New York: Harcourt Brace and World, 1961); and W.H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962).

81. See Lucien Huyse, Passiviteit, pacificate en verzuiling in de Belgische politiek: Een sociologische studie (Antwerp: Standaard Wetenschappelijke Uitgeverij, 1970), pp. 231-32, as cited by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 60-61. See also McRae, "Introduction," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, 18-21. It is important to note here that, in our discussion of the Belgian case, implicit but direct reference is made to Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 55-61, and especially to combinations 2 and 5 in Table 1, p. 58. See also Douglas W. Rae and Michael Taylor, The Analysis of Political Cleavages (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).

82. Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, p. 120; and idem, "Linguistic Fragmentation and Other Dimensions of Cleavage: A Comparison of Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland," pp. 4, 5, 6, 8.

83. Wolinetz, "The Politics of Non-Accommodation in Canada," p. 28. We acknowledge a debt to Professor Kenneth McRoberts, of York University, for suggesting and explicating the "concessions" thesis.

84. Wolinetz, "The Politics of Non-Accommodation in Canada," pp. 5, 6, 15 (italics added).

85. Presthus, Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics, p. 4.

86. See McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), pp. 52, Table Seven, 53; Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, pp. 186-88; and Richard J. Van Loon and Michael S. Whittington, The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure & Process, Second Edition (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976), p. 59.

87. Michael Hechter, "Group Formation and the Cultural Division of Labour," American Journal of Sociology 84 (September 1978): 6, 29, as quoted by McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), p. 15. The concept was developed originally in Hechter, Internal Colonialism: The Celtic Fringe in British National Development, 1536-1966 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975). McRoberts renders in-depth explanations of Hechter's theory of internal colonialism, and the applicability to Quebec of the cultural division of labour in his "Internal Colonialism: The Case of Quebec," Ethnic and Racial Studies 2 (July 1979): 293-318.

88. See McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), pp. 15-17, 119-123, 265-69, 273-76.

89. Lorwin, "Belgium: Religion, Class, and Language in National Politics," in Dahl, Political Oppositions, p. 187.

90. David Easton, A Systems Analysis of Political Life, p. 250 (italics added).

91. Walker Connor, "Self-Determination: The New Phase," World Politics 20, 1 (October 1967): 49-50.

92. Karl W. Deutsch, Political Community at the International Level (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954), p. 39.

93. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 244.

94. Quincy Wright, "The Nature of Conflict," Western Political Quarterly 4, 2 (June 1951): 196.

95. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 244. Cf. Stanley, "The Contractarian Basis of Confederation," ibid., where he argues that political unity in Canada is attributable, "in part at least, to the recognition by [French and English] of the necessity of some modus vivendi

and the recognition by both of the rights of the other" (p. 275); and p. 74 above. See also Louis Hartz, "The Fragmentation of European Culture and Ideology" (pp. 3-23), and McRae, "The Structure of Canadian History" (219-274), in Louis Hartz, ed., The Founding of New Societies (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965); and Hartz, "Violence and Legality in the Fragment Cultures," Canadian Historical Review 50 (1969): 123-40.

96. McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 244; see also Van Loon and Whittington, The Canadian Political System, 58-60.

97. Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, pp. xiv, xv.

98. See ibid., pp. 187-88; and Table 4, p. 233.

99. Van Loon and Whittington, The Canadian Political System, p. 59. The figures are for the 1971 census year.

100. Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, p. 189.

101. Ibid., pp. 188-89.

102. Eric A. Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies, pp. 73-74, as cited by Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies, pp. 49-50 (italics added).

103. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, p. 50.

104. Daalder, "The Consociational Democracy Theme," p. 612. See also Rodney P. Stiefbold, "Segmented Pluralism and Consociational Democracy in Austria," in Martin O. Heisler, ed., Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies (New York: David McKay, 1974.), pp. 147-55.

105. See McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), pp. 98-99.

III. CONSOCIATIONALISM AS AN UNDERLYING CHARACTERISTIC OF POLITICAL CULTURE

> Against Lijphart's views of consociational democracy as the outcome of a desire on the part of elites to counteract the potential threat of political divisions, one might put the reverse thesis: earlier consociational practices facilitated the peaceful transition towards newer forms of pluralist political organization. . . . Consociationalism, in this view, is not a response to the perils of subcultural splits, but the prior reason why subcultural divisions never did become perilous.1
>
> Hans Daalder

A. Theoretical Perspective

In and of itself, the preceding quote points up the fundamental difference between the approach to the study of consociationalism discussed here and that to which we shall turn our attention in Chapter V, both of which focus upon the theme of elite co-operation. The second approach--of the three advanced by Kenneth McRae--represents, as Daalder notes, Arend Lijphart's view, in which elite co-operation is seen as a pattern of learned behaviour, a deliberate response to the generally divisive nature of segmental cleavages. Conversely, the first approach views elite co-operation as a long-standing characteristic of the political tradition, a factor which itself helps to moderate tensions as both social and political structures develop along segmental cleavage lines. Further, McRae observes that the difference in these approaches is not simply a matter of timing, but is concerned more with "causal relationships." In this regard he notes Daalder's suggestion that elite behaviour should not be viewed solely as a dependent variable, the implication here being that "Lijphart's elites act to counteract the perils of 'objective' cleavages." In Daalder's view, on the other hand, "the elite culture is in itself a most important independent variable which may go far to determine how cleavages are handled in a political society, to what extent they become loaded with political tension, and to what degree subcultural divisions are solved in a spirit of tolerance and accommodation, or by violence and repression."[2] For his part, moreover, Daalder arrives at these and other determinations by way of viewing elite culture in the light of the dialectical process of history.

Indeed, this approach holds that, in the main, some plural societies owe their political stability to the existence of older patterns of coalescent elite behaviour in the "pre-modern" period, which have, in an age of "mass politics," given rise to a politics of accommodation. Here, as Daalder argues, "ancient pluralism has facilitated the development of a stable, legitimate and consistently pluralist modern society."[3] Further, in his empirical investigation of the structure and membership of cabinets and political parties in a number of European states, Daalder found that "older elite styles eased the transition to mass politics and made for a tradition in which the principle of proportionality led to a de-emphasis of the majority principle in favour of a pluralist autonomy of all subgroups in the society."[4] Judged in terms of this "tradition," which represents the crucial factor in this approach, the classic consociational systems, for example, share one important common characteristic: all four--the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland--existed at one time or another within the boundaries of the Holy Roman Empire. Consequently, all four states escaped in varying degrees the long, gradual centralization of authority that characterized, among others, the French, Spanish, English, and Scottish national monarchies from the twelfth to the sixteenth centuries. By way of comparision, we find that, in its own right, the province of Lower Canada (more or less equivalent to contemporary Quebec) also was able to escape the centralization of authority in Canada by rejecting the legislative union proposed by some of the English-speaking delegates to the pre-Confederation conferences at Charlottetown and Quebec City, and opting instead for the autonomy inherent in the federal concept. Commenting at some considerable length on the fundamental problem which faced both French and English delegates to these conferences, G. F. G. Stanley notes:

> Broadly speaking--and there are, of course, exceptions to this general statement--the English-speaking representatives, pragmatists, suspicious of ideas and generalizations, preoccupied with economic and political interests and secure in their ever increasing majority over the French Canadians, were disposed to favour a strong central government, if not actually a legislative

> union; the French Canadians, empiricists, uneasy, apprehensive, and deeply concerned with the survival of their culture, were by religion and by history in favour of a constitution which would, at the very least, secure them such guarantees as they had already extracted from the British government during the hundred years which had gone before. No French Canadian, intent upon preserving his national identity or bettering his political future could ever agree to a legislative union. Only federalism would permit the two, distinct, and separate, cultures to co-exist side by side within the bosom of a single state.5

Of course, federalism was to win out as Confederation, which was intended to bring together the dual Province of Canada and the four seaboard provinces of New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Prince Edward Island, and Newfoundland, was an impossibility without the concurrence of French Canada. In short, the survival of French Canada, despite the deliberate attempt to overwhelm it in a union of the two Canadas in the 1840s, demanded the emergence of a federal concept. What is more is that French Canadians would consent to such a concept only after some guarantee for their language, institutions, religion and legal code was included in the resolutions that were to form the basis of the British North America Act of 1867.[6] Thus it was agreement on the specific nature and form of the federal concept, as well as subsequent attempts somehow to reconcile the conflicting interests and principles of French and English, particularly in Quebec, which gave rise to the tradition of accommodation and diversity.

B. Quebec's Historical Political Tradition

Enjoying wide currency among most contemporary observers of early Canadian and Quebec history is the notion that the seeds of the accommodation and "peaceful co-existence" between the two racial groups were sown in the wake of the British conquest of New France in the 1760s. For instance, with reference to the work of Pierre Elliott Trudeau, Reginald A. Whitaker demonstrates that, at the time of the Conquest, the simple reality of New France was that "the French were too weak to become themselves an independent nation, and yet too strong to be crushed by the conquerors." Thus as a result of both French Canada's marginal status and its resistence to pressures for assimilation or repression, British and later English-speaking Canadians were forced "to make compromises and concessions over time which have taken form in various shifting accommodations . . . of class alliances cutting across the two ethnic and linguistic communities."[7] Indeed, perhaps the most significant way in which such accommodations manifested themselves was in Quebec's "cultural division of labour," which, as Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate argue, originated with the Conquest. It is their belief that "a clear segmentation of roles can be seen in the terms of accommodation between British colonial authorities, who retained political power, and French Canada's prevailing clerical and seigneurial elites, who were granted continued authority within Francophone society in exchange for their support of the British regime." Such segmentation and accommodation were to be reinforced, the authors continue, with the arrival in the colony of British and American merchants, who proceeded to exclude "the already weak French-Canadian commercial elite from any major economic role."[8] It is important to note, as the foregoing would seem to suggest, that, contrary to those who claim that French Quebec's subsequent withdrawal ever further into its rural communities constituted a defense against the threat of assimilation, it has been argued that this retreat at first owed more to economic than to ideological or cultural imperatives. Pushed as they were out of commerce and administration, the French had nothing left to do but cultivate the soil. "Agriculture," Michel Brunet writes, became "a refuge for the French Canadians who [were] eliminated from their country's commercial life. Many tax farmers and merchants turn to agriculture from necessity."[9]

Thus in a society deprived of its natural lay leaders, the Catholic Church, due mainly to its control of "cultural" matters--i.e., religion and education--in what Francis Parkman was later to call one of the "most priest-ridden communities of the modern world,"[10] acquired, in Marcel Rioux's words, "a more solid position than the one it had enjoyed under French rule."[11] The Ancien Régime of New France dated roughly from the founding of Quebec in 1608 to the conquering of that territory between 1759 and 1763--the Conquest culminating as it did in the Royal Proclamation, intending to institute a policy of assimilation by the imposition of English laws, customs, and institutions; by the exclusion of Catholics from public office; and by a reduction of the territory of the former colony. In spite of these measures, as well as those brought to bear by way of subsequent Imperial statutes, the clergy were quick to develop and maintain a benevolent attitude towards the British. In fact, such benevolence, as alluded to by McRoberts and Posgate, was to become a defining characteristic of what historians have termed the "aristocratic compact," in which the Church, along with the enfeebled remnants of New France's seigneurial class, collaborated with British army officers and high colonial administrators, who themselves assumed formal political control and a major economic hegemony. Among any other political favours that they could extract from the British, the leaders of the French were granted the freedom of worship and a free hand in the education and socialization of their followers. Further illustrating the ways in which this "fateful tradeoff of mutual elite interests" was to benefit the principal partners to this "tacit alliance"--the higher clergy and the colonial government--Alfed DuBuc notes that:

> The Church would eventually acquire its legal status and would enforce its monopoly of education for many years; it would even come to participate in the colonial administration. Thus the political authority of a Protestant society became the defender of the values and institutions of the

> Catholic Church, while the religious authorities of French-Canadian society upheld, in the eyes of their flocks, British institutions.12

Still, while the granting of these concessions helped to secure for them the faithful support and loyalty of the French-Canadian elite, the British were, as Whitaker argues, only to retain their privileges at the expense of economic development. As we shall see, "the English bought economic superiority at the expense of leaving the major institutions of the conquered people intact." As a result, French Quebec would for its part find it difficult to develop an indigenous bourgeoisie, "so necessary for autonomous capitalist development, and would be saddled with internal elites dependent upon the English, and with a vested interest in fostering economic backwardness and political subservience among the mass of the population."[13] Though not to condone its behaviour, it is of interest to note here that, in adhering strongly to its "vested interests," the French leaders were, as contemporary analysts of the development and operation of colonial regimes will attest, acting in a manner entirely consistent with what is now known as a "comprador" elite.

Enacted a decade after the Royal Proclamation, the Quebec Act (1774)--virtually the Magna Carta of the French Canadians--was to have the effect of reinforcing the support and loyalty between the French and English leaders. In effect, as Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos and Dominique Clift note, the Act forced English and French in Quebec to come to some accommodation with each other, an accommodation which in this case was based on the notion of what they refer to as "ethnic domains." Like the "cultural division of labour" theorists, these authors argue that, under the prevailing circumstances, each group assumed a particular function or role, determined primarily by their respective aptitudes and interests. The English, for example, were in charge of commerce and of the economy while the French were to be in charge of laws and of social organization--that is, only to the extent that they did not interfere with economic development. "This was," Arnopoulos and Clift contend, "the first time that there appeared in Canadian history the notion of collective vocations, a concept that remained almost unchanged until well into the twentieth century."[14]

Yet, as was to be the case with the Constitution Act of 1791, it was the potentially divisive consequences for the colony posed by "foreign" turmoil (the American Revolution in this instance) rather than British goodwill to Canada that precipitated the adoption of the Quebec Act. Even so, the American invasion of Canada in 1775, as well as that which sparked the War of 1812-1813, would put to the test the loyalty of the new province towards its "benefactor," particularly in view of the terms of the original compact between the two races--a compact which had the French accepting British rule in exchange for Britain's defense of Canada. With the Act, as Mason Wade points out, Great

Britain hoped effectively to serve notice to potential American colonists that it was strengthening its "hold upon the portion of North American which was to remain British by allowing it to remain French and Catholic." Among other things, the Act restored the colony's former boundaries and re-established the French civil law regarding property and civil rights, although it was deemed "'at present inexpedient to call [a representative] Assembly.'" Although the new legislation merely accorded quasi-official status to the Roman Catholic religion, the following quote from Wade shows that its guarantees to the Church were nonetheless substantive:

> . . . the Act revoked the whole tentative system of civil, judicial, and ecclesiastical government which had been based upon the Proclamation of 1763, and which had been aimed at the assimilation of the French Canadians into an English colony governed under English laws in an English spirit. Catholicism was no longer merely tolerated out of expediency; Catholics were assured the free exercise of their religion, which was no longer to be an obstacle to preferment to any office or position, since a new form of oath was provided which did not offend Catholic principles. The Catholic clergy were assured their rights and accustomed dues from Catholics, while the tithes of non-Catholics were to be applied to the support of a Protestant clergy.[15]

Further, the wholly reciprocal nature of this accommodation is well illustrated by the fact that, constituting what Henri Marrou described as "the only representative of the national conscience and the national culture, the only elite,"[16] the Catholic clergy in particular played an active role in the dissemination of

British propaganda--speaking with scorn of the Ancien Régime and extolling the merits of the British constitution. In order to secure the protection and maintenance of its sources of revenue and the structure and viability of its institutions, the Church was indeed obliged to conciliate the British authorities. In this regard, the ecclesiastical administrators went even so far as to propagate a providential interpretation of the British arrival in the St. Lawrence valley. Here Brunet notes that, during the period of the French Revolution (1789-1792), the clerical elite, relying on its substantial influence in the colony, were successful in persuading the considerable number of church-going Canadiens that God Himself had favoured the British Conquest. The British presence, the clergy reasoned, ensured the protection of the Catholic Church in Canada and the "nation canadienne" from the abuses and horrors of the wicked revolution."[17] The Canadiens' largely unfailing and somewhat naïve acceptance of this ecclesiastical and political rhetoric, moreover, had the desired effect of strengthening the bond between the clergy and the British masters.

Whereas the decision not to establish representative government (taken during the drafting of the Quebec Act) may have held back the threat to the clergy and the seigneurs of competition from any secular, politically-based elite, the Constitution Act, by its very nature, could not help but give rise to just such a group. Furthermore, given the institutional base it created--the establishment of separate legislative assemblies, elected by the people, and legislative councils, appointed for life--the Act not only inaugurated a period of tension between the executive and legislative branches of the Assembly in Lower Canada, but threatened to undermine the "aristocratic compact" as well. According to McRoberts, the Act of 1791 made politics "the one arena in which Francophones and Anglophones engaged in direct competition."[18] However, the enthusiasm with which the burgeoning francophone political elite threw itself into this "competition" was to be short-lived, and the reasons for this may be gleaned from the consideration of two separate sets of circumstances. First, as alluded to earlier, demands for the establishment of representative government in Quebec came primarily from the British merchants who invaded Lower Canada following the Conquest. Here McRoberts and Posgate note that these demands were "partly prompted by the fact that the British governors were thought to be too conciliatory to French demands, and that a reduction in gubernatorial power would rectify this." Yet when the _Canadiens_ subsequently succeeded at, among other things, having French recognized as a language of debate, "the English began to regret their enthusiasm for representative assemblies."[19] Still, this gives a false indication of the role played by the political leaders with respect to the institution of parliamentary rule. In other words, it is understandable that their role was, as some claim, negligible, for they were opposed to this form of government. Indeed, how could the Canadiens "adjust to influencing the destiny of the State," Rioux queries, "when they had not even had anything to do with running their own parishes?"[20] Commenting on the position of the early settlers under the Old Regime, Gustave Lanctot observed:

> The habitants of New France had no experience of common action in political matters. With no organization whatsoever that could group and direct them they become accustomed to submitting without question to the ordinances of the intendants, to the orders of the governors and to the edicts of Versailles.[21]

Later, post-Conquest French-Canadian folk society would, by way of being withdrawn into itself in rural communities and engaged in the practice of a subsistence economy, set up natural barriers to its inhabitants' access to the mainstream of political and economic life. As a result, the Canadiens found themselves hard put to acquire an interest in or an understanding of those affairs taking place outside their own local and immediate spheres of activity. The indifference bred of this lack of interest and understanding, moreover, is starkly illustrated where Rioux notes that Louis-Joseph Papineau, himself a popular French-Canadian leader, "had to be brought to the Chamber by military escort, after having been absent from sessions for two years."[22]

Second--and perhaps because of their ignorance of and indifference towards parliamentary government--the French

Canadians initially found the English to be uncompromising as far as the distribution of official positions was concerned. Here Rioux reports that while comprising fourteen-fifteenths of Lower Canada's population, the French Canadians, in the first election following the Constitution Act, obtained only three-quarters of the seats in the legislative assembly. What is more is that the "French Canadians were a minority in the Legislative Council (seven out of sixteen) and in the Executive Council (four out of nine). In administrative posts their minority was even more marked."[23] As such was the case, it is easy to see how their early experiences with democracy and representative government taught the Canadiens to distrust the parliamentary regime; a distrust which, some students claim, did not begin to abate until the mid-1960s--if then at all.[24] Thus, knowing nothing of its intrisic value, save for what they learned in their relations with the English, the Canadiens began quickly to identify democracy with the struggle for their religious and linguistic rights. As was natural with a vanquished people, moreover, French Canadians tended henceforth to use the parliamentary regime less for defending political and economic principles (as the English did) than for securing their ethnic and cultural survival.[25]

By the 1830s the Canadiens had become painfully aware of what was by then the fairly steady disintegration of French society. Given that theirs was a predominantly rural, agriculturally-based existence, the French Canadians feared reforms to or the abolition of the seigneurial system, since by that time more than half of the more prosperous manor farms were in the hands of English owners who had acquired the seigneurial rights. Contributing to this fear was the developing tendency on the part of the seigneurs, the governors, and even the magistrature simply to view the censitaries as tenants and to deny them the co-ownership inherent in the feudal and seigneurial systems. However, the collective anxiety which gripped much of French society was caused not only by the external pressures of English capitalism, but also by a growing internal crisis resulting from the excessive subdivision of land and the absence of local outlets for surplus manpower. These internal problems were, in turn, brought on largely as a result of the comparatively rapid rate of growth in the population of Lower Canada that was taking place at the time. In strict demographic terms, William Kingsford observed that, from 1632 to 1760, the Canadiens had increased to a total population of some 60,000, whereas by the end of the following 128-year period (1888) they were 1,250,000 strong.[26] Couching the situation in somewhat different terms, Abbé Lionel Groulx noted that, of the 8 million acres of arable land on the seigneuries, 5.1 million were occupied.[27] Compounding the problems caused by the growing scarcity of fertile land at that time was both London's opposition to the creation of new manor farms (especially in regions like the area around Montreal, where buildings began to press upon each other in greater density) and the fact that the crown lands, where the habitant might have been able to establish himself, became the object of fraudulent grants and speculations on the part of English-speaking people. Preservation of the seigneurial system, under such conditions of over-population as were being experienced, thus seemed as dangerous to the French Canadians as reforms which, to all appearances, would dispossess the class that worked the land and enhance the economic power of the English merchants. Like it or not, French Canadians would have to consent to reforming the institutions and laws of Lower Canada, if only to ease the burden on the seigneuries and to bring to an end the speculation which had caused an increase in the charges that weighed upon the censitaries.

While it would affect dramatically the traditional francophone way of life, which had long provided effective protection to a society relatively poor in capital and entrepreneurship, the process through which reforms to the system of anti-economic laws and customs were brought about also helped to initiate a much needed mobilization of politically-minded forces in French Canada. Although there was on the eve of the uprisings of 1837-1838 little agreement as to the cause that was being promoted--some, for instance, thought that they were defending the seigneurial system while others wanted to do away with tithes, rents, and the French civil law, all of which were becoming archaic with the beginnings of industrialization--the mass of

French Canadians were nonetheless united in their implacable opposition to the capitalism of the English merchants and of the British governors. At the vanguard of the ensuing struggle--arguably the first "nationalist" struggle in the "new" Quebec--was a class of professionals who had succeeded at gaining the confidence of the population by virtue of the services rendered by its members. Generated by the anomalies of the accommodation between the francophone clergy and the British colonial administrators and composed largely of lawyers, notaries and doctors, whose more radical element was inspired by a combination of French and English ideas of the times--democracy, liberalism, anti-clericalism--this new secular and predominantly middle-class (sub-) elite quickly eclipsed the clergy and seigneurs in popular esteem, if not actually in power and influence, and naturally assumed the ideological leadership of Lower Canada. The fact that they were, as Whitaker notes, educated above their largely peasant backgrounds made it difficult for these professionals to find a place in the state administration controlled by the workings of anglophone patronage. Forced, therefore, to return to their places of origin, these new middle-class elements, comprising a truly representative elite, had the dual advantage of having close ties with the people and "the voice and education to agitate on behalf of French grievances in the Assembly."[28]

Significantly, this new elite's first political moves were to involve the exploitation of the Constitution Act, which had granted representative assemblies while refusing responsible government. It will be recalled that while the Assembly in Lower Canada was dominated by francophones, the executive branch of government was in the hands of an English governor and his councillors, who were hand-picked from the ranks of the English merchant classes and thus were referred to critically as the Chateau Clique. So deficient at that time was the democratic process that, in practice, real power was seen to reside not in the hands of the people through their elected representatives, but with these appointed officials and an entirely English civil service--all of whom were responsible in the end only to the government in England, and who were given to impeding the elected representatives of the French-Canadian majority in their efforts to pass legislation. Is it surprising, then, that political chaos was the order of the day, given that those who were most vigorously opposed to the laws voted by the Assembly were often the very people called upon to put them into effect?

Indeed, the nature of the social and political circumstances that led up to and were played out during the "troubles" of 1837-38 resulted in an almost unmanageable array of difficulties for the citizenry of Lower Canada. Particularly hard hit were the English-speaking merchants of Montreal and their Québécois counterparts in Quebec city. What ultimately saved the day for the commercial elite, however, was its recognition of the fact that by somehow forcing a political union of Lower Canada (which, at the end of the 1830s, had a French population of 500,000 and a growing English population of 150,000) with Upper Canada (which had an entirely English population of 450,000), the French, being made a minority in a new assembly, would have no choice but to discontinue their obstructionist tactics. What the French Canadians found to be unsettling, indeed intolerable, about all of this was the colonial authorities' use of arbitrary methods to force them into the Union, not to mention the actual terms of the Union, which were patently unfair. Here, as Jacques Monet observes: "A population of 650,000 was to have in the united legislature the same representation as the upper province's 450,000, and the Upper Canadian debt of £1,200,000 (huge compared to Lower Canada's £95,000) was to be charged to both; . . . "[29] Still, as Trudeau has argued, there were at the time two ways in which the French Canadians could utilize the "arsenal of democratic 'fire-arms' put at their disposal." First, they could continue to sabotage the parliamentary apparatus by way of their systematic obstruction which, like the Irish strategy at Westminster, might lead to Laurentian Home Rule. Alternatively, the French Canadians could display an outward acceptance of the parliamentary "game," but without any inward allegiance to its underlying moral principles. In the end the second choice was to prevail, Trudeau notes,

> no doubt because the years 1830 to 1840 demonstrated that sabotage would lead to suppression by force. Moreover, a show of co-operation would have the added advantage of permitting French Canada to participate in the governing councils of the country as a whole. Such a decision guided most French-Canadian politicians after the union of Upper and Lower Canada, and continued to do so after Confederation.30

Thus the eventual repression of the rebellions helped to hasten the collapse of the campaign for social reform in Lower Canada. What was more was that the Act of Union of 1841 enabled the English majority in the "united" Canadas to take control of political institutions, with the general expectation that the "stubborn" and "backward" element in French-Canadian society would eventually be assimilated and that their uneconomic system of laws and customs would, once and for all, be done away with. With the conclusions and recommendations of his rather one-sided analysis of the causes of the tensions in the Canadas, Lord Durham added an air of officiality to that expectation when he opined that "the union of the two Provinces would not only give a clear English majority, but one which would be increased every year by the influence of English emigration; and I have little doubt that the French, when once placed, by the legitimate course of events and the working of natural causes, in a minority, would abandon their vain hopes of nationality."[31] Yet while Durham actively encouraged British immigration and sought at the same time to proscribe the official use of the French language, the Union Act, which was intended to be the first step in his program for reform, failed ultimately to realize his hopes for a homogeneous colony. Indeed, with the institution of responsible government (which Durham himself had recommended and which was eventually achieved in 1849, largely because of a change of government in London and the installation of a sympathetic governor in Canada), the French Canadians, as Garth Stevenson observes, "gained enough political power to secure the abandonment of his [Durham's] assimilationist design, although not enough to destroy the anglophone minority in their midst." This power resided, for instance, in the retention of the distinction between the civil law of the lower province and the common law of the upper one, as well as in the eventual recognition of the status of the French language, in spite of what turned out to be only a brief attempt to impose unilingualism. All of this and more was, Stevenson continues, guaranteed under the crucial principle which established that the government was thenceforth to be "dependent on the confidence and support of the elected lower house of the legislature."[32]

Still, as mutual discontent increased, the governing of both English-speaking and French-speaking Canadians, within what is perhaps best described as a "quasi-unitary" state, became correspondingly difficult. What helped to ease these tensions and preclude the political disaster the era of Union Government otherwise held in store for French Canadians, however, was the development, from about 1849 onward, of a rather distinctive system of intercultural elite accommodation. Quite unlike that which had evolved almost a century earlier, this accommodation saw the more moderate among the French-Canadian leaders (i.e., those who, like Louis-Hippolyte LaFontaine, opposed the democratic republicanism and anti-clericalism of Papineau and his followers) forge an alliance with the leaders of the Upper Canadian Reform movement (i.e., Robert Baldwin et al.), while at the same time managing effectively to defend French Canada's cultural interests. While this alliance strengthened, the gap between LaFontaine and his followers and the _patriote's_ autonomist faction grew steadily wider, largely as a result of the groups' ideological and motivational differences. What ultimately led to the final separation of the one from the other was, as Monet has found, LaFontaine's insistence upon no less than a constitutional solution to the French-English situation. Indeed, unlike the leaders of the "particularists" --Denis-Benjamin Viger and John Neilson held sway during Papineau's exile--LaFontaine "had concluded that the Union was not an evil in itself, that the British constitution generously applied could preserve both his people's heritage and Britain's empire." The key to success, LaFontaine argued, was not the creation of a particular state (as he had several times urged before the rebellion), but rather that the imperial authorities cease to consider the _Canadiens_ a separate race, thus excluding them from "la grande famille." Thus by identifying la survivance with the British connection and, within that context, seeking to circumvent the difficulties of the Union bill and establish responsible government--the "principe dominant de votre gouvernement constitutionnel . . . le principe démocratique, principe essentiel du gouvernement anglais"[33]--LaFontaine reasoned that all other things would thereby accrue unto the French Canadians.

Created in 1839-40, and culminating in the institution of responsible government in 1849, the famous Baldwin-LaFontaine reform alliance served to establish the mode of elite behaviour which characterized political leadership in Canada up until Confederation in 1867. During that period, the most obvious and important place where coalitions of this type were formed was within the cabinets of successive governments, cabinets which were constructed in such a way as to include representatives of both cultural communities. What is particularly interesting to note here is that cabinets were formed in this manner despite the fact that there was never a specific requirement that they be supported by a "double majority," including majorities of French and English parliamentarians. Furthermore, the governments themselves were headed by two party leaders, one from each section of the province, rather than by a single prime minister. In light of the different legal systems, moreover, separate attorneys general were appointed to the two sections. Also in consequence of this difference was the fact that some of the legislation adopted by the provincial Parliament applied only to one of the sections, while parallel but distinct legislation applied, in turn, to the other. As such, matters concerning the important areas of education and municipal affairs, for example, were dealt with differently in the two halves of the province.[34]

Perhaps the most uniformly representative government of the early post-rebellion period was that which was formed during the administration of Sir Charles Bagot, who was governor-general of Canada from 1841 to 1843. Through his opposition to the ideas, practices, and policies of his predecessors and immediate superiors--that is, of "multiplying the vendus" (French Canadians who became the allies of the British in Lower Canada) and "playing the game of Divide et impera"[35]--Bagot distinguished himself in his vice-regal post by actively conciliating the Canadiens, admitting them to an unprecedented share in the administration of the province. By way of justifying his actions to the then colonial secretary, Edward George Stanley, Bagot reasoned thus: "It is impossible to conceal from oneself that the French members of the Assembly possess the power of the Country and whoever directs that power, backed by the most efficient means of controlling it, is in a situation to govern the Province most effectually."[36] Thus applying his personal policy of taking "from all sides the best and fittest men for the public service," Bagot quickly set about making a number of significant and highly symbolic appointments, based largely on the criterion of patronage. Furthermore, insistently urged by his council in Canada to introduce some members of the French Canadian party into the government, and influenced by the changing pattern of politics in the Assembly that saw a number of Upper Canadian Reformers incline more towards a direct alliance with the French, Bagot realized that in order to carry a viable legislative program through the House, he had to, as best he could, appeal directly to the wishes of LaFontaine. In so doing the governor called upon the leader of the Canadiens to help form the cabinet, offering LaFontaine the attorney-generalship of Lower Canada, as well as the right to nominate an English solicitor-general, a French commissioner of Crown lands, and the clerk of the executive council. For his part, Lafontaine set as conditions for his acceptance of this post the inclusion in the ministry of Baldwin, the right to name another French-Canadian minister, and the resignations of two prominent Upper Canadian Tories, William Henry Draper and Henry Sherwood, with whom Baldwin could not sit. In the end LaFontaine, who had in 1841 been chosen to represent the fourth constituency of York (Toronto) at the behest of Baldwin (who had been elected in both York and Hastings counties), became attorney-general of Lower Canada; Baldwin, who was elected unanimously as the representative of Rimouski in Lower Canada following his defeat at Hastings by outraged Tories, became attorney-general of Upper Canada; Augustin-Norbert Morin, a leading unionnaire and LaFontaine's Quebec agent, was made commissioner of Crown lands; and Etienne Parent, the once-militant patriote, the editor of *Le Canadien* (the French party's Quebec city organ), and the member for Saguenay, was named clerk of the executive council. Subsequently, the remainder of the cabinet was revised so that only one Tory remained in it. Commenting on these changes in the administrative order, Wade has observed that:

> The cornerstone of responsible government was thus laid on the foundation of control of patronage by the elected representatives of the people rather than by the appointees of the Crown. For the first time since the Conquest the French Canadians were given their full share in the executive branch of the government. . . . A more united Canada could scarcely be imagined than that in which the two heads of government were elected from each other's section, regardless of ethnic and religious differences.[37]

Following what might well be described as a recession of the tide of constitutional and administrative change, caused ostensibly by the policy and conduct of Bagot's successor, Sir Charles Metcalfe (1843-46), Lord Elgin (1846-54) brought to the office of governor-general a belief, like Durham's, in the principle of responsible government and an acceptance, like Bagot's, of party monopoly of patronage. Indeed, unlike Metcalfe--an adherent of the old school of colonial rule-- who attempted to form a "governor's party," Elgin saw it as "indispensible that the head of Government should show that he has confidence in the loyalty of all the influential parties with which he has to deal, and that he should have no personal antipathies to prevent him from acting with the leading men." Motivated by this belief, then, Elgin, during the course of his administration, steered clear of the electoral fray. In his approach to the French-English problem, moreover, the new governor was, like Bagot, optimistic that the ethnic conflict in Canada could be greatly eased by the political collaboration of French and English. Thus recognizing the indispensibility of the French Canadians to any Canadian government, Elgin went a step further than did Bagot by adopting the following as one of the basic principles of his governorship:

> I believe that the problem of how to govern Canada would be solved if the French would split into a Liberal _and a_ Conservative Party and join Upper Canadian parties bearing the corresponding names.--The great difficulty hitherto has been that a Conservative Government has meant Government of Upper Canadians which is intolerable to the French--and a Radical Government a Government of the French which is no less hateful to the British. . . . The national element would be merged in the political if the split to which I refer was accomplished.38

Viewed in retrospect, however, Elgin's proposal, while unique, seems to have been somewhat unrealistic, or at least premature. Indeed, in spite of the example of the Reform alliance, the politico-ethnic tensions which tempered French-English relations at that time strongly played against intercultural collaboration at the ministerial level, and doubtless would have done the same with respect to the formation of any intra-party alliances including members from both groups. Clear proof of this lay in the fact--which Elgin himself acknowledged--that the French Canadians' strength of organization enabled them to set up a powerful opposition to any ministry from which they were excluded, while it no less certainly provoked among the British of both Upper and Lower Canada a feeling of antagonism to one of which the French formed a part. Perhaps later realizing that the French Canadians' allegiance to their party was more political than national, and now viewing the political dichotomy in terms of parties for and against responsible government rather than involving a "French" and an "English" party, Elgin, following the elections of December 1847 (during which the Reformers of both sections won majorities of the seats), nevertheless fell back upon the practice of elite accommodation and party control of patronage as a solutions to the interethnic tensions. As a result, the ministry of 1848 was to include LaFontaine and Baldwin as attorneys-general for their respective sections, Francis Hincks as inspector-general of accounts, Etienne-Pascal Taché as commissioner of public works, Thomas Cushing Aylwin and William Hume Blake as solicitors-general for Lower and Upper Canada, and René-Edouard Caron as president of the legislative council. Committing himself thereafter to being "always disposed to listen to the advice of Parliament," Elgin effectively ushered in the era of full responsible government for Canada, based largely on the system he and Grey had agreed upon prior to the governor-general's departure from England,

and which had been worked out for Nova Scotia between its governor, Sir John Harvey, and the colonial secretary. As laid down by Grey, the basic concepts of this system of responsible government were that "any transfer which may take place of political power from the hands of one political party in the province to another is the result not of an act of yours [the governor-general's] but of the wishes of the people themselves," and that "it is neither possible nor desirable to carry on the government of any of the British provinces in North America in opposition to the opinion of its inhabitants."[39]

Despite their merits, these solutions to the problems of French and English in the united province appear, in the final analysis, not to have worked particularly well. One reason for this was that since they were of roughly equal size and had equal representation in Parliament, each section of the province harboured the belief that it was being constrained and dictated to by the other. Once the western half became the more populous, however, its residents, Stevenson astutely points out, "found the equal representation of the two sections to be an intolerable affront to liberal principles, although the injustice of it had somehow managed to escape their notice when they were a minority."[40] Compounding these problems was the fact that many of the issues which came before the legislature exacerbated ethnic and religious antagonisms, reinforced as they were by the divergences of economic interest between the two sections. To be sure, while the political coalitions of 1842 and 1848 between Baldwin and LaFontaine represented a recognition of Canada's binational character and may have enabled French Canadians to participate in government patronage and to begin developing their own entrepreneurial class, condemnation of the Englishman's economic behaviour and majoritarian attitudes, as Arnopoulos and Clift argue, "remained as strong as ever, and to this day continues to fuel French nationalism."[41]

Without a doubt, then, the situation, thus defined, led not to a greater unification but rather to the estrangement of the ethnic communities (particularly at the mass level), with the less populous eastern section, still suffering from the ill effects of the rebellions, withdrawing further into itself in the name of cultural and linguistic survival. Indeed, the French Canadians were to show positive signs of the fact that the defeat of the patriotes, many of whom had more in common with Durham's liberalism than he realized, greatly strengthened those characteristics that he most deplored: their backward-looking nationalism, conservatism, and domination by the clergy. Indeed, not only did the final defeat of the rebellion in 1838 confirm the political and economic hegemony of the English in Quebec, it also served, as Whitaker notes, to reconfirm "the dominance of the Church over Quebec life, a dominance which was to last for well over a century." Stripped of the liberal-democratic promise of 1837, French-Canadian nationalism was for that period to be characterized instead by social and political conservatism, "under the close tutelage of the Church, which had become perforce the only institutionalized defender of the French language and culture." Thus coupled with the resentment and animosity that resided in the wake of the rebellion, the aversion of clerical nationalism to anything resembling "radicalism" left the English-speaking capitalists with what more or less amounted to *carte blanche*. As such, Whitaker continues, the English "were only too happy to leave the Church in charge of educating a population which was more and more to provide a cheap and docile labour force for English, American and English-Canadian capital."[42]

Thus while the united province remained theoretically a unitary state until 1867, the separateness of its eastern division was tacitly recognized in a number of ways. First and foremost among them was the fact that, even within the constraints of the Union Government, the French Canadians managed to exercise political dominance in their own territory of Canada East. It was here that the French Canadians looked to their strong leaders, who they hoped would play an effective role in the next, most crucial stage of Canada's political evolution: the negotiations for dominion status and a federal constitution.[43]

As we have seen, the Act uniting Upper and Lower Canada backfired in its attempt to bring about the rapid assimilation of French Canadians. Contrary to Rioux's contention that "with Confederation, i.e., the union of four British colonies in North America (Upper Canada, Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia), the progress of assimilation seemed irreversible,"[44] it may well be argued that Confederation itself achieved little more in this regard. In fact, as even a cursory look at the terms of and prevailing circumstances leading up to Confederation may well show, the motives for the 1867 "pact" (especially those of the English-speaking merchants) were neither predominantly political nor cultural, though these were, of course, important considerations. Instead, the primary motives for Confederation were largely economic.

Indeed, since neither the status quo nor any of the alternatives--i.e., representation by population; the transformation of the unitary state into a federal union of the two sections; complete separation between the two, as had existed for half a century before 1841; and even a formal requirement that the government be supported by a double majority--proposed as solutions to the difficulties in Canada were widely accepted, territorial expansion began to be considered, particularly since economic motives pointed in the same direction. With each half of the Province of Canada tending to prefer that which corresponded to its own point of the compass, the alternatives ranged from eastward expansion, to include the other British colonies on the Atlantic seaboard, to westward expansion, to absorb the inland fur-trading empire of the Hudson's Bay

Company. In documenting the situation as it stood at about 1857, Stevenson points up what amounted to a compromise solution, which could be turned to in the event that either section objected to one or the other of these alternatives: "Expansion in both directions at once might satisfy both sections, permit federalism (a separate government for each section with a central government over both) while avoiding the dangers of a double-headed monstrosity, and enable French-speaking Canadians to accept representation by population in the lower house at the same time as the more onerous conventions of the existing system could be safely eliminated."[45] The ministry headed by John A. Macdonald and George-Etienne Cartier which, in 1858, committed itself to seeking a federal union of the colonies was soon to be brought to the realization that its initiative was at best premature. While the internal problems of the province were already insoluble by any other means, there emerged, during the early 1860s, an external threat to the security of British North America. Posed as it was by the American Civil War, this threat, as one of the primary tenets of consociational theory holds, nevertheless proved to be an essential condition for the formation of the Canadian federal union, both in terms of securing from the colonies themselves the necessary amount of support for unification and, equally important if not more so, winning the support of the British government. The British government had up until 1864 discouraged efforts toward Confederation. At that time, however, it reversed itself, citing an increased need for military defence and security as its reasons for doing so. A united British North America, especially one tied together by railways, it reasoned, would be more defensible and could bear a larger share of the costs of its own defence. It was no accident, then, that, during the interim--within which the Canadian and British authorities grappled with this potentially divisive problem--the various economic interests that led to Confederation became coincident with not only the broader aim of defence but also with the particular aim of commercial development and capital gain.

Indeed, in the same way that the Act of Union fulfilled a long-cherished aspiration of the Montreal merchants--that of erasing what they considered to be the economically irrational Ottawa River boundary, thus freeing them from the domination of the largely francophone legislature--the prospect of Confederation brought to fruition a number of the commercial and economic schemes of this influential group. For instance, the Montreal bourgeoisie and their chief political spokesmen like Cartier and Alexander Tilloch Galt, held high among their various economic motives an interest in uniting with the Maritimes and in building the Intercolonial Railway, which, it was expected, would funnel more trade through their city. At the same time, however, the large number of French-Canadian farmers in Canada East (Quebec) feared the growing economic, demographic, and political power of Canada West (Ontario). To be sure, in the heyday of British mercantilism prior to 1849, Montreal represented the chief Canadian stronghold of merchant capitalism, what with the city's dominant financial institution, the Bank of Montreal, claiming among its customers the government of the united province. Still, it is argued that while Montreal was at the time of Confederation Canada's largest city and leading economic centre (as it was to remain for some time to come), Toronto, although then much smaller than Montreal, was rising rapidly as an economic centre in its own right. For instance, in an attempt to upset the economic hegemony of the eastern metropolis, George Brown and a group of prominant Toronto businessmen organized the Bank of Commerce as a counterweight to the Bank of Montreal. What was more was the fact that, unlike their Montreal counterparts, these and other Toronto businessmen had litle interest in the Maritimes. Instead, they looked with increasing enthusiasm toward the West, which they viewed as potentially a vast extension of Toronto's agricultural hinterland in Canada West. Moreover, westward expansion would, they argued, help to ease the pressure of the growing population on the limited supply of land and end the necessity of migration southward in search of new agricultural opportunities.

With the means to propagate their own viewpoints, these economic interests were tied together by the so-called Great Coalition of 1864. Here Brown, the spokesman for Toronto's business elite, joined forces with Macdonald, whose political allies included Cartier and Galt. During the Confederation debates Macdonald accepted the federal concept, about which he had serious reservations even though he had long supported the union of the colonies. For his part, Brown also accepted the federal union (the only possible kind acceptable to French Canadians or Maritimers) as well as expansion to the East, shrewdly reasoning, as the American experience had demonstrated, that a federal state would be "capable of gradual and efficient expansion in future years to meet all the great purposes contemplated by our scheme."[46] Cartier and his followers were to accept the prospect of westward expansion, of course only as part of a package that included federalism (with specific provisions for a province of Quebec maintaining its own legislature) and the absorption of the Maritimes (as a counterweight to Ontario and the West).

Faced with the fear and trepidation of his followers, Cartier in particular, as P.B. Waite reports, "gambled his political life and won." By way of persuading French Canadians that the course they were about to embark upon was the right one, Cartier "swore that Confederation was necessary, and that it would not in any way weaken French-Canadian privileges." Still, in spite of being strongly entrenched as a French Conservative and as superintendent (in his role as attorney-general East) of the then forthcoming Code Civile, Cartier's power over French

Canadians, which his opponents openly acknowledged, enabled him, with the tacit though not yet overt assistance of the Church, to carry only a narrow majority of the French-Canadian members of the House of Commons with him. Indeed, of the 48 French-Canadian members present on March 11, 1865, 27 voted for Confederation, 21 against. Although the small but influential middle group that Cartier secured was manifestly uncomfortable about the break-up of the status quo, it nevertheless believed that "the time had come to recognize necessity."[47] Yet if French Canadians were for the moment convinced of the "necessity" of Confederation, disillusionment with the project would, as Stevenson notes, "come later with the ungenerous response of other provinces to the growth of their francophone minorities, the development of the prairie after its annexation into an overwhelmingly anglophone region, and the slow but steady erosion of Quebec's influence in federal politics."[48] As a result, the more ardently nationalist Quebeckers clung ever more tenaciously to their defensive and conservative ideology. Others, inspired mainly by Quebec's uneasiness at the gradual shift of Canada's economic centre from the so-called "Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence" to the "Golden Horseshoe" region of southern Ontario, were forced to emigrate to the United States. So as to counter this emigration, the French-Canadian clerical elite and middle class, Rioux notes, thus "began a large-scale movement of colonization and of a return to the soil."[49]

By and large, Confederation entailed both benefits and risks for the inhabitants of Quebec and, since they formed the majority in Quebec, the French Canadians had the most to gain or lose, whatsoever the case may have been. French Canadians were to benefit from Confederation by way of acquiring a range of powers, limited but sacrosanct, over their own affairs. This meant that the new entity, the province of Quebec, could serve as a concrete political unit, protected under law by provisions enumerated in the British North America Act. In essence, the new Constitution provided that the French-Canadian community could be clearly dominant within its own territory and thus have the opportunity to survive on its own terms. However, the price French Canadians paid for this provincial autonomy was their relegation to the position of a permanent minority at the federal level, where their rights and powers were subject to the actions of the Anglo-Canadian majority. To be sure, the real protection of French-Canadian rights and interests came only from the autonomous powers that they could exercise in their own province. Still, these rights and interests were to some extent protected by the informal alliances of French and English elites in the bi-ethnic parties, which were formed during the political stabilization after 1850. In this regard, McRoberts has demonstrated that such protection, in federal political institutions, has been achieved through a pattern of French-English accommodation, shaped in large part by a specialization of roles. Indeed, it is argued here that, for a little more than a century after its creation, the federal government was marked by clear norms of ethnic segmentation. For instance, cabinet portfolios concerned with the direction of the country's economy (i.e., Finance and Trade and Commerce) were invariably held by anglophones. (A distinct exception to that rule, however, was Hector-Louis Langevin's term--from 1869 to 1873--as Minister of Public Works, at that time an important "economic" portfolio.) Francophones, on the other hand, typically held ministries, such as Justice, which carried a significant amount of prestige within the predominantly liberal professional francophone elite. Even so, francophones still ranked high in the pecking order for appointment to such ministries as Public Works or the Post Office, which controlled the types of concrete, distributive patronage upon which mass-based, clientilist politics depended. As our earlier analysis has shown, this particular pattern of ethnic specialization began with the formation of the "alliance" cabinets of the 1840s.[50]

Conversely, anglophones played important roles within the Quebec provincial government; but, for the most part, there emerged from Quebec a form of ethnic specialization between the federal and provincial levels ~~of~~ government. Proof of the first may be found in the fact that, prior to the end of the nineteenth century, two Quebec premiers were English Canadians. John Jones Ross, whom Wade describes somewhat more accurately as a "Scottish *Métis*,"[51] "owing to

Ross's Scottish and French-Canadian parentage, was premier between 1884 and 1887; and Edmund James Flynn held that office from 1896 to 1897. Moreover, usually between 40 per cent and 50 per cent of the members of provincial cabinets were English Canadians--members who would receive the "traditional" economic portfolios, such as Treasury and Financial Institutions. Yet--and this relates to the second point--the tendency during the twentieth century has been for Quebec anglophones to gravitate toward federal-level institutions. By and large, this tendency can be viewed as a direct function of the declining economic and demographic strength of the English in Quebec, as well as of their dissatisfaction with the policies and programmes of the Union Nationale and the Parti Quebecois, which together held office for 32 of the past 50 years. Thus given their consequent pre-eminence within Quebec provincial institutions as well as the limitations on their participation at the federal level, the French Canadians were quick to view the provincial government as a francophone bastion, defining it as their primary base for political action. Still, the full implications of the ethnic specialization between levels of government were not to become fully evident until the 1960s, when there arose a firm determination to expand the role of the provincial government within Quebec society.[52]

C. Demography and the Transition to Mass Politics

Commenting on the so-called "dogma of cultural particularism," John Porter notes that, as the "mass society" develops, regionalism, local autonomy and group differences are fostered. Applying this argument to the case of Quebec province, Porter claims that while Quebec without a doubt is a special case where there is validity in the notion of cultural particularism, the province has, under the dual influences of industrialization and urbanization, become culturally more like other industrialized societies. As a result, the similarities in social characteristics that Quebec's urbanized population shares with other provinces may now be far more important than the differences that remain. More importantly, Porter maintains that public sentiments in Quebec, which arose from the province's particular culture, were exploited in the interests of power almost to the same extent that they were protected by provincial autonomy. The low occupational level of French Canadians; the rigidity of French-Canadian class structure; the authoritarian nature of French-Canadian institutions--these are among the characteristics Porter cites as having been as much a consequence of the power enjoyed by French-Canadian provincial politicians in coalition with "alien" corporate powers as they were a consequence of domination by the British charter group. Arguing in a similar vein, Robert Presthus notes that, despite their cohesion in the face of external challenges, French

Canadians have been divided along several axes. For example:

> Motivated by well-meant aspirations for economic development, their leaders sometimes colluded with foreign economic interests at the expense of the working class. More recently, and possibly encouraged by somewhat flamboyant federal spending policies, competitive cultural and economic aspirations have encouraged certain government expenditures that, in Montreal particularly, seem at times to ignore basic social needs. The Church, which enjoyed full legitimacy in virtually every sphere, inculcated values that often seemed inapposite to the social and economic aspirations of its members. . . . Educational values, which remained within the tradition of the classical college, sometimes proved inapposite to emerging needs.[53]

As such, concludes Porter, "French-speaking Canadians and other Catholic groups outside Quebec may well have fared better as provincial minorities, if education, for example, had been more a federal responsibility than a provincial one."[54]

To be sure, older elite styles did indeed result in the structuring of French-Canadian society in the way in which both Porter and Presthus have described it; and dramatic changes, resulting mainly from the rapid industrialization which began about 1914, did of course modify many aspects of Quebec's traditional social structure. Still, as the foregoing would seem to imply, the maintenance of political stability in French Canada and the larger Quebec society apparently had less to do with the way in which such styles of "pre-modern" elite co-operation and coalition may have "eased the transition to mass politics" (as Daalder suggests that they should)[55] than with the notion, as assumed by the theory of political development, that industrialization and concomitant urbanization and secularization resulted in increased levels of participation at the mass level. We must concede, however, that quantitative measures, such as voter turnout and voluntary group membership, have shown that actual participation remained relatively unchanged during the period of modernization in Quebec. Specifically, studies have revealed that high turnout has been a consequence of consistently high participation in rural areas, in Quebec as elsewhere, whereas in urban areas like Montreal rates were only 50 per cent to 65 per cent. This, however, appears to be somewhat anomolous, particularly insofar as one would expect to find a higher rate of political participation in urban areas where, by definition, industrialization is quicker to take hold. One of the factors most readily cited when explaining this condition is the well developed system of patronage in the predominantly French-Canadian rural areas, a system which was augmented by the relatively low rate of political participation by English-Canadian elements in Montreal ridings. Even where federal elections were concerned, moreover, there was no evidence of increased voting as a result of modernization.[56]

Viewing the situation differently, some observers have suggested that such mass-based parties as the Parti Québécois, such pressure groups as the Estates Générale, and even the appearance of the terrorist group Front de Libération de Québec (FLQ) were symbols of increased participation. It has been pointed out, however, that such parties and pressure groups (earlier examples of which were _Ralliement créditiste_ and _la Société Saint-Jean Baptiste_ respectively) had a tendency of showing up rather frequently in the province throughout its history. In fact, in his general conclusions, one observer has noted that the aggregate analysis of census characteristics and political participation (i.e., voter turnout) reveals a clearly negative relationship between social mobilization (_read_ modernization) and political participation in Quebec.[57] Still, when viewing the situation (as we shall) in terms of the _qualitative_ nature of relatively recent political developments in Quebec--for example, a more positive view of government, the strengthening of French-Canadian nationalism, the modernization and liberalization of party structures, and a general reshaping of traditional goals into a more positive pattern--one does find evidence of unprecedented political change. All of this may in one way or another be attributed to the exodus of French Canadians from rural areas to the cities and its causes. Also, we shall see that there has remained, within the context of this change, one all-important and constant value which may in part explain the uncertain path of economic development and political stability in Quebec: the time-honoured, French-Canadian theme of cultural nationalism.

Whereas, in historical context, the state-building and industrial expansion of the early years of Confederation had clear economic implications for Quebec's commercial elite, the effects of such developments on the mass of the French-Canadian population were largely of a cultural nature. As has been noted, there emerged from this period in Quebec's history an ideological perspective on the nature of the French-Canadian community itself, and on its relationship with the federation as a whole, that was dominated by the notion of survivance. As the Quebec provincial government was increasingly to be viewed as a largely francophone institution, the political process quite naturally became the primary means through which French-Canadian culture and religion could be defended. Since matters of a "cultural" nature were of singular importance to French Canadians, emphasis here was, as McRoberts and Posgate observe, explicitly to avoid "questioning the economic power of the English in Montreal or the economic consequences of cheap French-Canadian labour that was being hired by American and Anglo-Canadian enterprises." Yet while the ideology and its emphasis maintained that survival necessitated the rejection of industrial society, and hence social and economic change, French Canadians would, during the first few decades of the twentieth century, have to confront this change, which was "taking root in French-Canadian society to such an extent that the ideology would be reduced to mythology, albeit a tenacious one." Indeed, prior to 1900, the challenge to French Canada had come mainly from external forces and events such as military defeat, economic domination, repressive colonial policies, and constitutional manipulation. Now, however, the challenge was different insofar as it came from within the province itself and, as the authors note, "it directly involved the mass of the French-Canadian population, not just the elite."[58]

By way of their overwhelming preoccupation with the elements of collective survival--e.g., ethnic solidarity; the preservation of their language, culture, and religion; the ownership of agricultural land--and their relative distaste for and disinterest in matters economic, the mass of the French-Canadian population were, in the long term, to leave the way clear for the continuation of the French-English entente cordiale at the elite level. Still, as the years progressed, there arose a number of threats that had, delicately, to be warded off. For instance, the immediate and long-term effects of such issues and occurrences as the execution of Louis Riel in 1885, the Manitoba Separate Schools questions of the 1890s, the controversy which took place in Ontario in 1913 concerning the language of education, and the conscription crises of 1917 and 1942-44 threatened to undermine the stability of French Canada as a cultural community and that of the Canadian "community" as a whole. Although the Riel affair, for example, seemed to demonstrate that an Anglo-Canadian federal government had little concern for French-Canadian interests and sentiments, the informal elite alliance was protected by the electoral necessity of winning some French support in a national election. After the Riel affair, the French-English alliance in Ottawa shifted away from the Conservatives, who were becoming increasingly identified with Orange elements in Ontario. The Liberals were to benefit greatly from this shift as, under the leadership of Sir Wilfrid Laurier, they managed to shed the anti-clerical rouge image that had tainted them in the 1870s and 1880s. Further, the shift was consolidated by Laurier's ascendency to the federal leadership, and since 1891 the majority of Quebec's seats have gone to the Liberals in every federal election except two, in 1958 and 1984.[59]

In the province of Quebec itself, the lure of economic opportunity (posed by the rapid development Confederation introduced for Canada as a whole), coupled with the francophones' adherence to traditional norms and customs, made for an ambivalence which threatened to unravel the French-Canadian social fabric in two particular respects, both of which were, interestingly enough, predicted by Lord Durham. Furthermore--and this is to state matters in an oversimplified manner--this dynamic would, in turn, give rise to a revolutionary French-Canadian ideology which, when set in motion, bore serious consequences for the traditional alliance of French and English elites in Quebec.

First, as was noted above, a change in the employment situation, caused by the movement of Canada's economic centre from the St. Lawrence to southern, Ontario forced many Quebeckers to seek work in New England. Here, as Ramsay Cook points out, about half a million French Canadians emigrated to the United States in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Partly as a result, the French-speaking population had, by 1921, reached its lowest level--27.9 per cent of the total Canadian population. Second, as the industrial development of the province began to accelerate, an increasing number of French Canadians became city-dwellers and industrial labourers. In short, then, the demographic scenario for the first half of the twentieth century read as follows: in 1901, 40 per cent of the population of Quebec lived in cities; in 1911, the percentage had risen to 48; another 8 per cent had been added in 1921, thus causing the urban population to exceed the rural population for the first time in history; and the figures for 1931 and 1951 were 63 and 67 per cent respectively.[60]

As the primary focus of this process of urbanization, Montreal tripled in size during the period 1871 to 1921. By comparison, Quebec City grew by less than 50 per cent, and while three other cities--Sherbrooke, Trois Rivières, and Hull--each doubled in size, they still only had populations of 20-25,000, as compared with Montreal's 618,506. It is important to note, however, that these figures tend to disguise the fact that French Canadians were still considerably less urbanized than the province's English Canadians, and that during the 1940s, the movement to the

II, however, the process has been so strong that now more than 80 per cent of Quebec's French-origin population is urban.) In 1931, for example, 59 per cent of the French-Canadian population dwelt in urban areas as compared with 82 per cent of the English-Canadian population. Moreover, although it contained 36 per cent of Quebec's total population in 1931, Montreal was 40 per cent non-French, and only 27 per cent of the province's French Canadians resided there.[61]

By and large, the industrialization that took place in Quebec during the period under consideration turned out to be a mixed blessing. Indeed, while it helped to stem the upsetting French-Canadian diaspora to the United States and other parts of Canada and provided jobs in times of surplus labour, economic expansion nonetheless served to undermine the cohesion and solidarity of French-Canadian society. With respect to the cultural consequences of this industrialization, Arnopoulos and Clift note that:

> The chain of command in many industries demanded a loyalty that competed, as it were, with that required by traditional institutions such as the Church, the family, and the parish, and by the whole tenor of rural life. Industrialization introduced instability and tensions by displacing the old feelings about one's place and role in society, and substituting newer notions of careers and upward mobility.62

As such, industrialization (and concomitant urbanization) proved, socially, to be a disorienting experience, leading, as it did, French-Canadian elites into somewhat contradictory attitudes. As was to be expected, clerical and nationalist elements were allied in their implacable condemnation of industrial society, the dangers of the large city, and the depradations of big business. In this respect, change was much less evident than in other spheres of French-Canadian society. However, this is not to imply that the clerical domain was immune to the pressures brought to bear by those elements in society which were predisposed to change. On the contrary, such pressures, while still peripheral, made themselves felt in tendencies that indicated changes in the dominant role of the Church. Here urban intellectuals began to question the Church's predominance in Quebec's social and cultural affairs and, as alluded to by Arnopoulos and Clift, the Church was having to adapt to a new type of parishioner, the urban factory worker. Even within the apparent sanctity of the rural Quebec parish, the time-honoured authority of the curé was threatened by signs of instability and change.[63]

The political situation in Quebec was, at least initially, considerably more stable. Owing to the French Canadians' continuing antipathy towards the Conservatives, the Quebec Liberal party, like its federal counterpart, dominated politics at the provincial level, staying in power, usually with large majorities, for the forty-year period from 1897 to 1936. The extent to which this dominance was perpetuated was in large measure a result of the fact that electoral politics in Quebec, as elsewhere in Canada, was very much centred on the dispensation of patronage. Here, as close observers of Quebec politics have found, the parties were run by caucus, not by open organizations, and at the constituency level drew on the local elite--typically a small group of lawyers, other professionals, and the proprietors of small businesses--who distributed patronage at that level. Although it was similar to the federal and other provincial governments in these respects, patronage in Quebec City took on a significant additional form, namely, the encouragement of large-scale external (i.e., non-French) investment through incentives such as cheap rights to mineral and forest resources, monopolies over public utilities, and an unregulated and unorganized labour force. Thus by way of this judicious use of patronage, provincial governments, such as the Taschereau Liberals and the Union Nationale under M. Duplessis, were able to preserve, up until 1960, the accommodation with Anglo-Canadian and American commercial enterprise. Likewise, these governments managed to maintain the prominence of the rural vote over the urban vote by a margin of almost two to one, in spite of the increasing trend towards urbanization.[64]

By the 1960s, however, the combined clerical and politically nationalist elements in Quebec began to find it increasingly difficult to discourage, much less to counteract, the exodus from the country-side to the cities. Thus rather than attempt to fight the seemingly irreversible trend towards urbanization and industrialization, French

Canadians, with the emergence at that time of a "neo-nationalist" intelligentsia and a new, career-oriented, upwardly mobile bureaucratic middle class, decided to abandon their traditional assumptions about the character and needs of their "nation" and set about making their peace with industrial society. No longer did the mass of French Canadians labour under the "agrarian myth," nor did they continue to subscribe to the clergy's anti-etatisme. Now the new belief (summed up by McRoberts and Posgate in their phrase "The New Ideology of the Quebec State") was that rather than posing a threat to the integrity of their nation, social and economic development within the urban sector could enable French Canada to reach new accomplishments. Indeed, as one observer has so aptly noted, the cultural consequences of the recognition of the economic reality in Quebec "seem[ed] to represent the final repudiation of the agrarian, clergy-bound view of French Canada and the full-scale emergence of an industrial society ready and eager to compete within the North American environment and beyond."[65] Accordingly, the emerging bureaucratic leadership within this "new Quebec" set about to prove that not only could the French culture survive in an urban-industrial society, but that that very society, guided by a positive state, could provide a better life than French Canadians had hitherto experienced. This, then, was the promise of the period of the "Quiet Revolution," a time when, from their base in Quebec City, the political leaders of the French-Canadian subgroup would directly confront their ethnic and economic counterpart, resident in the powerful city of Montreal--the site of the earliest Anglo-Canadian commercial interests and the centre of English-speaking Quebec.

D. NOTES

1. Hans Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations: The Cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland,"in Kenneth D. McRae, Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), p. 121.

2. Ibid., p. 122 (italics added). N.B.: This theoretical outline is in large part drawn from McRae, "Introduction," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, pp. 10-13.

3. Daalder, "On Building Consociational Nations," p. 114.

4. H. Daalder, "Cabinets and Party Systems in Ten European Democracies," Acta Politica 6 (1971): 299-300. A broader exploration of this theme may be found in idem, "Parties, Elites, and Political Development," in Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), pp. 43-77.

5. G.F.G. Stanley, "The Federal Bargain: The Contractarian Basis of Confederation," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, pp. 276-77.

6. See William Ormsby, "The Province of Canada: The Emergence of Consociational Politics," in McRae, Consociational Democracy, pp. 269, 274; see also Donald V. Smiley, The Canadian Political Nationality (Toronto & London: Methuen, 1967), pp. 5-6.

7. Reginald A. Whitaker, "The Quebec Cauldron," in Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams, Canadian Politics in the 1980s (Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1981), pp. 28, 29.

8. Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate, Quebec Social Change and Political Crisis, Revised Edition (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980), p. 15.

9. Michel Brunet, "La conquête anglaise et la déchéance de la bourgeoise canadienne, 1760-1793," Amérique française 12, 2 (juin 1955): 46, as quoted in Marcel Rioux, Quebec in Question, Updated Edition, trans. by James Boake (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1978), p. 34 (italics added).

10. Francis Parkman, Montcalm and Wolfe: France and England in North America, (Centenary Edition, Boston: n.p., 1922), 426, first published in 1884; as quoted by Michel Brunet, "The British Conquest: Canadian Social Scientists and the Fate of the Canadiens," Canadian Historical Review (June 1959): 96.

11. Rioux, Quebec in Question, p. 29.

12. Alfred Dubuc, Les classes sociales au Canada de 1760 à 1840 (Montréal: Université de Montréal, mimoegraphed, 1967), pp. 19-20, as quoted in Rioux, Quebec in Question, pp. 44-45. See also Brunet, "The British Conquest," pp. 101, 102; Kenneth McRoberts, "Internal Colonialism: The Case of Quebec," Ethnic and Racial Studies 2, 3 (July 1979): 301; and Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos and Dominque CLift, The English Fact in Quebec, Second Edition (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984) p. 225.

13. Whitaker, "The Quebec Cauldron," in Whittington and Williams, ed., Canadian Politics in the 1980s, p. 29.

14. Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, pp. 20-21.

15. Mason Wade, The French Canadians 1700-1967, Revised Edition, in two volumes; Volume I, 1760-1911 (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, Limited, 1968), pp. 63-64. See also Garth Stevenson, Unfufilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity, Revised Edition (Toronto: Gage Publishing Limited, 1982), p. 85.

16. Henri Marrou, "Préface française," Espirit, (août-septembre 1952): 7, note 1, as quoted by Rioux, Quebec in Question, p. 35.

17. Brunet, "The British Conquest," pp. 101, 102.

18. McRoberts, "Internal Colonialism," p. 301.

19. McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), pp. 30-31.

20. Rioux, Quebec in Question, p. 37.

21. Gustave Lanctôt. L'Administration de la Nouvelle-France (Paris, 1929), p. 140, as quoted by Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," in Trudeau, Federalism and the French Canadians (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968), p. 104. See also Fernand Ouellet, "M. Michel Brunet et le probléme de la conquête," Bulletin des recherches historiques (juin 1956): "La sociéte canadienne à l'époque de la Nouvelle-France avait vécu sous l'absolutisme le plus complet" (p. 99).

22. Rioux, Quebec in Question, p. 38.

23. Ibid., p. 37.

24. See, for instance, Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy

in Quebec," in Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, pp. 103-23.

25. See Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," p. 104; and Frank R. Scott, "Canada et Canada Français," *Espirit*, (août-septembre 1952): 185. Unless noted to the contrary, the description of nineteenth-century French Canada that follows here is in large part derived from Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos and Dominique Clift, *The English Fact in Quebec*, pp. 10-15; and Rioux, *Quebec in Question*, pp. 46-52.

26. See William Kingsford, *The History of Canada*, Vol. IV (Toronto, 1890), p. 45, as cited by Brunet, "The British Conquest," p. 97.

27. Lionel Groulx, *Histoire du Canada français depuis la découverte*, Vol. 2 (Montréal: Fides, 1960), p. 131, as cited by Rioux, *Quebec in Question*, p. 46.

28. Whitaker, "The Quebec Cauldron," in Whittington and Williams, *Canadian Politics in the 1980s*, p. 29.

29. Jacques Monet, *The Last Cannon Shot: A Study of French-Canadian Nationalism, 1837-1850* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976), p. 40.

30. Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," in Trudeau, *Federalism and the French Canadians*, p. 106.

31. Excerpted from *The Report of the Earl of Durham, Her Majesty's High Commissioner and Governor General of British North America*, 4th ed. (London: Methuen, 1930), p. 215 as quoted in Paul G. Cornell, Jean Hamelin, Fernand Ouellet and Marcel Trudel, eds. *Canada: Unity in Diversity* (Toronto-Montreal: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada, Limited, 1967), p. 214.

32. Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union*, p. 86; see also pp. 21, 22.

33. *Papiers LaFontaine*, LaFontaine à Ellice, 17, 29 avril 1838, as cited in Monet, *The Last Cannon Shot*, p. 46. Also see Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union*, p. 21.

34. See Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union*, pp. 21, 22. For interesting discussions of the debate concerning the application of the so-called doctrine of "double majority" to the governing of the Province of Canada, as well as for a look at the doctrine's relative merits and shortcomings, see Monet, *The Last Cannon Shot*, pp. 204-10, 212-16, 260; and Ormsby, "The Emergence of Consociational Politics," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 271-72.

35. Bagot Papers, 9, Edward George Stanley to Bagot, 1 Sept., 3 Oct. 1842, as cited in Monet, The Last Cannon Shot, p. 103.

36. Bagot Papers, 7, Bagot to Stanley, 28 July 1842, ibid., p. 104.

37. Wade, The French Canadians, Vol. 1, pp. 240, 242; see also pp. 234, 238; and Monet, The Last Cannon Shot, pp. 89, 90, 103, 104, 116.

38. See A.G. Doughty, ed., Elgin-Grey Papers (4 Vols., Ottawa, 1937), Vol. 1, p. 20, Elgin to Grey, 27 March 1847; see also Kennedy, Documents, 500-1, Elgin to Lady Elgin, 13 July 1847, both of which were quoted by Wade, The French Canadians, Vol. 1, at pp. 252 and 251, respectively.

39. See Wade, The French Canadians, Vol. 1, pp. 253, 255. See also Monet, The Last Cannon Shot, p. 257; Thomas Chapais, Cours d'histoire du Canada, Vol. 6 (Quebec, 1929), pp. 36-37; Doughty, Elgin-Grey Papers, Vol. 1, p. 28, Elgin to Grey, 26 April 1847; and Elgin-Grey Papers, Vol. 3, pp. 1022-23, Grey to Harvey, 3 November 1846.

40. See Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union, pp. 21, 22.

41. Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec (1984), p. 15.

42. Whitaker, "The Quebec Cauldron," in Whittington and Williams, Canadian Politics in the 1980s, p. 30.

43. See McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), p. 32; and Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union, p. 86.

44. Rioux, Quebec in Question, p. 59.

45. Stevenson, Unfulfilled Union, p. 23; see also p. 22. Unless noted otherwise, what follows here is drawn from this source, at pp. 21-27, 86.

46. See The Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada/1865, a selection edited and introduced by P.B. Waite (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963), p. 60

47. P.B. Waite, "Introduction," in P.B. Waite, ed., The Confederation Debates, pp. vi, xviii. See also Province of Canada, Assembly Journals, 1865 (1st Session), p. 192; Province of Canada, Legislature, Parliamentary Debates on the Subject of Confederation of the British North American Provinces, 1865, p. 962; and Paul G. Cornell, The Alignment of Political Groups in Canada, 1841-1867 (Toronto, 1962),

pp. 58, 59 and Table 19.

48. Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union*, p. 34.

49. Rioux, *Quebec in Question*, pp. 59-60.

50. See McRoberts and Posgate, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis* (1980), p. 32; McRoberts, "Internal Colonialism," p. 301; and Frederick W. Gibson, ed., "Cabinet Formation and Bicultural Relations," *Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, No. 6 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970). Also, see pp. 149-50, 152 above.

51. Wade, *The French Canadians*, Vol. 1, p. 396.

52. See McRoberts, "Internal Colonialism," pp. 301-02; Robert Boily, "Les hommes politique de Québec, 1867-1967," in Richard Desrosiers, ed., *Les Personnel politique québécois* (Montréal: Les éditions du Boréal Express, 1972), p. 61; Jean Hamelin and Louise Beaudoin, "Les Cabinets provinciaux, 1867-1967," ibid., pp. 98-101; and Joseph Desjardins, *Guide parlementaire Historique de la province Québec, 1792 à 1902* (Québec, 1902), pp. 42-44.

53. Robert Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973), p. 50.

54. John Porter, *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1977), p. 383.

55. See above pp. 112-13, and note 4.

56. See Dale Posgate, "Social Mobilization and Social Change in Quebec," (unpublished doctoral dissertation, State University of New York at Buffalo. 1972), pp. 227, 232; and Vincent Lemieux, *Parenté et Politique: l'organisation sociale dans i'Ile d'Orleans* (Québec: Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1971).

57. See Posgate "Social Mobilization," pp. 315, 324-40. For comparative data on group membership among French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians, see Presthus, *Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics*, Chap. 10.

58. McRoberts and Posgate, *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis* (1980), p. 33.

59. See ibid., pp. 32-33.

60. See Ramsay Cook, *Canada and the French-Canadian Question* (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1966), p. 83; see also Rioux, *Quebec in Question*, p. 63.

61. See McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), pp. 34, 50.

62. Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, pp. 32, 33; see also Cook, Canada and the French-Canadian Question, p. 83.

63. See Léon Gérin, "The French-Canadian Family--its Strengths and Weaknesses," in Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin, eds., French-Canadian Society, Vol. 1 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), pp. 32-57; Gérald Fortin, "L'Etude du milieu rural," in Fernand Dumont, ed., Situation de la recherche sur la Canada français (Québec: Presses de l'Université Laval, 1962), pp. 106-09; McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), p. 34; and Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, p. 33.

64. See McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), p. 35; and Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, p. 33.

65. Peter C. Newman, "The New Corporate Champions," Maclean's, June 17, 1985, Vol. 98, no. 24, p. 31. See also McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis (1980), Chap. 6, esp. pp. 94-103; and Cook, Canada and the French-Canadian Question, pp. 83-84.

IV. Consociationalism as a Pattern of Social Structure

> English and French, we climb by a double flight of stairs toward the destinies reserved for us on this continent, without knowing each other, without meeting each other, and without even seeing each other, except on the landing of politics. In social and literary terms, we are far more foreign to each other than the English and French of Europe.1
>
> Pierre J.-O. Chauveau

A. Theoretical Perspective

The second of Kenneth McRae's approaches to the study of consociationalism to be dealt with in this thesis is viewed as a function of the social structure of cleavage, whether of a religious, linguistic, cultural or ideological nature. In essence, this approach holds that the extent to which consociational politics will develop is largely dependent upon the degree to which a given society is segmented around a line or lines of salient or intense cleavage. Viewed in terms of empirical analysis, the hallmark of this approach is to begin by identifying institutionalized cleavage structures and then observing to what extent elements of cohesion and co-operation emerge in the political system. Here, unlike Arend Lijphart, who defines consociationalism first and foremost in terms of the existence of "overarching co-operation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system," Val R. Lorwin, with whom much of the theoretical work on the present approach is identified, defines consociational systems in terms of the bases of party formation and voluntary associations and leaves open the question of elite co-operation and political outcomes. For his part, Lorwin sees this concept, which he characterizes as a pattern of "segmented pluralism," as involving

> the organization of social movements, educational and communications systems, voluntary associations, and political parties along the lines of religious and ideological cleavages. It is pluralist in its recognition of diversity of religious, socioeconomic, and political affiliations; it is "segmented" in its institutionalization of most other forms of association along the lines of politico-religious cleavage.

"Not building effective elite co-operation into the definition," Lorwin claims, "makes one more likely to examine the conditions which induce, and those which inhibit or frustrate, such co-operation."[2]

Conceptually at least, the basic requirement for this approach would seem to be that the cleavage or cleavages in question should be sufficiently intense and durable enough to give members of the respective groups a distinctive and persistent outlook or cultural orientation that is different from that of other segments; in other words, a raison d'être for maintaining organized segmentation whereby the respective segments each maintain their own distinctive generalized view of life which serves as a rallying point for preserving such segmentation. The four "classic" cases of consociational democracy, for example, meet this requirement, owing largely to the fact that the primary dimension of cleavage in each has been, at least in a formal-structural sense, religious and ideological, and is thereby reflective of the broad lines of cleavage common to much of Western Europe. As far as these cases are concerned, it has been demonstrated that the development of mass politics in the Catholic or partially Catholic West European democracies has led typically to a tripartite division of social organization and a corresponding structure of major political parties. Specifically, this division comprises a Roman Catholic, a secular liberal and a socialist sector. For the most part, these three categories apply fairly directly to Austria and Belgium in particular, and with minor variations to Switzerland (where the farmers have a fourth significant party and corresponding interest groups) and to the Netherlands (where Calvinism has developed its own social sector and its own religiously oriented parties).

To be sure, segmentation in other settings can and does run along other lines of cleavage, such as race, caste or social class. As stated above, however, segmented pluralism requires that cleavages be substantially deep and lasting in nature--that is, cleavages that have been incorporated comprehensively into social structures and reflected in the political process. Here Lorwin claims that "the availibility of individual alternatives distinguishes the politics of segmented pluralism from those based on caste, communalism, race, or even language."[3] For his part, McRae questions whether the distinction between religious-ideological cleavage and other forms of cleavage may in fact be less fundamental than Lorwin appears to suggest. Indeed, by way of testing the validity of Lorwin's claim, McRae in turn questions whether, given the logic of comprehensive segmentation with minimal cross-pressures in the consociational model, voluntary interbloc transfers of allegiance are likely to take place as the level of segmentation and even hostility remain high. Of a more fundamental nature is his question as to whether the notion of "individual alternatives" is a necessary condition--or even a facilitating condition--for segmented pluralism. By way of alluding to its potentially far-reaching applicability, McRae concludes that, "if the experience of the successful consociational democracies in mediating deep and lasting religious and ideological cleavages can be shown to be relevant to societies where divisions of a similar intensity run along ethnic or cultural or linguistic lines, then that experience may be important for a very substantial part of the contemporary world."[4] In point of fact, both Belgium and Switzerland can be cited here since the linguistic-cultural dimension also has been of importance, although it remained secondary to religious-ideological cleavage during that period in the nineteenth century which saw the formation of political parties and interest groups. Similarly, as we shall see, following a long period during which the most important difference separating its inhabitants was religion, the most salient cleavage in the province of Quebec is now, and has been since the 1960s, of a linguistic-cultural nature.

To the observer raised in a more integrative setting, the extent to which segmentation can be carried in a consociational system can be rather startling. Indeed, segmentation in such societies may be so intense and durable as to permit a person to be associated for most of his or her life with such institutions and organizations as schools, universities, trade unions, co-operatives and hospitals, all run on a denominational basis. Further, his or her associational activities, whether for music, sports, youth groups, charitable works and the like, may be similarly organized by his or her own segment of the population. Leisure time, following work in the company of an employer and co-workers of an individuals own persuasion, may by preference be spent with friends who share the same ideals and beliefs. Individually, a person in this way socialized will read denominational books and a denominational press, and may even watch or otherwise listen to denominationally produced television and radio programmes. Perhaps more significantly, however, is the fact that such an individual will vote for a political party or become affiliated with an interest group that makes a strong case for segment solidarity as a defense against opposing philosophies.

Still, in reality, few segmented systems are as thoroughly compartmentalized as the foregoing would seem to suggest. Should they occur, problems of an intra- or inter-segmental nature are likely to stem from, say, real or apparent differences in the ideological purity or structural completeness of the segments, or from the fact that, under increasing conditions of urbanization, all segments are likely to suffer some attrition as cross-pressures increase. Yet while the 1960s saw a general weakening of the ideological foundations of segmented pluralism in the West European democracies, among others, there nevertheless remained, even where this weakening was most marked, a strong residue in the structures of parties and interest groups. In large part, such structures and groups were to remain viable by virtue of being in the hands of elites with a personal stake in their preservation. To the extent, then, that ideological quiescence poses a threat to their position, elites in plural societies can in many instances remobilize their followers by pointing up the dangers inherent in dismantling segment barriers.[5]

B. The Quebec Case

As was noted in Chapter I, Quebec, within the larger Canadian context, displays a unique situation of overlapping and reinforcing cleavages by which province, language and religion are linked and interrelated. In this way the Quebec case departs from that of the other Canadian provinces, particularly insofar as it is predominantly French-speaking and Roman Catholic. The pattern of cleavages in Canada as a whole is made even more complex by the fact that every province has both religious and linguistic minorities, although in all except Quebec the religious minorities are larger than the linguistic ones. Since about 1960, however, the pattern of institutionalized segmentation, in Quebec and elsewhere, has undergone a transformation from religion to language. A diminished interest in organized religion; the emergence of a climate of ecumenism; the increased salience of linguistic issues in the working world as urbanization and industrialization have advanced--these are among the occurrences which have helped to influence the change in this pattern. Politically, the shifting pattern of segmentation towards a linguistic base has, for a number of reasons, served effectively to throw the Canadian system off balance at the provincial level. For instance, in proportion to the substantial religious minorities that exist in every province except Quebec, the official language minorities are small and politically weak in all provinces except Quebec, New Brunswick, and Ontario. Still, compared with the significant Roman Catholic minorities of an earlier era, the French-speaking minorities, for example, are now on the whole weaker and more vulnerable to majority pressures.

Further--and this is somewhat ironic--within Quebec itself the shift to linguistic segmentation has had the effect of making the English-speaking sector as a whole (including English-speaking Catholics) more significant than the relatively small Protestant sector alone. As a consequence, the bargaining power of the minority in Quebec has remained strong and even increased while that of the French-speaking linguistic minorities has in some, but certainly not in all other provinces become weaker and more precarious.

Owing to the complex nature of this structure of cleavages, it may perhaps prove worthwhile briefly to examine its institutionalization in historical context, tracing along the way the shifting pattern of segmentation towards its contemporary linguistic-cultural base.

i. Historical Context

To begin with, in his reading of the situation, McRae argues that the most "visible" cleavage in Canadian history had its origin in the double Cession to Britain of Acadia in 1713 and New France in 1763. Here Britain was for the first time to acquire a colony--New France--whose population was alien in religion, language, culture and legal system. Since Britain's own Roman Catholic population was at that time disenfranchised and barred from holding any public office, the most important of these differences was religion. Thus with the influx of English-speaking settlement into Quebec, differences between the so-called "new subjects" and "old subjects" tended to be institutionalized along religious lines. Serving to reinforce this pattern of religious institutionalization in the colony was the passage of two major Acts of the Imperial Parliament in London during the final quarter of the eighteenth century. First, the Quebec Act of 1774 confirmed the position of the Catholic Church in the colony; and second, the Constitution Act of 1791 made Roman Catholics in Canada eligible to vote and hold public office, rights not available to their co-religionists in Britain until 1829.

By and large, the coincidence of religious and ethnic-linguistic cleavage remained firm until the 1840s, by which time extensive Irish immigration began to affect a substantial rise in the population of English-speaking Catholics. As a result of the societal cross-pressures attendant upon the arrival of these immigrants, instability quickly began to characterize this primary line of cleavage. Indeed, religious issues were intensified by the importation into Canada of hereditary quarrels between Orangemen and Irish Catholics. Adding substantially to this religious tension was the Catholic Church's counterattack on liberalism during the Papacy of Pius IX. Still, attesting to its intensity is the fact that the politics of significant religious confrontation witnessed during the second half of the nineteenth century was to remain, at the federal level, the most obvious line of cleavage long after Confederation in 1867. Consequently, during this important formative period, a good deal of institutional segmentation was to take place, with, for instance, the Catholic population acquiring not only publicly supported denominational schools in most provinces but a whole network of colleges, newspapers, hospitals, and charitable and welfare organizations which served to render a substantial portion of Catholic life a world apart. To be sure, linguistic issues might arise from time to time within the Catholic communities themselves. Nevertheless, the primary line of cleavage was religious.[6]

At the Quebec provincial level, on the other hand, segmentation during this same formative period presented somewhat of a different picture, since given that the French formed a substantial majority, language and ethnicity had theretofore begun to constitute particularly salient lines of cleavage between the two charter groups. Founded largely upon these cleavage structures, the roots of this segmentation can be traced to the 1840s when, in an attempt to allay the French Canadians' fears concerning the maintenance--indeed the survival--of the distinctive structure of their education system under the Union Act of 1841, the then governor general, Sir Charles Bagot, appointed for the United Province as a whole a nominal superintendent of education. In reality, however, the duties of the superintendent were to be carried out by two deputies, one from each section of the province. Thus by placing Jean-Baptiste Meilleur, a French-Canadian Catholic with close ties to the clergy, in charge of Lower-Canadian education, the governor guaranteed that the schools would never be assimilated, thereby revoking one of the main purposes of the Union. Bagot likewise contributed to the survival of the Canadiens' ancestral legal system--another of the characteristics which differentiated them as a nation --when, in 1842, he determined against the publication of an ordinance of the Special Council which had been decreed in 1840 and made subject to the approval of the governor general. Drafted in 1840 by Sir James Stuart, the then chief justice of the Court of Queen's Bench for Lower Canada, the ordinance had as its aim the rearrangement of the "ancient" French system into that of the English courts of common pleas. In making his decision public, moreover, Bagot appointed to the vacant chief justiceship of Montreal the first Canadien ever so honoured, Rémi Vallières de Saint-Réal, who, in the governor's words, "stands consensu omnium single and alone as the first lawyer in the country, and who is equally versed in the French and English laws and languages."[7]

Further, with the Education Act of 1845, Denis-Benjamin Papineau (the brother of Louis-Joseph and a "true nineteenth century nationalist"), established definitely the independence and distinctive character of French-Canadian education. While much of the legislation was in fact drafted by Meilleur and Augustin-Norbert Morin, Papineau was, as one of only two French Canadians in the Executive Council, chiefly responsible for piloting the bill through the Assembly after putting his final touches to it. As it stood, the project aimed at repealing all of the unpopular clauses of the law of 1841 and sought to introduce a school system which would be both independent of the municipal district councils and founded firmly on French Canada's traditional social unit, the parish. According to the bill itself, each school would be under the control of school commissioners elected on a denominational basis, with the religious orthodoxy of the separate units guaranteed by the curés or clergymen who were, however, to serve ex officio as "visitor." Yet whereas the law passed easily through the Assembly, the official opposition were particularly rankled by this last clause, which they believed did not give the clergy the control it wished. Indeed, a few years earlier the clergy's main political organ, Les Mélanges Religieux, made its expectations clear by way of emphasizing what it perceived to be the intimate link between education and religion:

> Observez combien il est important d'entourer la jeunesse de précautions pour la préserver du souffle empesté d'une éducation fausse; étudiez l'histoire de tous les pays et de tous les siècles, et vous enserez convaincus. . . . Voilà pourquoi dans tous les pays on a toujours confié l'éducation de la jeunesse aux ministres et à la religion.[8]

Thus the opposition forces campaigned for the law's amendment, pleading for a system of education which would, ideally, unite clerical authority at the local level with centralized control by the superintendent at the education department. Bowing to these pressures, Papineau, in mid-1846, made a series of changes to his law, which now provided that elections to school commissions would be strictly by denomination and that the curé or minister in each parish would hold a veto power in the hiring of teachers and in the selection of textbooks. Despite this opposition, however, Papineau's school law was, as Jacques Monet reasons, "of far-reaching importance":

> For here at last was a system formulated by French Canadians themselves and based on the religious theories and social order which they had evolved. Far into the future it would characterize them as a distinct people. And far more than any (purely symbolic) repeal of the language clause in the constitution, it definitely abrogated the threats to French-Canadian cultural survival inherent in the Act of Union.9

Thus the establishment of an independent and distinctly francophone system of education was of vast importance to the Canadiens, particularly insofar as such a system was crucial to the intergenerational transmission of their language and culture. Given both this and the religious basis for institutional segmentation, therefore, what developed in Quebec by the dawn of Confederation was neither a homogeneous society (as the unionists had envisioned) nor a pluralistic society, but two tenuously related and distinct societies co-existing on the same territory. What was more was that far from attempting to bridge this cultural gap, the British North America Act (1867), by giving the Quebec legislature jurisdiction over the matters that were of greatest concern to the clergy at the same time as it protected the language, the Protestant educational system, and the political representation of the anglophone minority, served instead to reinforce the distinctiveness and separation between French and English. Also of significance in this regard is the fact that while the anglophone bourgeoisie, centred in Montreal, had its finance, railway and shipping activities placed under federal jurisdiction, the francophone bourgeoisie, centred in Quebec City, had its land and forest-resource activities placed under provincial jurisdiction. Hence Quebec was to be divided within itself, not only culturally, but economically as well; and although the economic division did not correspond precisely with the cultural and linguistic one, there was nevertheless a rough approximation between their boundaries. As with education, moreover, the formalization of this division was the result of no mere accident. For during the debates on the issue of Canadian Confederation, the French Canadians seemed to understand quite well the powers it was necessary to entrust to the provinces in order that Quebec could control its own institutions. "Indeed," as Jean-Charles Bonenfant has noted, "they were so convinced that the province's jurisdiction would be adequate for that purpose that they gave little thought to ensuring a genuine dual form of representation at the federal level."[10]

It is perhaps worthwhile to note here that this autonomist strategy was to prove fateful, since economic development in Quebec had, by the turn of the century, run its course. Like its counterparts in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, who began to decline in importance soon after Confederation and who continued to do so during the early part of the twentieth century, the francophone bourgeoisie confined within Quebec lacked the capital to develop the new resource industries of mining, hydroelectricity, and pulp and paper. Having exhausted its best efforts to promote the interests of the bourgeoisie by subsidizing and building railways into the northern and eastern hinterlands of the province and by encouraging the development of forest resources by local capital, the provincial state began to place heavy emphasis on attracting American direct investment. As a result of the influx of American capital--which would continue through numerous changes of government after 1936--French Canadians were reduced to a distinctly marginal position in the province where they comprised four-fifths of the population. Still, explanations of their early failure to make strong inroads into domestic markets are not limited solely to the bourgeoisie's lack of financial resources. Widely shared and politically influential is the myth that the French Canadians were in some way culturally unfitted for economic achievement, possibly as a consequence of their Roman Catholic religion. Shown earlier to have been linked intimately to religion, the French-Canadian educational system was not only elitist but dedicated to producing lawyers and priests, rather than engineers and businessmen. While this may indeed have been the case, it must be interpreted both in the light of two centuries of anglophone domination of the economy and the consequent restrictions of opportunity, and in view of the fact that the provisions of the Quebec Act, the defeat of the _patriotes_ in the rebellions of 1837-38, and the terms of Confederation all tended to reinforce, for better or for worse, the influence of organized religion in French-Canadian society.[11]

ii. The Pattern of "Mutually Self-Satisfying, Self-Segregated Institutions"

It has been argued that the only two areas of societal living where interethnic contact between French and English in Quebec has been institutionalized are those of work and politics. What little ethnic contact there was in the work world, for example, developed in the context of rapid industrialization and urbanization, which took place from Confederation through to the post-World War II period, and especially after the turn of the century. Viewed along a broader historical time-frame, ethnic accommodation (or, rather, the lack thereof) in Quebec is seen to have been constructed on the basis of _mutually desired self-segregated institutions_.[12] Indeed, we have seen where institutional self-segregation in the fields of education and religion has been total. Subsequently, we shall see that a similar degree of institutional self-segregation has taken place within, among others, the areas of health and welfare and residence, and that, even today, various French and English elements of the Quebec business elite remain isolated and separated from one another. Given all of this, then, one might well conclude that that which existed between the French and English more than anything else constituted a "non-accommodation," since such segregation, when viewed in terms of the theory of political stability, lends credence to the notion that "good social fences make good political neighbours," that a kind of "voluntary apartheid" policy, between encapsulated cultural units, is perhaps the best solution for a divided society.[13]

More specifically, the pattern of segregated institutions in Quebec developed during what Michael B. Stein has identified as a phase of incongruity between political status and interethnic group perceptions prior to 1960. Here the francophone and anglophone communities developed mirror images of each other, both of which, however, were incongruent with their group's actual numerical composition and political status. In other words, for many decades prior to 1960 French Quebeckers, although always comprising a majority of the population of Quebec, tended to perceive themselves as a minority group. Contributing to this perception were a number of interesting social-psychological factors, influenced by the nature of the anglophones' own self-image. First despite a certain pride in the sources of their culture and the training they received within the elitist structures of the Catholic educational system, the French in Quebec nevertheless tended to acknowledge the Anglo-Quebeckers' cultural superiority and their advanced schooling in the secular realm. The anglophones' own sense of this superiority was to a large extent derived from their identification with the *majority culture* of English-speaking Canada and the United States. After all, Quebec anglophones did read many of the same books, periodicals and newspapers, were exposed to the same radio and television programs, viewed the same films, and participated in the same sporting and recreational events as other English-speaking people on the North American continent. Likewise, Quebec anglophones identified with the English-speaking *political majority* at the federal level and with the federal government which reflected it. Here, displaying the obverse of what the francophones had done at the Quebec provincial level, Anglo-Quebeckers tended to regard the *federal government* rather than the provincial government as their instrument and protector, and thus looked to the rest of English-speaking Canada for support and sympathy when they felt their "rights" were being circumscribed. Somewhat unfairly, it might be added, the concerns of Anglo-Quebeckers in this regard were mitigated, to a certain degree more than those of the minority groups in other Canadian provinces, by the principle of minority rights, which accords protection to minority groups in liberal democracies.[14]

Viewing the situation in broader historical perspective reveals that the first phase of what Stein refers to as the anglophones' strong and self-confident "majority-group consciousness" began immediately after the capitulation of 1760, when British merchants and officials established their economic and political control over the habitant in Quebec. While this phase was to reach its apogee within the period 1830 to 1865--during which time the Papineau Rebellion was put down and the English merchants formed an alliance with the French clerical and political elites to ensure that the Union would work in the absence of its assimilationist overtones--its economic and cultural ramifications were to be felt for more than a century to come. For instance, although never more than one-fourth and generally only one-fifth of the population of the province, those of non-French origin actually did, in 1851, for example, constitute the majority in the City of Montreal, then the economic capital of the United Province (see Table 4.1). While there was again, by the time of the first census of 1871, a majority of about 60 per cent French in Montreal (a figure which, as Table 4.2 shows, remained virtually unchanged until well after the beginning of the Quiet Revolution in the 1960s), the strong English economic hegemony nevertheless contributed to the francophones' "minority-group consciousness." By and large, these feelings were reflected in self-perceptions which were marked by a sense of inferiority and subordination to the English,

TABLE 4.1

POPULATION OF FRENCH, OF NON-FRENCH AND OF OTHER ORIGINS, MONTREAL, 1851 CENSUS

ORIGIN	POPULATION
French	26,020
Non-French	
Canadian	12,494
Irish	11,736
Scottish	3,150
English	2,858
	30,238
Other	1,457
	57,715

Adapted from Richard Joy, Languages in Conflict: The Canadian Experience (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972), p. 104.

TABLE 4.2

ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF MONTREAL, 1871-1971

ORIGIN	1871	1901	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971*
French	60%	64%	60%	63%	64%	62%	61%
British	38	34	26	24	22	18	16
Jewish	--	2	6	6	5	4	5
Italian	--	--	2	2	2	6	7
Polish	--	--	1	1	1	1	1
Other	2	--	5	4	6	9	10
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Total Population (in thousands)							
	144.0	360.8	1.003.9	1,116.8	1,320.2	1,747.7	2,187.2

*1971 figures are for Montreal and Jésus Islands; the rest are for Montreal Island only.

Adapted from Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, Revised Edition (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980), p. 52, Table Seven.

particularly where social standing, economic power and influence, and cultural impact and control were concerned. Thus it was that each group viewed the other in terms of that group's own self-perceptions, perceptions that, according to Stein, "shaped socioeconomic and political behaviour patterns which were unconducive to mutual understanding and co-operation within a politically integrated but dynamic environment."[15] Somewhat ironically, though, it was by virtue of the minimization of contact, and hence of tension and conflict, afforded by segregated institutions that French and English in Quebec were able to redress these problems of "mutual understanding and co-operation."

Proud of their superior economic entrepreneurship, which they attributed to their advanced secular education and innate British business skills, early Anglo-Saxon industrialists moved into a Quebec society that displayed an acute population surplus, a distinctive political and religious elite, and a developing set of institutions based largely in the rural parish. Politically stable, economically conservative, and containing an abundant source of technically unskilled labour seeking employment, this society provided the ideal conditions for Anglo-Saxon capitalist investment. Contributing to these conditions, moreover, was the fact that the incoming group, which brought with it its own set of institutions servicing its own nationals, was able to fill the managerial and technical levels without inciting protest from the locals. In actual fact, the French-Canadian elite was ideologically co-operative and was protective only about its continued control over its demographic substructures. All in all, the aims and needs of the various elements in Quebec society were met by way of the introduction of industry. First, the incoming group could develop its economic pursuits with a minimum involvement in the local ethnic society. Second, the local elite's leadership was not being challenged. Third, industry was relieving the economic burden of the demographic suplus of French-Canadian society.[16]

From this evolved the mutually satisfying pattern of self-segregated institutions, enabling the English, for example, to live in Quebec in autonomous and separate communities, isolated from their linguistic counterparts, and maintaining their own churches, hospitals, schools, media and voluntary associations. Major areas of substantial English-speaking settlement within the province included the Montreal region, the region of Quebec City, the Ottawa Valley, the Eastern Townships, and the Gaspé Peninsula. Such concentrations were at no time more evident than during the pre-Confederation period, when, in 1861, for instance, the city of Montreal still harboured an English-speaking majority and 44 per cent of the population in Quebec City was English-speaking. Moreover, population data for that same year indicates that English-speaking majorities existed in both the Eastern Townships and the Ottawa Valley, while

25 per cent of the residents of the Gaspé spoke English.[17] Properly exemplifying the extent to which even one of the rural regions was capable of sustaining its own English-language institutions was the way in which the Eastern Townships crowned their local educational system. Here religiously affiliated with the Church of England and incorporated at Lennoxville in 1843, Bishop's University, a privately controlled institution, was established at a time when fully two-thirds of the Townships had been English-speaking.

Throughout the post-Confederation period, however, the ability of the English-speaking inhabitants of the majority of the regions to continue to support their institutions was thrown into doubt, as Quebec in general witnessed a shift in the focus of immigration from rural to urban areas. Indeed, according to Table 4.3, only one of the rural regions containing a relatively large English-speaking population registered a significant absolute increase during the period 1861 to 1961; and even there, in the Ottawa Valley, growth, which resulted largely from inter-provincial migration, has now come to an abrupt halt. Furthermore, although there was an increase in its urban anglophone population between 1931 and 1971, Quebec City's net demographic change was nonetheless similar to that of the remaining rural regions. Influenced by a variety of economic and political considerations (i.e., the cumulative effects of the Depression and the two World Wars, for example), ~~such~~ change

TABLE 4.3

REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF ENGLISH-SPEAKING QUEBECKERS: SELECTED YEARS, 1861-1981

ENGLISH-SPEAKING POPULATION OF EACH REGION	1861	1871	1901	1931	1971	1981
Montreal	64,531	66,062	162,185	282,456	587,095	514,195
Eastern Townships	89,748	77,789	74,141	57,933	57,830	55,275
Ottawa Valley	34,612	35,669	41,755	35,561	50,525	51,075
Quebec City	30,656	22,730	13,746	12,084	16,005	13,195
Gaspé	11,972	12,252	15,830	18,037	13,880	12,475

Adapted from Census of Canada, selected years, 1861-1981.

See Ronald Rudin, The Forgotten Quebecers; A History of English-Speaking Quebec, 1759-1980 (Québec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1985), p. 179.

was characterized by the massive out-migration of anglophones to other parts of Canada and the North American continent. Accompanying this migration was a progressive change in the composition of the total Quebec population towards increasing ethnic heterogeniety (first eastern and northern, and then Mediterranean nations) as a major source of migrants. Still, the most striking fact about the changing geographical distribution of the English-speaking popualation was the increasing demographic concentration in the Metropolitan Montreal area. While the percentage of English Quebeckers living in the region of Montreal has, to be sure, always been high in this century, the number nonetheless increased from 70 per cent to close to 85 per cent during the period 1921 to 1971.[18]

Montreal has, by and large, become the principal geographical repository for migrants within and emigrants to Quebec primarily by virtue of its position as the province's institutional and economic locus. Indicative of the extent to which this has been the case is the fact that a number of observers have taken to referring to Quebec as two provinces, namely, "the Island of Montreal and the rest, which is pastoral."[19] The linguistic and cultural implications of this notion of "two Quebecs" are well revealed when one consider that, of the 800,680 Quebeckers who, in 1976, declared themselves to be of English "mother tongue" (as opposed to those who cited English as being the "language most often used in the home," estimated to have been 848,512), only 202,290, or 25 per cent, lived outside the Montreal metropolitan area. As such, non-Montreal English Quebec has had to functioned largely on a regional basis, with only periodic recourse to the institutional and economic structures laid down by Montreal's original Anglo-Celtic population, with which it formerly had a much closer relationship. Significantly, though, the cultural and demographic dangers inherent in the isolation of the non-Montreal English-speaking population (which is largely Anglo-Celtic in origin) have, to a large extent, been alleviated. Indeed, the recent mobilization of English Quebec, spearheaded by pressure and special-interest groups such as Alliance Quebec, has led to the consolidation of an "on-island/off-island" contact.[20]

A direct consequence of the process of migration and emigration to Montreal itself is the fact that all of the large ethnic groups, whose members are not of Anglo-Celtic or French origin, are established almost exclusively in that city. For instance, one of the largest of these groups, the Jews, which at one time maintained significant communities in Quebec and Sherbrooke, have now largely disappeared from those cities. What is interesting to note here, particularly from the point of view of our analysis, is that despite the fact that the Jews and other ethnic communities in Montreal are now primarily English-speaking, their presence has nonetheless made it appropriate to describe the city's geographical make-up with such words and phrases as "patchwork" or, more fittingly, "vertical mosaic." Locating them in precise terms, the following gives a good indication of the patterns of immigrant passage and residential self-segregation that have been prevalent in Montreal during the better part of the last half century.

> Jews started near the foot of St. Lawrence Boulevard in the centre of the city and progressed north. As they became more affluent, they moved west along Van Horne Avenue and finally settled in Cote St. Luc and the Town of Mount Royal. Greeks are now where Jews were forty years ago and the Portuguese are not far behind. Newly arrived Italians settle in the north of Montreal around Jean Talon market. As they improve their status, they move to St. Michel or St. Léonard.[21]

Other forms of empirical analysis also indicate that the major ethnic and linguistic groups in metropolitan Montreal have been highly segregated from one another. For instance, employing segregation measures, based on data compiled from the censuses of 1951 and 1961, Stanley Lieberson found that the index of dissimilarity between the British (i.e., Anglo-Celtic) and French ethnic groups was 55.4 in 1961. Essentially, this means that 55 per cent of one or the other ethnic group would have had to relocate themselves into different census tracts if the spatial frequency distribution of the two groups was to be identical. (It may perhaps help to clarify the concept if we consider that an index of 100, maximum segregation, occurs only if no tract contains members of both groups; that is, if the tracts holding 100 per cent of the city's X population contain no residents of group Y.) Similarly, segregation between monolingual speakers of English and French was also very high--an index of 64 was recorded for 1961.[22]

Further, Lieberson found that, with the exception of the Italian and Ukranian communities, other ethnic groups--Germans, Scandinavians, and the Dutch, for example--were far less segregated from the British than from the French (see Table 4.4, columns 1 and 2). While highly segregated from the British, however, other European groups were found to be even more isolated from the French than were those groups mentioned above. Indeed, although data are not available on the Jewish ethnic population for 1961, an examination of their segregation indexes for 1951 indicates that whereas Jews tended to be highly segregated from the British, they were that much further removed from the French (see Table 4.4, columns 5 and 6). This, however, presents somewhat of a paradox, especially given the nature of the racial situation at mid-century. On the evidence, one should perhaps, but does not necessarily, find that there existed a greater estrangement of the Jewish and British communities than there was of the Jews and the French.

Indeed, it is starkly to highlight the nature of the situation to note that, whereas the Canadian Jewish community celebrated the bicentenary of its presence in the country in 1959, it was not until the 1930s that Jewish children, for example, gained admittance to all English schools in Quebec, admittance previously denied them by certain Anglo-Protestant school boards. Jews did, to be

TABLE 4.4

BRITISH AND FRENCH RESIDENTIAL SEGREGATION FROM OTHER ETHNIC GROUPS

Ethnic Group	TYPE I[a]		TYPE II[b]			
	1961		1961		1951	
	British (1)	French (2)	British (3)	French (4)	British (5)	French (6)
German	30.2	52.2	30.6	54.5	28.4	58.4
Italian	66.3	51.0	66.3	50.1	60.8	43.9
Jewish	NA	NA	NA	NA	74.0	86.2
Netherlands	28.2	59.0	28.7	60.6	31.3	71.8
Polish	47.1	54.3	46.5	54.0	50.2	57.6
Scandinavian	18.6	56.4	19.1	57.9	23.1	65.0
Ukrainian	54.3	53.5	54.3	52.7	61.5	59.0
Other European[c]	55.9	66.9	55.8	67.6	36.8	51.7

(a) Segregation measures for the entire metropolis.

(b) Measures which maximize comparisons in segragation with reference to as many of the spatial units traced in Montreal in 1951.

(c) Jews not specified in 1961 are mainly included in this catagory.

Adapted from Stanley Lieberson, "Linguistic and Ethnic Segregation in Montreal," Report Prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Ottawa, 1966, pp. 4, 5.

sure, comprise the single most important group of Quebeckers who entered the province prior to the 1930s with neither French nor English as their mother tongue. On this basis, their situation was complicated by the fact that they did not fit neatly into an educational system that was polarized along Catholic-Protestant lines (a dichotomy which was formalized in 1869 by a revision of the Educational Act, serving to divide the Council of Public Instruction (CPI) into separate Catholic and Protestant committees). By way of manipulating the system, however, the most wealthy among the Jewish population did secure an "English" education for their children which, it was assumed, would guarantee them more prosperous economic futures. Put off by the more explicit religious content of the Catholic curriculum, affluent parents could work out arrangements with the Montreal Catholic School Commission (MCSC) whereby they would pay their school taxes to the Catholic board in return for the establishment of their own schools, where the normal curriculum of the MCSC would not be used. This was the situation as it stood at the turn of the century, and, in an atmosphere permeated by controversy, the poorer elements within the Jewish population continued to send their children to the Protestant schools.

Indeed, it was by virtue of a deal struck between the leaders of the Protestant community and the provincial government that, in 1903, the Quebec legislature passed an act clarifying the status of the Jews with regard to education. Here the aim of the Protestant leaders was to secure the Jewish tax dollars that were being lost to the MCSC. Thus with its recognition of Jews as Protestants for educational purposes, the 1903 act ensured that Jewish tax dollars and Jewish students went to Protestant schools. What the parties to this deal did not, or perhaps could not, anticipate, however, was that the next few years would see the massive immigration to Quebec of relatively poor, non-tax paying Jews. Given that the Protestant leaders had, by and large, shown themselves to be more interested in Jewish tax dollars than in the education of Jewish children, educating these children began to place a strain on Protestant school finances since, by the early 1920s, Jewish children made up close to 40 per cent of the students in Montreal's Protestant schools. Now widely described by Montreal's Protestants as "our educational problem," the issue, after enduring a series of court decisions, was finally decided by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council which, in 1928, ruled the 1903 act to be *ultra vires*, or unconstitutional. The Judicial Committee found that by giving Jews the same status as Protestants, the 1903 law violated Article 93 of the BNA Act, which specified rights for Catholics and Protestants only. This represented a victory for the Protestants insofar as they were no longer bound by law to pay for the education of non-Protestants. It was thus left up to the provincial government to forge a new agreement.[23]

Jews were eventually to become the first group of outsiders to gain full entry into Anglo-Protestant society. Their doing so, however, was facilitated less by a show of goodwill on the part of the English community than by government concessions in the form of a separate Jewish school board, whose sole mandate it was to negotiate a contract with the Anglo-Protestant boards for the admission of Jewish students. The lack of an interethnic entente is well illustrated by the fact that, up until World War II, Montreal's major English-language university still discriminated against Jewish students, with its insistence that they attain higher entrance scores than students from other ethnic groups. At the same time, Anglo-Protestant hospitals such as the Royal Victoria and the Montreal General practised a type of selective recruitment, admitting only a certain number of Jewish interns and rarely offering them top appointments. Thus it was in response to these anti-Semitic policies that the Jewish General Hospital came into being. Likewise, the Jewish community set about providing for its own with, in addition to its many synagogues, the establishment of such other separate institutions as the Jewish People's School, the Jewish Public Library, the Mortimer Davis Y.M.H.A., the Jewish Old Folks' Home, the Jewish Neighbourhood House, and the offices of the Jewish Immigrant Aid Services.

Built in the 1930s and early 1940s, these community institutions were situated in the area extending beyond Pine

Avenue to the north and Park Avenue to the east--an area which, by 1921, contained 86 per cent of Montreal's Jewish population. As noted earlier, the homes vacated by Jews formerly living in this area--Outremont and the Laurier, St. Michel and St. Louis wards--are now primarily occupied by immigrants of Greek, Hungarian, Italian and Polish ethnic origin. Noted also was the fact that the Jews' increasing prosperity was largely instrumental in catapulting them to the more affluent western sections of Metropolitan Montreal --Mount Royal, Notre Dame de Grace, Hampstead and Snowdon, to name a few. Of interest to note here, however, is the fact that, in addition to Westmount, these areas had long been the preserves of Montreal's English-speaking elite. Given the nature and extent of Anglo-Protestant discrimination, then, the pattern of Jewish immigrant passage in Montreal seems not only to have been an ironic but a dramatic occurrence as well. Indeed, the percentage of Montreal's Jewish population resident in the old area of settlement decreased from 78.5 per cent in 1941 to 43.1 per cent and 20.8 per cent in 1951 and 1961 respectively. Conversely, the percentage of the total Jewish population resident in the new western area of Montreal and its northwestern suburbs increased from 15.0 per cent in 1941 to 40.2 per cent and 74.7 per cent in 1951 and 1961 respectively, constituting a majority of the entire Jewish population of Metropolitan Montreal. In subsequent years, the percentage of the Jewish population still living in the old area decreased at an even more rapid pace, particularly since almost all of the community institutions cited above were relocated to the newer Jewish residential areas.[24]

While the post-War period witnessed a greater accommodation of the ethnic minorities by the anglophone elites, the immigrants' access to top positions within the anglophone-dominated economic structures nevertheless remained difficult, at least until 1960. Whereas Jews and other immigrants could and did establish a variety of small businesses and thus acted as professionals within their own communities, they were not admitted to the inner circles of the big financial institutions, the school boards, or McGill University. As with the schools issue in the 1930s, this exclusivism was finally ended at the instigation of the provincial government, which in the early 1960s and under the leadership of Jean Lesage passed a law changing the constitution of the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal (PSBGM) to guarantee the Jewish minority a five-member representation. Evidence that other barriers were falling came in the form of the admission of Jewish brokers to the Montreal Stock Exchange, changes in the membership regulations of several private clubs, and the acceptance of a prominent member of the Jewish community, Samuel Bronfman, onto the board of governors of McGill University. One interpretation of the paradox of greater Jewish identification with the anglophone rather than the francophone community (despite interventions on behalf of the Jews by French Catholic society and government) cites the minority's access to these important positions in the social and economic institutions of the English community as contributing greatly to the Jewish elite's decision to bury its memories of past prejudices. According to Arnopoulos and Clift, the liaison between the Jews and Anglo-Celts intensified with the rise of nationalism in Quebec, which the Jews feared more than the discrimination formerly practised by the English. What the Jews found most threatening in all of this was the xenophobia which they thought nationalism in turn gave rise to, as well as the pressures in favour of a homogeneous rather than a pluralistic society. To the extent that French Catholic society pushed pluralism, cultural or otherwise, it had, in former times, been directed at the Anglo-Protestants, largely by way of legislation intended to impose on the English community attitudes of tolerance towards the ethnic minorities which the French themselves refused to practise.[25]

No doubt the Jews' advancement paved the way for the acceptance of Italians, Greeks, Slavs and finally Blacks and other ethnic groups into the broader English-speaking community. If it can in fact be designated as such, the turning point came in 1968 with what became known as the "incident of St. Léonard," which was eventually to unleash a struggle for clientele between English and French institutions.

In the late 1960s, the population of St. Léonard, a northeastern municipality of Greater Montreal, broke down as follows: francophones, roughly 53 per cent; Italians, 32 per cent; Polish, Ukranian and other immigrants of East European extraction, 10 per cent; and Anglo-Celts, less than five per cent. The schools in St. Léonard were essentially of two types: French and bilingual--the last featuring an interesting and unique approach whereby all subjects were taught one week in French, the next in English. The "incident" itself was sparked by the decision of the local school board to abolish the bilingual component of the system and make all schools French only. In appealing for allies in the fight against French nationalists, the Italians--the second largest group in the area and the one with the greatest interest in retaining bilingual schools--at first found the anglophones, who themselves were beginning to feel threatened, to be sympathetic. Yet it was the opinion of some that, during the two years of court hearings that it took to win back for the parents of St. Léonard the right to send their children to bilingual schools, the anglophone community declined to play an active role in the dispute. For his part, Robert Beale, then president of the Association of Parents of St. Léonard and himself the son of a French-Canadian mother and an Irish father, had this to say of the anglophone business establishment:

> They were apathetic and indifferent--and ignorant. Five years later I had prominent people coming up to me and asking, 'Bob, is that St. Leonard affair settled yet?' But at the time, when we needed them and I knocked on the doors of big business--department stores, corporations--to say we had to raise $50,000, they said, 'Hey, take it easy. We have to do business with the French.' They missed the whole point. We were fighting for French rights, too; francophones who wanted their children to be bilingual appreciated it. But to businessmen the buck came before the principle.26

It was not until English-French tensions increased, however, that the anglophone community began to take full interest in defending the rights of the immigrant communities. Yet this interest seems to have been fuelled less by a genuine regard for pluralism and cultural diversity than by opportunism and, perhaps understandably, a heightened concern on the part of the anglophones for their own cultural and political gain. Indeed, where once the anglophone community did not concern itself with currying the favour of the ethnic minorities and even took their presence for granted, they were, in the light of the Quebec government's restrictive language laws and the consequent Anglo-Protestant diaspora of the late 1960s and 1970s, shocked into an awareness of just how essential the minorities could be to the survival of English community institutions such as hospitals, universities, colleges, and social services. Accordingly, the English resolved to change the elements of their institutions in order to accommodate immigrant expectations. For instance, Italian and Greek teachers were hired by the English school boards, who then placed them in administrative posts; English social agencies actively sought out "ethnic" social workers and community organizers; and governments and corporate trusts began to fund special studies on ethnic minorities.

At about the same time, the francophones, for their part, assumed a greater interest in the ethnic minorities than they had hitherto and for much the same reasons as did the English--that is, out of a concern for cultural survival, given the long-term implications of current demographic trends. Convinced in the past that they posed a threat to their language and culture, the French community did not seem much interested in accommodating the wave of immigrants that swept into the province during the early part of the twentieth century. Given the prevailing situation, and owing to its crucial role in the transmission of language and culture from one generation to the next, the educational system once more became the focus of attention for those subcultures concerned.

Established in the 1840s, the MCSC catered mainly to the educational needs of Montreal's French-speaking population and to those English-speaking Catholics--namely, the Irish--who were largely abandonded by their Protestant co-linguists. By the 1930s, however, the arrival of new Catholics created somewhat of a dilemma for the French-speaking clerics who ran the Catholic schools. The most important of these non-British Catholic groups who, like the Jews, entered the country with neither French nor

English as their mother tongue, were the Italians, who in 1931 numbered 25,000. Of these, some 7,000, or 63 per cent of all Italian-origin students, were educated under the auspices of the MCSC, as compared with fewer than 10,000 students of British origin. It was the clerics' fear that if these new students were permitted to enter the French system in large numbers, the traditional role of the French-Catholic school as a place where certain values are transmitted to a homogeneous student body would be destroyed. Accordingly, French-Catholic leaders encouraged the establishment of a semi-autonomous English sector within the MCSC, which was to be provided with the means to educate all Catholics whose mother tongue was not French. As it turned out, the Catholic hierarchy had, in the words of one observer, encouraged no less than

> la création d'un secteur catholique autonome de langue anglaise pour accueillir non seulement les Irlandais mais bientôt nombre de catholiques non-francophones qui auraient autrement fréquenté les écoles de langue française. Les élites du début du XXe siècle précédent, entretenaient que la survivance des Canadiens-français reposait sur leur langue et sur ~~leur~~ religion et sur les institutions qui les maintenaient.[27]

When coupled with the fact that English was the language of the economy, this state of affairs influenced a large number of immigrant arrivals to Quebec--especially those who had left their countries of origin for economic reasons--in their decision to integrate into the English community. Indeed, there was fixed in the immigrants' consciousness the notion that English was the language of advancement and French the language of marginalization; that Quebec society was marginal in North America, not simply in terms of language and culture, but economically as well. Since all of this was taking place at at time when the fall in the birth rate among the French threatened to disrupt their demographic equilibrium in Canada and to undermine the political leverage of French in Quebec, the provincial authorities were prompted into taking evasive action. First, they pressed the federal government to take account of demographic shifts in Quebec and to facilitate the entry of what French officials called "francophonisable" immigrants. Next, the Quebec government instituted programs designed to help immigrants integrate into French life, but which also inhibited their immersion into the English milieu. Last--and most controversially--the government attempted to divert newcomers from the English to the French community. It was the laws on education--Bill 22 and Bill 101--that set the English community most at odds with the French.

Finally, as the middle men in this "rivalry," the ethnic minorities, who by the mid-1970s numbered more than half a million, naturally felt ambivalent about Quebec society and their place within its institutional and linguistic hierarchy. This uncertainty was in large measure fuelled by their conviction that, in attempting to defy Bill 101 by allowing the children of immigrants to enter their schools, the PSBGM had used them as pawns of the anglophone establishment in its fight against the forces of French nationalism. In turn, the minorities were dismayed by the exclusivism and chauvinism which they felt tempered much of French nationalist opinion. Further, they sensed on the part of French assimilationists an insensitivity towards and an ignorance of the meaning and importance of the immigrants' so-called ghettos, enclaves which helped many of their inhabitants to ease the transition from peasant backgrounds to the potentially disorienting urban society. A part of the problem faced by newcomers to Quebec, moreover, stemmed from the tendency of even those of their children who were born here often to feel more Italian, Greek, or Portuguese than, say, Canadian or *Québécois*. Maintaining no particular allegiance to either of the language communities, those among the newcomers who attempted to speak both English and French, but preferred English, nonetheless aimed at striking a balance that would advance their economic interests as well as ease their social integration. With a foot in each of the language communities, "*Québécois de nouvelle souche*," as they have been called, were by the mid-1970s becoming numerous enough (and thus equipped with the requisite political leverage) to disrupt the functioning of any institution, French or English, which took their aspirations for granted.

C. Notes

1. Pierre J.-O. Chauveau, *l'Instruction publique au Canada* (Québec, 1876), p. 335, as quoted by Mason Wade, ed., *Canadian Dualism: Studies of French-English Relations/La Dualité Canadienne: Essai sur les relations entre Canadiens français et Canadiens anglais* (Toronto/Québec: University of Toronto Press/Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1960), p. viii.

2. Val R. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in the Smaller European Democracies," in Kenneth D. McRae, ed, *Consociational Democray: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), pp. 36-37, note 5; see also p. 33; and Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," *Comparative Political Studies* 1 (April, 1968), p. 21. N.B.: As was the case in the preceding chapter, the content of this theoretical discussion is based on that in McRae, "Introduction," in McRae, ed., *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 5-8; and idem, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," ibid., pp. 240-45.

3. Lorwin, "Segmented Pluralism," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, p. 35.

4. McRae, "Introduction," ibid., p. 26.

5. See Gerhard Lehmbruch, "Segmented Pluralism and Political Strategies in Continental Europe: Internal and External Conditions of 'Concordant Democracy,'" paper presented at the Torino Round Table of the International Political Science Association, 1969, pp. 6-7.

6. See McRae, "Introduction," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 242, 243.

7. *Bagot Papers*, 7, Bagot to [Colonial Secretary Edward George] Stanley, 12 June 1842, as quoted by Jacques Monet, *The Last Cannon Shot: A Study of French-Canadian Nationalism, 1837-1850* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976), pp. 97, 98.

8. *Les Mélanges Religieux*, 11 mars 1842, as quoted in Monet, *The Last Cannon Shot*, p. 242.

9. Monet, *The Last Cannon Shot*, pp. 209-10; see also pp. 182-83, 209, 242, 243. As well, see Archives of the Province of Quebec, Fonds de l'Instruction Publique Projets, 1843, Meilleur à Morin, 29 septembre 1843; L. J. Turcotte, *Le Canada sous l'Union* (Québec, 1871), Vol. I, p. 181;

A. Gerin-Lajoie, *Dix ans au Canada* (Québec, 1888), p. 280; *Les Mélanges*, 11 avril 1845; *L'Aurore des Canadas* (Montréal), 13 février 1845; *Le Canadien* (Québec), 17 février 1845; and L. Groulx, *L'Enseignement français au Canada* (Montréal, 1931), pp. 220 ff.

10. Jean-Charles Bonenfant, "Quebec and Confederation: Then and Now," in Dale C. Thomson, ed., *Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the Inside* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), p. 54. See also Garth Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity*, Revised Edition (Toronto: Gage Publishing Limited, 1982), pp. 86, 87.

11. See Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union*, pp. 86-88. Also see Jorge Niosi, "The New French-Canadian Bourgeoisie," *Studies in Political Economy* 1 (Spring 1979): 113-62; and P.A. Linteau, R. Durocher, and J.C. Robert, *Histoire de Québec contemporain, de la Conféderation à la crise* (Montréal: Editions Boréal Express, 1979), pp. 112-13, 159-60, 423-24, 448-49. For an excellent critique and re-definition of conceptions of the French-Canadian bourgeoisie, see Pierre Fournier, "The New Parameters of the Quebec Bourgeoisie," *Studies in Political Economy* 3 (Spring 1980): 67-92.

12. This term was coined by Hubert Guindon. See his "Social Unrest, Social Class and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution," *Queen's Quarterly* 71 (Summer 1964): 157-59; and idem, "Two Cultures: An Essay on Nationalism, Class, and Ethnic Tension," in Richard H. Leach, ed., *Contemporary Canada* (Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967), pp. 56-59. N.B.: this section has its basis in these works.

13. See Arend Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, ed., *Consociational Democracy*, p. 83; and David Easton, *A Systems Analysis of Political Life* (New York: David Wiley, 1965), pp. 250-51.

14. See Michael B. Stein, "The Politics of Multi-Ethnicity in Quebec: Majority-Minority Group Consciousness in Transition," paper prepared for a conference on "Multi-Ethnic Polities: The Canadian Experience," Columbia University, April 14, 1980, pp. 1-6. See also Stein, "Changing Anglo-Quebecer Self Consciousness," in Gary Caldwell and Eric Waddell, eds., *The English of Quebec: From Majority to Minority Status* (Québec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1982), p. 110; Richard Simeon, and David Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures in Canada," *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 7, 3 (September 1974): 406, 407, 410-11, 414; Andrew Sancton, "The Impact of French-English Differences on the Government Structures of Metropolitan Montreal," unpublished doctoral thesis, Oxford University, 1975; and Gary Caldwell, "English-Speaking Quebec in Light of its Reaction to Bill 22," paper presented

to the American Northeastern Anthropological Association, Wesleyan University, Connecticut, March 27, 1976.

15. Stein, "The Politics of Multi-Ethnicity in Quebec," p. 1; see also pp. 2, 3, 5, 6. Stein first applied the concept of "majority-group consciousness" to the English of Quebec in "Le Bill 22 et la population non-francophone au Québec: une étude de cas sur les attitudes du groupe minoritaire face à la législation de la langue," *Choix, le nationalisme québécois à la croisée des chemins* (Centre québécois de relations internationales, Université Laval, 1975): 127-59. For a more detailed exposition, see Stein, "Changing Anglo-Quebecer Self Consciousness," in Caldwell and Waddell, *The English of Quebec*, pp. 110 ff. For theoretical and empirical analyses of the social characteristics of majority and minority ethnic groups, see R.A. Schmerhorm, *Comparative Ethnic Relations* (New York: Random House, 1970); and Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, "Minorities and the Process of Stratification," *American Sociological Review* 33 (June 1968): 356-64.

16. See Guindon, "Two Cultures," in Leach, *Contemporary Canada*, pp. 56-57; Stein, "Changing Anglo-Quebecer Self Consciousness," in Caldwell and Waddell, *The English of Quebec*, pp. 110-111; and Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos and Dominique Clift, *The English Fact in Quebec*, Second Edition (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984), pp. 39-40, 73.

17. These areas or regions are defined as encompassing the following counties:

1) *Montreal region*: Island of Montreal, Île Jésus, Chambly, Laprairie, Beauharnois, Châteauguay, Deux-Montagnes, Vaudreuil, Soulanges.

2) *Quebec City region*: Quebec City, Quebec County.

3) *Ottawa Valley*: Gatineau, Hull, Labelle, Papineau, Pontiac, Argenteuil.

4. *Eastern Townships*: Compton, Frontenac, Richmond, Sherbrooke, Stanstead, Wolfe, Megantic, Shefford, Brome, Drummond, Arthabaska, Missisquoi, Huntingdon.

5. *Gaspé Peninsula*: Bonaventure, Matane, Matapédia, Rimouski.

See Ronald Rudin, *The Forgotten Quebecers: A History of English-Speaking Quebec, 1759-1980* (Québec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1985), pp. 34-38; and Gary Caldwell, *A Demographic Profile of the English-Speaking Population of Quebec, 1921-1971*. Publication B-51, (Quebec:

International Center for Research on Bilingualism, 1974), p. 29.

18. See Caldwell, "People and Society," in Caldwell and Waddell, The English of Quebec, pp. 62, 63; idem, A Demographic Profile of the English-Speaking Population of Quebec, p. 29; Eric Waddell, "Place and Society," in Caldwell and Waddell, The English of Quebec, pp. 46-47; and Rudin, The Forgotten Quebecers, p. 178.

19. Gerald Clark, Montreal: The New Cité (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), p. 29. In this case, the perception is attributed to Carl E. Beigie, president of the C.D. Howe Research Institute.

20. See Caldwell, "People and Society," in Caldwell and Waddell, The English of Quebec, p. 63; and Census of Canada, 1976, Vol. 2, Tables 2 and 3.

21. Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, p. 149. See also Louis Rosenberg, "Changes in the Geographical Distribution of the Jewish Population of Metropolitan Montreal in the Decennial Periods from 1901 to 1961 and the Estimated Possible Changes during the Period from 1961 to 1971: A Preliminary Study," Bureau of Social and Economic Research, Canadian Jewish Congress Research Papers, Series A, No. 7 (Montreal, 1966): 1-3.

22. See Stanley Lieberson, "Linguistic and Ethnic Segregation in Montreal," Report Prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism (Ottawa, 1966), pp. 4, 5. See also Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly Duncan, "Residential Distribution and Occupational Stratification," American Journal of Sociology 60, (March 1955): 493-95.

23. See Rudin, The Forgotten Quebecers, pp. 237-39. Also see E.I. Rexford, Our Educational Problem: The Jewish Population and the Protestant Schools (Montreal, 1924).

24. See Rosenberg, "Changes in the Geographical Distribution of the Jewish Population of Metropolitan Montreal," pp. 1-3; and Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, p. 144.

25. Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, p. 145. Unless noted to the contrary, the discussion that follows here is drawn primarily from this source, at pages 140-47.

26. Quoted in Clark, Montreal: The New Cité, pp. 96-97; see also pp. 94-95.

27. Henry Milner, La réforme scolaire au Québec (Montréal,

1984), p. 33, as quoted by Rudin, The Forgotten Quebecers, p. 232. See also p. 231; MCSC Archives, Relevé des nationalités le mois de septembre, 1931; and T.W.R Wilson, "A History of the English-Catholic Public Schools of Quebec," Report Prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, 1965.

V. Consociationalism as a Pattern of Elite Behaviour

> On the question of language, I do not believe that it is possible or desirable for the mass of our people to learn how to speak English. . . . The case is not the same for our elite, those who by their wealth, intellectual culture and political and social position, ought to lead our people and maintain the union between ourselves and our neighbours. On them falls the duty of learning English, of drawing close to the elite of the English . . . of thoroughly studying the temperment, aspirations and the traits of English Canada. Moreover, the English elite have the same responsibility. If the most influential and most enlightened of the two races tried to have more to do with each other and got to know each other better, our national future would not be so precarious.1
>
> Henri Bourassa

A. Theoretical Perspective

In Bourassa's advocacy, as early as 1902, of bilingualism among the elites coupled with unilingualism of the French-speaking and English-speaking masses, one encounters language tinged with strikingly contemporary consociational overtones, which foreshadow almost exactly Canada's federal language policy of the latter 1960s. Viewed in terms of our particular purposes, moreover, the words of the influential French-Canadian nationalist provide an apt blueprint not only for the consociational accommodation of linguistic diversity but for the accommodation of differences on either side of cultural and religious cleavage lines as well. Such accommodation, as practised by the elites in divided societies, is the hallmark of the third and last of the approaches to the study of consociational democracy as outlined by Kenneth McRae. As noted elsewhere, this approach is most directly associated with the work of Arend Lijphart, and somewhat less directly with that of Gerhard Lehmbruch, and depends for its success most crucially on the ability, mutual good will and allegiance of the elites. Indeed, to reiterate Lijphart's claim, "the essential characteristic of consociational democracy is . . . overarching co-operation at the elite level with the deliberate aim of counteracting disintegrative tendencies in the system."[2]

While the particular ways of operationalizing co-operation in this view of consociationalism are deemed to be "of no great importance," they nonetheless depend, as we saw in Chapter III, upon historical factors and on the geographical and other considerations surrounding the structure of cleavages that were delineated in Chapter IV. In Chapter II we described the behavioural preconditions of the concept of overarching co-operation--the ability to recognize the dangers of fragmentation, a commitment to maintaining the system, the ability to transcend subcultural cleavages at the elite level in order to work with the elites of other subcultures, and the ability to forge appropriate solutions that will accommodate the divergent interests and demands of the subcultures--which, according to Lijphart, must be met if consociational democracy is to succeed. Moreover, we discussed, in the context of their relatively successful application to the Quebec case, certain conditions conducive to the establishment and continuance of consociational politics among the elites. These included the existence of a relatively low total load on the system as a whole; the existence of external threats, both direct and indirect to the system; a balance of power among the subcultures; distinct lines of cleavage between the subcultures; a general sense of national attachment at the mass level; and popular approval of the principle of government by elite cartel. Given that they have undergone a relatively successful application to the Quebec case, however, we feel it necessary to take issue, albeit mildly, with McRae's claim that these factors "seem to be not so much necessary conditions as empirically observed characteristics of the countries concerned that have facilitated the development of appropriate elite attitudes and behaviour." Indeed, it has to be more than just the mere coincidence of objective observation which renders such conditions highly conducive though, we admit, not necessarily essential to the operationalization of elite co-operation. So it must also be with the time factor, which Lijphart himself views as being important only in that, "as inter-elite co-operation becomes habitual and does not represent a deliberate departure from competitive responses to political challenges, consociational norms become more firmly established."[3] While the importance of these conditions is largely self-evident, the failure to pay greater attention to the notion of the prior establishement of consociational patterns tends to diminish the significance of long-term processes of political socialization, particularly insofar as they contribute to a genuine and in-bred commitment to maintaining a system of co-operation in the face of diversity. This appears to be what Lehmbruch had in mind when he wrote that,

> under certain (and quite different) historical circumstances, "fragmented" political cultures generate methods of conflict management which permit the survival and continued existence of the political system and the retention at the same time of a considerable measure of group autonomy. These methods consist in transactions which differ markedly from bargains in a "homogeneous" political culture and have much in common with agreements as they take place among nations. Then they become norms which are retransmitted by the learning processes in the political socialization of elites and thus acquire a strong degree of persistence through time.[4]

One of the more important forums within which this process may be facilitated politically, Lehmbruch notes, is the legislature, which itself serves as a powerful agent for socializing its members into a co-operative pattern, a "consensual subsystem," if you will, with respect to one another. As we shall see, this argument can quite readily be applied to the functioning of other organs of institutionalized co-operation--corporations, profesional and trade associations, legal establishments, and the like--among subcultural elites. First, however, an overview of the social and cultural background of the elites to be examined, including the isolation of, among other things, their places of birth, their educational experiences and ethnic and religious affiliations, may prove an interesting prelude to a broader discussion of their place and role within the system as a whole.

B. Quebec's Political and Economic Elite

i. Socioeconomic Perspective

Historically-based examinations of their respective socioeconomic status tend to reveal grave disparities between French and English in Quebec.[5] As was noted earlier in the text, the existence of such differences is perhaps most plausibly accounted for by those observers who view them as a function of the province's traditional cultural division of labour. Alluded to at that point was the notion that the strange division of labour that occurred between the largely rural-based, agriculturally-inclined francophones and the urban, economically-motivated anglophones was brought about by the commercial dominance of the English and the French Canadians' alleged incapacity for economic achievement, which is attributed to the pervasiveness of organized religion in French-Canadian society. Yet while distinctions of an occupational nature clearly did exist between members of the two groups, the present discussion should not be construed in such a way as to suggest that work-related contacts between French and English were non-existent. On the contrary, French Canadians did in fact participate in certain "anglophone"-controlled sectors of the economy. However, in their attempt to capitalize on the trend in the twentieth century towards increasing urbanization, most of these French Canadians, the descendants of nineteenth-century farmers, participated not as owners or managers but primarily as workers. To be sure, while a significant portion of the wage-earning class was represented by anglophone (particularly Irish) elements, it was mainly the surplus French-Canadian rural population that met the greatly increased demand for wage labour.

To the extent, then, that contacts between the English and French in Quebec did take place at the economic level, they tended to be minimal in nature, particularly insofar as such contacts occurred primarily between management and labour respectively. This state of relative disparity was reflected further in the fact that, even as late as 1961, the francophone bourgeoisie, dominant only in the service industries, retail trade, construction, and the two most backward sectors of manufacturing--leather and wood products--remained subordinate to Anglo-Canadian and American capital. Indeed, the available data for that year show that enterprises controlled by francophones accounted for only 21.8 per cent of manufacturing employment in Quebec and for only 15.4 per cent of value added in the same sector. Control of the remainder of Quebec manufacturing was, by contrast, about evenly divided between anglophone Canadian capital, predominant in the areas of finance, utilities and transportation, including the Montreal-based enterprises whose operations extended from coast to coast, and foreign (mainly American) capital, dominant in the resource industries and the more advanced sectors of manufacturing. Moreover, worker-related data for that same year indicate that 30.4 per cent of the members of the British Isles labour force held positions in either the professional, technical, or managerial categories whereas only 14.2 per cent of employed persons of French origin fell into these categories. As a consequence, the average employment income of male workers in 1961 was $5,824 for those of English or Scottish origin, $5,374 for Irish, and $3,879 for French. Viewed in a broader comparative context, it was found that the Anglo-Quebeckers enjoyed, on the average, a standard of living comparable to that maintained by residents of Ontario, while francophones subsisted at a level equal to that of residents of the Maritime provinces.[6]

The anglophone community's initiation and control of much of Quebec's economic activity for two centuries prior to the 1960s restricted, significantly, French Canadians' opportunities where business and commerce were concerned. Further and profound limitations to francophone economic achievement were posed by the French-Canadian educational system, which was, with its religious and authoritarian nature, dedicated primarily to producing lawyers and priests rather than engineers and businessmen. Given its basis in historical fact, moreover, this trend was indicative of the difficulty involved in curbing the influences of religion and ethnic affiliation on class and class structure. This is perhaps nowhere more apparent than in Catholic communities and Catholic societies which have, owing to their inherently conservative ethos and "other worldly" orientations, been slower to industrialize than Protestant ones. Indeed, Max Weber, in his study of *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, sought to show how significant changes in the economic order of some societies could only be made if they were preceded by changes in religious values. Here Weber argued in terms of a relationship between Protestantism and capitalism, based on the notion that the worldly asceticism of Calvinism was congenial to, if not actually an essential prelude to, the growth of capitalism. From this followed the thesis that the Catholic milieu is less conducive to the creation of those values which prepare a labour force for industrialization, namely, the acquisition of technological skills, orientation towards profit-making, and personal accountability. An "other worldly" orientation in education, for example, leaves less time for "this worldly" knowledge. As a result, Catholics, in Quebec as elsewhere, lost out on the general upward social mobility that comes with the attainment of skills in the industrial labour force, and thus became over-represented in the lower unskilled occupations. This in turn resulted from Catholics' traditional under-representation in those educational institutions emphasizing technical studies and preparation for industrial and commercial occupations. Instead, as Weber noted, "Catholics preferred the sort of training which the humanistic gymnasium affords."[7]

Yet the very existence of a French-Canadian elite--as indeed there was--leads one to believe that, despite irrefutable evidence of general social class inferiority among francophones vis-à-vis the Anglo-Saxon population, social class difference within the French-Canadian subculture were perhaps no less severe than those differences between French Canadians and English-speaking Canadians generally. By way of arguing this point, Richard J. Ossenberg notes that, while of the same magnitude as those separating francophones and anglophones generally, the social class inequalities within the French-Canadian population, especially in Quebec, have been "ignored, played down, or obscured by the 'larger' issues of Canadian Confederation." While English-speaking Canadians have, to be sure, been "elitist" in their relationships with French Canadians, emphasizing as they have the national and continental dimensions of Anglo-Saxon cultural, economic and political superiority, Ossenberg maintains that "there has also been a strong elitist tradition within the French-Canadian population."[8] In fact, one of the main features of this tradition was the French-Canadian educational system, which was--and this is paradoxical--responsible not only for producing class differences between French and English but for introducing those differences within the French-speaking subculture as well. A good indication of the elitist nature of the system can be gleaned from the fact that secondary school education in Quebec was until the 1960s based on private fee-paying institutions, composed in part by the collèges classiques offering "humanistic" and liberal arts curricula.

Judged in socioeconomic terms, the most striking aspect of the subsystem of classical colleges--long the preferred route to higher education in Quebec before being eliminated in the early 1970s--was its tendency to produce inequality of class representation between students who could and those who could not afford to attend its institutions, among those who remained in them until the B.A. years and among those who eventually went on to university. The standard duration of the course work at the classical college was eight years: the first four corresponding to the English-speaking academic high school and the last four to the undergraduate years in the English-speaking university. Prior to 1962, when the government of Jean Lesage undertook to pay fees in all classical colleges, the cost of this secondary education averaged $1,000 per year for tuition, room and board. In his interpretation of the results of the 1956 survey on student income and expenditure conducted by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, John Porter, for one, was not surprised by the finding that 22 per cent of classical college students in the B.A. years reported annual parental incomes of more than $10,000, a proportion greater than that for all medical students in the sample. Also of little surprise was the fact that the median family income for these French-Canadian students was very close to that of all medical students.

Furthermore, while less money was available for scholarships and bursaries for classical college students than for all other undergraduates, almost twice as much student income came from parents than was the case with all undergraduates.[9]

Significant among the other studies which have shown that this system of fee-paying secondary education made the classical colleges class-biased institutions was the Quebec government's own Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, more commonly known as the Tremblay Commission. Preceding by two years the publication of the D.B.S. survey, the Tremblay Commission found that 45.6 per cent of the Catholic boys in classical colleges in 1956 had fathers in the census classification "proprietors, administrators, and professionals" while only 14.2 per cent of Quebec's childhood population were from that class. In contrast to this the commission found that the sons of "skilled" and "unskilled" workers constituted 29 per cent of the students in the colleges as compared with 54 per cent of the children of the province. After some deliberation on the costs of the classical college education, the Commission was unequivocal in concluding that, "This situation has the effect in a large proportion of cases of making an obstacle to the exercise of the natural right of parents to give their children the education of their choice."[10]

Affiliated with the arts faculties of the universities, the classical colleges (composed in 1960 of one hundred schools, of which sixty were for males, twenty for females, and twenty were seminaries) offered highly selective curricula, emphasizing study of the Thomist philosophy, Latin, religion, and the humanities. As a consequence, these schools tended to turn out students who had neither the background nor the proclivity for higher education in anything other than the liberal arts and professions--law, theology, medicine, and the like. What was more was that graduates of the classical colleges who partook of post-secondary education did so, more often than not, at either Université Laval or Université de Montréal, which was a branch of Laval until it received its own charter in 1920. Prior to the beginning of the era of educational reform in the early 1960s, both universities were under heavy ecclesiastical control, with the archbishop of the respective city serving as the rector of each institution, and the faculty being recruited primarily from the teaching orders of the Catholic Church.[11]

In its self-assumed role as principal defender of French-Canadian culture and values, the Church, in its founding of Laval in 1852, was inspired partly by the concern over French Canadians having to attend McGill to receive university training. The extent to which Laval and its offshoot, Montréal, have been and remain the primary bastions of French-Canadian higher education can be gleaned from even the most cursory glance at Tables 5.1 and 5.2, within which are listed the secondary and post-secondary

TABLE 5.1

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF THE 1936 DUPLESSIS CABINET

MINISTER	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
M. Duplessis (Lawyer)*	Trois-Riviéres Schools	Laval
O. Drouin (Lawyer)	Académie Commerciale Collège de Lévis	Laval
M. Fisher (Insurance Agent)	Hemmingford Schools	(None)
H. Auger (Real Estate and Insurance Broker)	Académie Ste-Anne de Yamachiche Académie l'Archévêque de Montréal	Montréal Monument Nationale
O. Gagnon (Lawyer)	Collège de Ste-Anne de la Pocatière	Laval Oxford
B. Dussault (River Pilot/ Mayor/Reeve)	(None)	(None)
J. Bourque. (Lumber Merchant)	Séminaire St-Charles (Sherbrooke)	(None)
J. Paquette	Collège Mont-St-Louis (Montreal)	Laval
W. Tremblay (Merchant)	(None)	(None)

TABLE 5.1 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY
MEMBERS OF THE 1936 DUPLESSIS CABINET

MINISTER	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
F. Leduc (Chemical Engineer)	Collège Mont-St-Louis	l'Ecole Polytechnique (Montreal)
J. Bilodeau (Lawyer)	Collège de Ste-Anne de la Pocatière	Laval
A. Elie (Farmer)	Académie de la St-Antoine	(None)
T. Coonan (Lawyer)	St. Ann's School	McGill
G. Layton (Merchant)	Montreal H.S.	McGill
T. Chapais (Lawyer)	Collège de Ste-Anne de la Pocatière	Laval

* Occupation of minister prior to entering Quebec Legislature.

Adapted from: *The Canadian Parliamentary Guide* (Hull, Que.: Labour Exchange), volumes for the years 1937, 1938, 1939; Sir Charles G.D. Roberts and Arthur Leonard Tunnell, eds., *The Canadian Who's Who: A Handbook of Canadian Biography of Living Characters* (Toronto: Trans-Canada Press), vols. 2 (1936-37), 3 (1938-39); *La situation de l'enseignement du Quebec*. Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec, juin, 1975, Table 6, pp. 39-56; and Louis Gadbois, ed., *Les clientèles de l'école secondaire privée: Rapport d'une enquête sur les familles des élèves inscrits dans les institutions de l'A.I.E.S.* (Montréal: Centre d'animation, de développement et de recherche en education, 1976), Appendice A, pp. 198-201.

TABLE 5.2

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF THE 1976 BOURASSA CABINET

MINISTER	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
R. Bourassa (Lawyer)*	Collège Jean de Brébeuf	Montréal Oxford Harvard
G.-D. Lévesque (Lawyer)	Séminaire de Gaspé Jean de Brébeuf	McGill
G. Saint-Pierre (Engineer)	Collège Victoriaville	Laval Imp. Coll. of Science and Technology London
R. Garneau (Economist)	Collège Mont-St-Louis	Laval Geneva
W. Tetley (Lawyer)	R.C.N. College	McGill Laval
N. Toupin (Administrator)	Collège St-Maurice Montreal H.S.	Montréal Laval
K. Drummond (Politician)	----	McGill Harvard La Sorbonne
F. Cloutier (Doctor)	----	Laval La Sorbonne
J.-P. L'Allier (Lawyer)	Séminaire Ste-Thérèse	Montréal Ottawa

TABLE 5.2 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF THE 1976 BOURASSA CABINET

MINISTER	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
G. Harvey (Accountant)	Collège du Sacré-Coeur (Victoriaville)	Goyetche Bus. College International Acc. Society
J. Cournoyer (Lawyer)	----	----
J. Bienvenue (Lawyer)	Collège des Jésuites	Laval
C. Simard (Businessman)	Collège St-Joseph de Sorel Pensionnat Mont-Jésus-Marie	Ottawa
O. Parent (C.A.)	Collège Notre-Dame (Hull) Ecole Supèrieure (Hull)	Queen's Chicago
V. Goldbloom (Doctor)	Selwyn House School Lower Canada College	McGill Columbia
R. Mailloux (Businessman)	Baie St-Paul Schools	(None)
C.-E. Forget (Lawyer)	----	Montréal London Johns Hopkins

TABLE 5.2 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF THE 1976 BOURASSA CABINET

MINISTER	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
D. Hardy (Lawyer)	Séminaire St-Thérèse	Montréal
R. Queneville (Doctor)	Séminaire de Joliette	Montréal
G. Vaillancourt (Merchant)	Séminaire de Sherbrooke Collège du Sacré-Coeur (Sherbrooke)	(None)
P. Phaneuf (Educator/ Administrator)	Catholic H.S.	(None)
L. Bacon (Activist/ Administrator)	Valleyfield Schools	(None)
F. Lalonde (Lawyer)	Collège St-Jean Vianney Collège Ville-Marie	Montréal McGill
B. Lachapelle (Engineer)	Collège St-Stanislas	l'Echole Polytechnique M.I.T.
P. Berthiaume (Administrator)	Collège St-Laurent	Montréal McGill
J. Giasson (Insurance Agent)	Collège de Ste-Anne de la Pocatière	(None)

TABLE 5.2 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF THE 1976 BOURASSA CABINET

* Occupation of minister prior to entering Quebec Legislature.

Adapted from: The Canadian Parliamentary Guide (Ottawa: Queen's Printer), volumes for the years 1974, 1975, 1976; The Canadian Who's Who, vol. 13 (1973-75); Kieran Simpson, ed., Canadian Who's Who 1979 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), vol. 14; La situation de l'enseignement du Québec. Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec, juin, 1975, Table 6, pp. 39-56; and Louis Gadbois, ed., Les clientèles de l'école secondaire privée: Rapport d'une enquête sur les familles des élèves inscrits dans les institutions de l'A.I.E.S. (Montréal: Centre d'animation, de développement et de recherche en éducation, 1976), Appendice A, pp. 198-201.

institutions attended by, and the prior principal occupations of, members of Quebec's 1936 Duplessis and 1976 Bourassa cabinets respectively. In Table 5.1 we find that six of the 12 francophone ministers in the 1936 cabinet studied at Laval, while two others took at least one professional degree at Montréal. Not surprisingly, two of the three English-Canadian ministers--Thomas J. Coonan and Gilbert Layton--who received university educations did so at McGill, Quebec's principal English-language institution of higher learning. Only one minister (Onésime Gagnon) sought higher education at an institution (Oxford) outside the province. Additionally, nine of the 12 francophone ministers were educated within the classical colleges--two at Collège Mont-St-Louis and three at Collège de Ste-Anne de la Pocatière. Viewed in terms of prior occupations, the cabinet breaks down as follows: six lawyers, one of which was an English Canadian; six members--the three merchants, the two insurance agents, and the river pilot--engaged in small ("petit-bourgeois") retail trade and service enterprises; one doctor and one farmer. What is surprising, however, especially given the period in Quebec's social history, is the fact that the only member who was employed in a "technical" capacity was a French Canadian. Before entering politics, François-Joseph Leduc was a chemical engineer.

Although things had changed in Quebec within the space of forty years, as Table 5.2 shows, they nonetheless remained essentially the same. Indeed, by 1976, the number of French-Canadian members in the cabinet had almost doubled, increasing from 12 to 23, whereas the number of English-Canadian members stayed at three. Eight of the francophone ministers took at least one degree at Montréal while five attended Laval. A relatively significant indication of change is the fact that three French-Canadian ministers attended McGill at one time or another; and while it is safe to assume that the anglophone ministers who attended university did so at McGill--as was indeed the case--one of them (William Tetley) studied law at Laval. Also of interest to note is the fact that while only one minister in the Duplessis cabinet sought higher education outside of the province, eight ministers in the Bourassa cabinet spent at least part of their university careers studying elsewhere. La Sorbonne, the University of London, Harvard, and the University of Ottawa were each represented by two members within the cabinet, while the following were attended by at least one of the ministers: Geneva, Chicago, Columbia, M.I.T., Johns Hopkins, and Queen's University at Kingston.

What had not changed, however, was the large number of French-Canadian ministers who were educated within the classical colleges. Seventeen of the 23 members of the 1976 cabinet had attended at least one of the colleges--the two most senior ministers going to Collège Jean de Brébeuf and two others to Séminaire Ste-Thérèse. As in 1936, the legal profession was again the occupational category with the largest representation (nine) among members of the cabinet. Collectively, the "traditional" professions--doctor, accountant, administrator, merchant, and so on--claimed 12 members. Finally--and perhaps not as surprisingly as was the case in 1936--the remainder of the cabinet, composed of five French Canadians, broke down in terms of prior occupation thus: two engineers, two businessmen, and one economist.

What conclusions can be drawn from this compilation of facts and figures? First, the classical college background of 75 per cent of the first set and 74 per cent of the second set of French-Canadian ministers in the 1936 and 1976 cabinets gives some indication of the class composition of the respective groups. Further, the homogeneity of these groups derived not only from a common educational experience at the classical colleges, but from post-secondary education at Laval and Montréal as well. Contributing to this same homogeneity was the fact that, as available biographical references indicate, all 35 ministers were French-speaking, Roman Catholic natives of Quebec. These factors were no doubt helpful in fostering among the respective groups the ability to articulate for French-Canadian society a consistent set of values. In large measure, this also holds true for the English-speaking ministers. Indeed, while the ministers in this group indicated adherence either to one of the Protestant denominations or, in the case of Victor Goldbloom, the Hebrew faith, all six were Quebec-born and, one may correctly assume, fluently bilingual. Considerations of tokenism aside, one may also assume that the very inclusion of these individuals in their respective cabinets was a reflection not only of the governments' attempts to accommodate the interests of the more substantial minority groups in Quebec, but an indication as well of the extent to which the ideological, intellectual, cultural and linguistic concerns of the anglophone ministers were in general accord with those of their francophone colleagues. In fact, William Tetley's inclusion of "priority" language guarantees into Quebec's consumer and corporation laws during the early years of the Bourassa Liberal government met, perhaps expectantly, with much protest from English business in the province. As an English minister in a francophone-controlled cabinet and government, Tetley assumed the difficult and ultimately thankless task of striking a balance between French and English rights in Quebec. Still, he made clear his "priority":

> The English-speaking population was concerned with the rising nationalism of French Canadians and in particular their desire to protect the French language. Maintaining the priority of the French language was our general theme, but priority also meant recognizing the second language. In this respect, I was particularly aware and concerned about the delicate dichotomy--protecting the French language in English-speaking North America and at the same time preserving the rights of English Quebeckers.12

By way of comparison we find that the economic elite which existed in Quebec in the mid-1930s displayed marked differences from, as well as some similarities to, its political counterpart. The first and most obvious difference--the one that has been alluded to throughout this study--is that of ethnic composition. Of the 26 corporate executives listed in Table 5.3, only one was of French-Canadian ethnic origin. Another seemingly apparent difference is that related to the deree of private school attendance by members of the economic elite. Here one finds that only 11 of the 22 individuals for whom biographical references in the secondary school category are available indicate attendance at private institutions. Of these, six studied at Bishop's College School, two at Upper Canada College, and three others at different private schools within Quebec. Additionally, five of the 22 executives received their secondary education at Montreal High School. Yet while the comparatively large number of individuals who attended this school gives some indication of the homogeneity of the elite, it may at one and the same time serve to misrepresent the class composition of the group as a whole. No longer in existence, Montreal High School was a public institution, situated in the heart of the affluent district that used to be known as the "Square Mile." As one observer has noted, the Square Mile was,

> for more than three quarters of a century, the enclave of the men who built not only Montreal's prosperity but that of much of Canada. Here dwelt the railway barons, the shipping giants, the sugar merchants, the bankers and directors of the largest insurance companies, and a host of other prominent figures, from leading physicians to McGill University principals. What they had in

TABLE 5.3

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1935

EXECUTIVE[a]	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
H. Holt (Engineer, Financier Royal Bank of Canada)[b]	— ----	----
W. Black (Clerk, Financier: Ogilvie Flour Mills, Ltd.)	(None)	(None)
R. McMaster (Industrialist: Steel Company of Canada)	Montreal H.S.	(None)
C. Gordon (Sales Clerk, Banker: Bank of Montreal)	Montreal H.S.	(None)
E. Beatty (Lawyer, Railway Exec.: Canadian Pacific Railway)	Upper Canada College	Toronto Osgoode Hall
J.W. McConnell (Industrialist: St. Lawrence Sugar, Ltd.)	(None)	(None)
A. Brown (Lawyer, Senator: Brown, Montgomery, McMichael)	St. Francis College (Richmond, Que.) Morrin College (Quebec)	McGill

TABLE 5.3 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1935

EXECUTIVE	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
J. Smith (Engineer, Company Exec.: Shawinigan Water and Power)	Central H.S. (Buffalo, N.Y.)	Cornell
R. Adair (Company Executive: Hartt & Adair Coal Co.)	(None)	(None)
A. MacTier (Stenog., Railway Exec.: Canadian Pacific Railway)	Sedberg School	(None)
Lord Shaughnessy (Lawyer: Meredith, Macpherson, Hague)	Bishop's College School	McGill Cambridge Laval
W. Angus (Engineer, Manufacturer: Canadian Car & Foundry Co.)	(Private Schools, Montreal)	McGill
J.H. Molson (Brewer, Financier: Molson Brewery, Ltd)	Montreal H.S.	McGill
G. Duggan (Engineer, Indust.: Dominion Bridge Co., Ltd.)	Upper Canada College	Toronto

TABLE 5.3

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1935

EXECUTIVE	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
M. Wilson (Banker: Royal Bank of Canada)	----	(None)
F. Beique (Lawyer, Banker, Senator: Banque Canadienne Nationale)	Collège Ville-Marie	Laval
F. Meighen (Manufacturer, Financier: Lake of the Woods Milling Co.)	Montreal H.S.	McGill
H. Paton (Contractor: Sheddon Forwarding Co.)	Paisley Grammer School (Scotland)	(None)
G. Hall (Mechanic, Railway Executive: Dominion Atlantic Railway)	Bishop's College School	(None)
F. Meredith (Lawyer: Meredith, Holden, Heward)	Bishop's College School	Laval
H. Drummond (Industrialist: Canada & Dominion Sugar Co.)	----	(None)

TABLE 5.3

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1935

EXECUTIVE	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
D.F. Angus (Financier: Standard Life Assurance Co.)	----	----
W.M. Birks (Merchant, Manufacturer: Henry Birks & Sons, Ltd.)	Montreal H.S.	McGill
J. Price (Financier: Price Brothers & Co.)	Bishop's College School	R.M.C.
C.F. Sise (Engineer, Company Executive: Bell Telephone Co., Ltd.)	Bishop's College School	McGill
P.F. Sise (Engineer, Indust.: Northern Electric Co.)	Bishop's College School	McGill

[a] Order in which executives are listed is based on gross assets of corporations on whose boards they were direc-directors.

[b] Denotes profession of executve and his main corporate interest.

TABLE 5.3 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1935

Adapted from: Watt Hugh McCollum, Who Owns Canada? An Examination of the Facts Concerning the Concentration of Ownership and Control of the Means of Production, Distribution and Exchange in Canada (Regina, Sask.: C.C.F. Research Bureau, 1935), Table 3, pp. 12-13; Sir Charles G.D. Roberts and Arthur Leonard Tunnell, eds., The Canadian Who's Who: A Handbook of Canadian Biography of Living Characters (Toronto: Trans-Canada Press), Vol 2 (1936-37); B.M. Greene, ed., Who's Who in Canada (Toronto: International Press, Ltd.), Vol. 23 (1934-35); and Peter C. Newman, "Canada's Biggest Big Businessmen," Maclean's Magazine, Vol. 70, no. 21 (October 12, 1957), pp. 14-15.

> common was not only wealth and power but ancestry that was almost entirely English or Scottish; few of French descent made it to the Square Mile.13

Thus it was perhaps owing to the school's proximity and noted academic excellence, and possibly also to a sense of frugality on their part, that those members of Montreal's White Anglo-Saxon Protestant establishment who dwelt within the Square Mile chose to send their offspring to Montreal High School rather than off to Bishop's College in Lennoxville, to Lower Canada College, or even to Westmount High School, which was located in a suburb whose inhabitants were at the time regarded distastefully as "new rich" or "middle class."

The two elite groups of the mid-1930s compared reasonably well in terms of the proportion of their respective members who partook of post-secondary education. Ten of the 15, or 66 per cent, of the ministers in the Duplessis cabinet (those, that is, for whom references are available) attended at least one university or post-secondary institution; the figures for the economic elite were 14 of 24, or 58 per cent, respectively. Of these 24, eight studied at McGill, three at Laval and two at the University of Toronto. Of interest to note here, particularly in terms of the relationship between ethnic affiliation and the choice of institution, is the fact that two of the three Laval alumni, namely, Lord Shaughnessy and Frederick Meredith, were English Quebeckers. Among the other post-secondary institutions represented by members of this elite were

Osgoode Hall Law School, the Royal Military College at Kingston, and Cambridge and Cornell universities.

Although perceived to be relatively uniform when judged in terms of place of birth, the economic elite was not as overwhelmingly homogeneous as was its political counterpart. Whereas all 15 members of the Duplessis cabinet were Quebec-born, only 16 of the 26 corporate executives in the 1935 economic elite were born in that province. To be sure, these individuals comprised much more of a Canadian as opposed to a purely Quebec provincial elite. Yet the perspective of the group as a whole, especially when viewing domestic economic policy, presumably remained a "national" one, since about half the number of members who were not natives of Quebec had at least been born elsewhere in the country. In point of fact, three executives were born in Ontario while one other was a native of Nova Scotia. Four of the remaining six members of the elite were born in the United Kingdom and the other two in the United States. Considerations of "foreign" influence on the economic motives and political ideologies of these last six individuals can, we believe, be dispensed with, inasmuch as each immigrated to Canada in either his childhood or adolescence, and can thus be said to have undergone the greater part of his socialization here.

Two other factors which contributed to the relative homogeneity of the corporate elite were religion and social club membership. An examination of religious affiliations may prove of interest here, especially given what was noted earlier concerning the association in social theory between Protestantism and capitalism, and also because of the relationship between religion and ethnic affiliation. An application of Weber's thesis to our 1935 elite group yielded no surprises: with the exception of Lord Shaughnessy, who was of Irish-Catholic descent, each of the British-origin executives indicated religious affiliation with one of the Protestant denominations while the lone executive of French origin belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. More specifically, 10 of the 24 members of the first group were Anglicans, nine Presbyterians and one belonged to the United Church of Canada. The remaining four merely described themselves as being "Protestants." That only one member of this elite was of French-Canadian ethnic origin makes clear the fact that the economic and educational systems did not, at least in mid-1930s Quebec, provide Catholics with a very wide avenue of upward mobility. On the other hand, the very inclusion of a French Canadian and an Irish Catholic, under the rubric "economic elite" suggests, as Porter does, that "Catholicism and economic power are not dogmatically incompatible."[14]

With reference to Weber's empirical analysis, Porter further suggests that, in the epoch of the impersonal and largely anonymous corporation, "the club has superseded the congregation as establishing, in the corporate world at least, worth and social status."[15] From the observations he made during a visit to the United States during the early years of the present century, Weber concluded that clubs and other fraternal organizations contributed to the secularization of the sect, because membership in both types of associations was based on the elective principle. Here he found that membership by election indicated social approval by the incumbent social groups. In the mid-1950s the exact function of clubs in elite life was unclear. It was the opinion of one group of observers that an individual's "membership in the 'right' clubs and associations, even though he may rarely appear there, is considered useful, if not essential, to validate the male career."[16] While a member of the elite derives the greater part of his status from a range of other positions, clubs, exclusive and as expensive as they are to join, do provide an additional locus of interaction which makes for homogeneity of social type. Indeed, some two decades later, Wallace Clement, in his study of Canada's economic elite, concluded that club memberships served as badges of "social certification." The club, according to Clement,

> is a place where friendships are established and old relationships nourished. A person's 'contacts' are important in the corporate world because they affect the ability to have access to capital, to establish joint ventures and to enter into buyer and seller relationships with the men who control the nation's largest corporations. . . . Canadian clubs are one of the key institutions which form an interesting and active national upper class.[17]

In our passive survey it was found that most members of Quebec's 1935 corporate elite held a variety of club memberships, the initial fees for which likely amounted to several thousands of dollars. On the average, membership in four or five clubs in the city of residence, as well as those of other large cities, appeared to be the common pattern. Among the most favoured, and hence the most exclusive, clubs in the Montreal area were the Mount Royal with 24 of the 26 members of the economic elite, the St. James's with 20, the Forest and Stream with 19, the Mount Bruno with 16, the Royal Montreal Golf Club with 11, the Montreal Hunt Club with 10, the Montreal with nine, and the University Club with seven. Clubs in other cities which were important to the economic elite were the York Club in Toronto and the Garrison Club in Quebec City, represented by eight and four members respectively. Finally, in Ottawa, although off the path of industry and commerce, the Rideau Club claimed seven members of this elite. The Rideau was established in 1865 by Sir John A. Macdonald. According to Peter C. Newman, its previous location--right across Wellington Street from the Parliament Buildings--"always symbolized its purpose: to provide a discreet meeting place where men representing business power and political authority can exchange favours."[18]

Included in our sample of the economic elite as it existed in Quebec in 1975 are 41 executives, 24 of whom were born in that province. Of the remaining 17, one was born in England, two in the United States, three in Europe, and 11 in other Canadian provinces. Included among the last group were eight Ontarians, two natives of Saskatchewan and one Manitoban. Viewed in terms of ethnicity, 24 of the 41 were found to be of British origin. Additionally, three were of European descent, four were Jews and 10 were of French-Canadian ethnic origin. Although the proportion of francophones who qualified for inclusion in our sample of the national elite resident in Quebec increased six-fold (from four to 24 per cent) during the period 1935 to 1975, their numbers nonetheless gave a false impression of the economic in-roads French Canadians had made, particularly in their own province. The British-origin executives listed in Table 5.4 may have still dominated the economy of Quebec in the mid-1970s, but, as Newman notes, the surviving business establishment was being supplanted gradually by French-speaking Canadians with more of a province-wide influence.[19] What these francophones counted largely to their advantage was the settling in of the liberal economic philosophy that was adopted in the 1960s, as well as Quebec's restrictive language laws, which helped to fuel the westward exodus of anglophone business.

By way of commenting on the class composition of this group as a whole we note first that, of the 28 executives for whom biographical references were readily available, 20 indicated that they had attended at least one private school. Eight of the 10 French-Canadian executives were educated within the system of classical colleges. The two exceptions were Paul Desmarais (regarded by members of

TABLE 5.4

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1975

EXECUTIVE[a]	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
W. Arbuckle (Financier: Investment Secretariat, Ltd.)[b]	----	----
R. Bandeen (Transportation ~~Executive:~~ Canadian National Railways)	----	Western (Ont.) Duke
W. Bennett (Company Executive: Iron Ore Co. of Canada)	Fort William College	Toronto
C. Bronfman (Industrialist: House of Seagram, Ltd.)	Selwyn House School Trinity College (Port Hope, Ontario)	McGill
A. Campbell (Actuary, Company Executive: Sun Life Assurance Co.)	Inverness Royal Academy (Scotland)	Aberdeen
A. Charron (Lawyer, Company Executive: Lévesque, Beaubien, Inc.)	Collège de Montréal Collège Ste-Marie	Montréal

TABLE 5.4 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1975

EXECUTIVE	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
J. Courtois (Lawyer: Laing, Weldon, Courtois)	Collège de Montréal	Montréal
P. Curry (Company Executive: Power Corp. of Canada)	Ridley College (St-Catherine's, Ont.) Bishop's College School	----
A.J. de Grandpré (Lawyer, Company Exec.: Bell Canada)	Collège Jean de Brébeuf	McGill
P. Desmarais (Industrialist: Power Corp. of Canada)	----	Ottawa
R.F. Elliott (Lawyer: Stikeman, Elliott, Tamaki)	----	Queen's
A. Franck (Company Executive: Genstar, Ltd.)	Collège Notre-Dame (Antwerp)	Institut Supérieur Comm. (Brus.)
C. Harrington (Trust Company Executive: Royal Trust Co.)	Selwyn House School Trinity College (Port Hope, Ontario)	McGill

TABLE 5.4 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1975

EXECUTIVE	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
C. Hébert (Company Executive: Bombardier, Ltd.)	----	Ecole du Commerce (Victoriaville)
N. Ivory (Investment Counsel: Pembroke Management, Ltd.)	----	----
S. Jarislowsky (Investment Counsel: Jarislowsky, Fraser & Co.)	----	Cornell Chicago Harvard
E.L. Kolber (Financier: Cemp Investments, Ltd.)	Westhill H.S. (Quebec)	McGill
P. Laing (Lawyer: Laing, Weldon, Courtois)	Marlborough College (Wiltshire, England)	McGill Oxford
H. Lang (Engineer, Indust.: Canron, Ltd.)	Galt Collegiate Institute (Ontario)	McGill
P. McEntyre (Trust Company Executive: Commercial Trust Co.)	Bishop's College School	McGill

TABLE 5.4 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1975

EXECUTIVE	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
W.E. McLaughlin (Banker: Royal Bank of Canada)	Oshawa Collegiate Institute	Queen's
F. McNeil (Banker: Bank of Montreal)	----	Manitoba Saskatchewan
H. de M. Molson (Company Executive: Molson Companies, Ltd.)	Bishop's College School	R.M.C.
W. Mulholland (Banker: Bank of Montreal)	Christian Brothers Academy (New York)	Harvard
P. Nadeau (Company Executive: Petrofina Canada, Ltd.)	Pensionnat St-Louis de Gonzague	Laval
D. Nesbitt (Engineer, Inv. Dealer: Nesbitt, Thomson & Co.)	Westmount H.S.	McGill
J.A. Ogilvy (Lawyer: Ogilvy, Cope, Porteous)	Feller Institute	McGill

TABLE 5.4 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1975

EXECUTIVE	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
J. Ostiguy (Investment Dealer: Crang, Ostiguy, Inc.)	Collège Jean de Brébeuf	H.E.C. R.M.C.
P. Paré (Company Executive: Imasco, Ltd.)	Académie St-Léonard	Loyola McGill
L. Phillips (Lawyer: Phillips & Vineberg)	Montreal H.S.	McGill
G. Plourde (Bus. Administrator: UAP, Inc.)	Collège de Joliette Collège Jean de Brébeuf	Montréal
L. Rolland (Engineer, Indust.: Rolland, Paper Co., Ltd.)	Collège Jean de Brébeuf	Loyola Montréal
R. Scrivener (Company Executive: Bell Canada)	----	Toronto
I.D. Sinclair (Company Executive: Canadian Pacific, Ltd.)	----	Manitoba

TABLE 5.4 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1975

EXECUTIVE	LEVEL OF EDUCATION	
	SECONDARY	POST-SECONDARY
J. Soden (Company Executive: Trizec Corp., Ltd.)	----	McGill
S. Steinberg (Company Executive: Steinberg's, Ltd.)	----	----
W.I.M. Turner, Jr. (Engineer, Company Executive: Consolidated-Bathurst, Ltd.)	----	Toronto Harvard
L. Webster (Engineer, Company Officer: Prenor Group, Ltd.)	Lower Canada College	McGill
R.H. Webster (Trust Company Executive: Imperial Trust Co.)	Lower Canada College	McGill Babson Inst. (Boston)
K. White (Trust Company Executive: Royal Trust Co.)	Jarvis Collegiate	(None)
H. Wyatt (Banker: Royal Bank of Canada)	Central Collegiate Institute (Moose Jaw)	(None)

TABLE 5.4 (continued)

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS ATTENDED BY MEMBERS OF QUEBEC'S ECONOMIC ELITE, 1975

[a] Residents of Quebec chosen from a selected list of Canada's national business establishment.

[b] Denotes profession of executive and his main corporate interst.

Adapted from: Peter C. Newman, The Canadian Establishment, Volume I (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), Appendix D; Terry Hughes, Hugh Fraser and Terry M. Whelpton, eds., Who's Who in Canada (Toronto: International Press, Ltd.) Vol. 64 (1975-76).

English Canada's economic establishment as their chief ambassador from Quebec) and Jean-Claude Hébert (war hero and independently wealthy corporate executive), who we assume received their secondary education in or close to their native cities--Sudbury, Ontario and Magog, Quebec respectively. Of interest to note is the fact that four of the eight who were educated at classical colleges chose Collège Jean de Brébeuf, which, it will be recalled, counts among its alumni the two then most senior ministers in the 1976 Bourassa cabinet. As far as secondary education was concerned, the situation proved to be somewhat different for those of British or other ethnic origin. To be sure, 15 of the 28 executives for whom data is available did attend at least one private school. The relative locations of the schools, however, like the birthplaces of those who attended them, was characterized by a greater geographical distribution than was the case for the French-Canadian executives. Indeed, while Bishop's College School was represented by three individuals and Lower Canada College, Selwyn House School, and Trinity College School in Port Hope, Ontario claimed two each, six others went to private schools "abroad," of which the furthest was in Belgium. Although more than half of this non-French-Canadian group had in common a private school education, one's sense that theirs was not a "shared" experience tends to diminish, however slightly, the extent to which the group may be perceived as being homogeneous.

The same conclusions can, in large measure, be drawn from a review of the post-secondary school experiences of members of this elite. Examining the French-Canadian group first, we find that four businessmen spent at least part of their university careers at the Université de Montréal. Prior to enrolling at Montréal, however, Lucien Rolland had spent some time at Loyola College. For his part, Paul Paré enrolled at McGill after leaving Loyola; A. Jean de Grandpré did his university training at McGill alone. Among the remaining French-Canadian executives, Paul Desmarais studied for his professional degree at the University of Ottawa, Claude Hébert at Ecole du Commerce in Victoriaville, and Jean Ostiguy took his degrees from Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (affiliated with the Université de Montréal since 1910) and the Royal Military College in Kingston. Interestingly enough, only one of the 10 individuals--Pierre Nadeau--studied at Laval. Whereas both Laval and Montréal were the universities of choice among francophone members of Quebec's political elite, the underrepresentation here of the first institution is likely an indication of the incompatibility of Laval's "traditional" academic orientation with the career aspirations of the members of this group within the economic elite. The case for those of British and other ethnic background can, in this regard, be stated much more succinctly: only 12 of 30, or 40 per cent, of those for whom references were available attended McGill. Among the other universities represented by two or more of these businessmen were Harvard (4), Toronto (3), Queen's and Manitoba.

For the most part, this group as a whole fared reasonably better when judged in terms of those criteria--religion and club membership--which were shown to be conducive to the confraternity of elites, to a community of interests, if not actually a common outlook. Although it was, like its predecessor, composed primarily of anglophones, there were, however, certain differences in the ethnic-religious orientation of members of the 1975 economic elite to distinguish it from the earlier group. These included the fact that while 23 of the 31 businessmen of British or other ethnic origin were affiliated with one of the Protestant denominations, four others were of the Hebrew faith and another four belonged to the Roman Catholic Church. As was to be expected, the 10 French-Canadian executives listed Catholic as their religion. Likewise, in terms of club life, there appears to have been a greater intermingling among the ethnic groups than there had been in the mid-Thirties. Still, somewhat ironic was the fact that a number of clubs were identified whose memberships were decidedly "ethnic" in nature. First, the clubs which remained the most favoured were the Mount Royal with 26 members of our sample, the St. James's with 16, the Mount Bruno, the Royal Montreal Golf, and the University clubs each with eight. By way of comparing the relative ethnic composition of these and other clubs, it was found that while Senator Beique was not a member of the Mount Royal Club in 1935 (belonging only to the St. James's, the Montreal, and the Reform clubs), four of our French-Canadian businessmen did hold memberships in that club in 1975. Also during that period, the St. James's increased its francophone representation from one to four, and the Royal Montreal Golf and Mount Bruno clubs added one and two respectively. Conversely, Montreal's première French-Canadian club, the St. Denis, claimed among its membership six francophones, two anglophones and one Jew from the 1975 economic elite. Finally, the fact that the Montefiore and Elmridge clubs were each represented by three Jewish businessmen alone gives some indication of the clubs' primary, if not exclusive ethnic group composition.

By and large, the foregoing represents an attempt to show certain areas of interaction deemed to be instrumental in the socialization of elite groups in general, and those in Quebec in particular. The aim here was essentially to test the concept "elite," whose validity, Porter maintains, rests on the probability that the individuals assigned to the group are socially homogeneous. In other words, if the general sociological proposition that individuals who interact together are more likely to have beliefs and values in common is true, and if it is possible to demonstrate that there are areas of interaction which tend to be exclusively elite, there then exists grounds for viewing an elite as a sociological group rather than merely as a statistical class. Throughout the sociological groups we have examined run thin, but nonetheless perceptible threads of kinship, held in place by common exposure to the socialization processes provided by, among other institutions, the private fee-paying school, the law school, and the engineering and business faculties of the universities. In general, early contacts such as these can and do lead to close associations later in the career, particularly in the partnerships of law and finance and sometimes even in those of big business and government. There are, to be sure, limits to what can be shown by way of the biographical references that compose the bulk of our objective data. Yet given the size and relative inaccessibility of our groups, the ideal alternative, the sociometric technique--asking each member of the respective elite groups to indicate how well he knows all the other members[20]--would prove difficult, if not impossible to administer. Viewed in terms of the particular aims and limited scope of the present analysis, however, the data do show that while relations between Quebec's most influential French and English elite groups were characterized by varying degrees of institutional segmentation, there nonetheless remained certain areas of interaction which brought together some of their members.

C. "Commitment to Maintaining the System"

By way of accounting for the fact that Quebec's political elite is largely French Canadian in composition, some observers trot out the standard argument which holds that, given the anglophones' early control and lasting domination of economic activity in both the province and the larger Canadian polity, the only fields of wide-spread influence left open to well-educated francophones were those of politics and public administration--primarily at the Quebec provincial level. Irrefutable, as we have seen, is the fact that the French Canadians who took up positions in these areas were, as a result of their backgrounds in the liberal arts and professions, eminently qualified to do so. Yet while this line of argument is well and good as far as it goes, one should not undercut or otherwise ignore the fact that young French Quebeckers were for the longest time socialized in an environment permeated with the doctrine of a church whose underpinnings were profoundly legitimist in nature. Indeed, as was shown in Chapter III, the roots of "French-Canadian political culture" can be traced back to the early post-Conquest period, when, as Donald Smiley writes, "the clergy itself played an important role in consociational accommodation at all levels." Although the close links between religion, ethnicity and education that were forged by the Church contributed to occupational segregation between French and English and also to the relative autonomy of the two societies, this tradition led nonetheless to the development of "effective channels of access to, and interaction between, the Anglo-Saxon business community and the francophone political and ecclesiastical leadership."[21] Having held firm in various guises and to varying degrees, this tradition has over time dictated the behaviour of the political and economic elite in Quebec.

One of the most significant and symbolic ways in which this business-government relationship was facilitated was by way of a cabinet-based accommodation. As alluded to earlier, this accommodation made it customary for an elected member of Montreal's financial community (frequently chosen by the Bank of Montreal) to be appointed Provincial Treasurer. Indeed, as Jean Hamelin and Louise Beaudoin have written:

> L'influence anglophone prenait appui sur la haute finance. La Banque de Montréal, créancière traditionnelle de la province au XIXe siècle, tenait à choisir le trésorier. Lors des ententes tacites au début de la Conféderation, il avait éte convenu que le trésorier serait Anglais. Le finance anglaise avait prôné la Conféderation, mais elle avait mis toutes les chances de son côté.[22]

The appointment of Quebec's first Treasurer (equivalent in stature to the Minister of Finance in the federal government) was, however, marked by controversy and, ultimately, conciliation. When asked in 1867 to form the first Quebec government, Joseph-Edouard Cauchon made the mistake of ignoring the power of English business interests by nominating a francophone to serve as Provincial Treasurer. Pressured into reconsidering his original proposal, Cauchon ultimately offered the post to Christopher

Dunkin. Dunkin was to refuse this offer, citing as he did Cauchon's opposition to the expansion of Protestant educational rights in the province. In a letter to Cauchon reproduced in the 3 January 1868 edition of Le Canadien, Dunkin made clear the constituency for which he spoke: "Il m'est impossible d'oublier que votre conduite pendant le dernière session vous enlevait naturellement la confiance de cette partie de vos compatriotes bas-canadiens dont les opinions doivent trouver en moi un représentant."[23] In his apparent frustration at being unable to fill the Treasurer's position, Cauchon turned over the task of forming the government to Pierre Chaveau, who then went on to become Quebec's first premier. Having, unlike Cauchon, maintained cordial relations with the English-speaking population, Chaveau was thus able to secure Dunkin as his Treasurer. The strength of this tradition to withstand numerous changes of government in subsequent years was made clear in 1930, when the premier at that time, Louis-Alexandre Taschereau, explained to The Gazette his choice of Gordon Scott as Treasurer in these terms: "Respectful of minorities, we wished to continue the Quebec tradition by confiding the Treasury to one of our compatriots of the English language."[24]

Although there were exceptions to the custom of handing to anglophones the Treasury portfolio in the years prior to 1944, the tradition came effectively to an end in that year. Prior to his resignation as leader of Quebec's Liberal party, however, Taschereau appointed another anglophone as a successor to Gordon Scott. From 1932 to 1936, Ralph Stockwell occupied the office of Provincial Treasurer. Moreover, as leader of the Liberal party during the period of the "reorganization" government, which lasted from June to August, 1936, J. Adélard Godbout appointed Edgar McDougall to the post, as he would J. Arthur Mathewson in 1939 when the Liberals once again held power. Yet while Martin Fisher was made Treasurer at the beginning of the first Union Nationale administration in 1936, Maurice Duplessis instead appointed a francophone--Onésime Gagnon--to the post with the re-election of his government in 1944.

While not a single anglophone has served as Provincial Treasurer (or Minister of Finance, as the post was rechristened in 1951) since that time, other positions within the Quebec cabinet were later to be identified as being "reserved" for the English. One such position was that of Minister of Mines, held during the later Duplessis years by Jonathan Robinson (1944-48), C. Daniel French (1948-53), and William Cottingham (1954-60). Another was the Revenue ministry, established in 1960 by the Liberal government of Jean Lesage. During his three years in cabinet, Paul Earl held, first, the Mines portfolio and then Revenue. He was replaced as Minister of Revenue by Eric Kierans who himself was, in 1965, succeeded by Richard Hyde. Nineteen Sixty-Six saw the re-emergence of a revived Union Nationale with a new leader, Daniel Johnson, and the appointment of yet another anglophone Minister of Revenue, Raymond Johnston. Finally, while William Tetley held the Revenue portfolio for a mere six months after the Liberals were returned to power in 1970, he nonetheless spent five of his six and a half years in the Bourassa cabinet in the newly established Ministry of Financial Institutions, Companies and Co-operatives.[25]

By and large, neither of these posts could match the power and influence inherent in the Treasury and Finance portfolios. As a result, then, any significance attached to the appointment of anglophones to such quasi-economic posts as were Revenue and Financial Institutions would appear to have been more symbolic than real. Indeed, as one observer has noted, the withdrawal of the important finance portfolios from English control was an indication of a "change in the unwritten rules of the political system that could be made because of the declining influence of the English-speaking population."[26] However, according to one former anglophone MNA, the main criterion upon which cabinet appointments were made had, at least by the time he became a minister in 1970, changed from a consideration of the individual's social and ethnic background to a concern with his or her "ministerability." In other words, while a candidate's social, cultural and religious affiliations were now to be viewed as secondary, modifying factors, and while the new leader of a party was somewhat constrained in his choices by a tradition of respect for the seniority of

---

members with previous cabinet experience, ministers were appointed primarily on the basis of their "minds," their intellectual abilities and potential for leadership and initiative in their prosepective posts.[27]

Although the power and influence of Quebec's English-speaking population had begun generally to wane by the mid- to late-1940s, several of its individual members continued to play important roles as cultural and economic brokers. For instance, prior to his untimely death in the fall of 1948, Jonathan Robinson was considered to have been Duplessis's English-speaking lieutenant in Quebec. Commenting on the esteem Robinson garnered as a member of the former premier's cabinet, Conrad Black writes:

> Since the First World War, only George Marler has rivalled him as spokesman of distinction for the English minority in Quebec. To attend his funeral in Waterloo, the entire provincial government landed on pontoon planes on Lake Brome, on whose shores Robinson had lived. Robinson's greatest achievements were the Ungava Development Bill and the launching of the careers of two subsequent Prime Ministers of Quebec, Daniel Johnson and Jean-Jacques Bertrand. 28

Among those anglophone businessmen who also remained influential during the Duplessis era were R.E. Powell, president of the Aluminum Company of Canada, who was on good personal terms with the premier, and John H. Molson. For instance, by way of his cordial relations with Duplessis, Molson was able to secure generous grants for the Joint Fund of the Montreal Children's, Royal Victoria, and Royal Edward Laurentian hospitals, of which Molson was president in 1956.

Others who were recipients of Duplessis's largesse were Samuel and Allan Bronfman, president and vice-president, respectively, of Distillers Corporation-Seagrams, who were indebted to the premier for the treatment accorded the Montreal Jewish General Hospital; Rodgie MacLagan, president of Canada Steamship Lines, who acquired grants for the Reddy Memorial Hospital; J.Y. Murdoch, president of Noranda Mines, with which the Union Nationale collaborated in the expansion of the Noranda mining region in Abitibi, and on whose behalf the premier dispatched provincial police to maintain order at the site of the illegal 1957 Gaspé Copper Mines strike in Murdochville, named after the industrialist; and the president of Quebec North Shore Paper Company, Arthur Schmon, who made "requests" for amendments to municipal charters in north shore communities, for the expansion of newsprint production and timber cutting facilities, and for the generation of greater hydro-electric power in the region. Clearly, as Black notes,

> the English industrialists had an accommodation with Duplessis as secular leader of the incumbent French majority, their host in Quebec. They were separate, and as long as they were good citizens, respectful of the Prime Minister, Duplessis, there was no problem. . . . To them, Duplessis was a man to whom the unfathomable murkiness of French-Canadian politics could safely be left.29

While his position as provincial premier and his noted benificence were doubtless significant, Duplessis otherwise maintained his entrée into the closely guarded inner circles of Quebec's English business establishment by way of his close personal ties with, in particular, John W.H. Bassett and John Wilson McConnell. Arguably Duplessis's closest English-speaking friend in the 1950s, Bassett, besides being the proprietor of the Montreal Gazette, was a fiercly partisan politician, whose biases in favour of the Union Nationale were faithfully adopted by his newspaper. In numerous and extravagant ways, Bassett was rewarded for the Gazette's laudatory comments on positions adopted by the government as well as for the organ's editorial advocacy of Duplessis's personal reflections. For instance, while chancellor of Bishop's University in the mid-1950s, Bassett requested and won for the institution a special grant of $1 million from the government. Further testimony of the strength of the Bassett-Duplessis friendship came in the form of a profitable allotment of provincial government printing business, particularly school texts, to the Gazette Printing Company, which was of crucial importance to the Gazette's operations. The English-language daily would likewise benefit from Duplessis's personal assurance of the availability of newsprint and the stability of its price.[30]

Whereas Duplessis may have maintained closer personal ties with John Bassett than he did with most other English-speaking businessmen, his relationship with J.W. McConnell remains the most celebrated. Born in Muskoka, Ontario in 1877, McConnell, armed with only an elementary school education, began working in business at an early age, becoming successful enough to enter Montreal's financial world in 1906. Subsequently, he would become an investment broker, the president of the Bank of Montreal, and a director of several large corporations such as Montreal Light, Heat and Power, Brazilian Traction, Light and Power (later Brascan), Canada Steamship Lines, Ogilvie Flour Mills, Sun Life Assurance Company, International Nickel Company and the Royal Trust Company. By 1938, McConnell would include among his principal operating assets the St. Lawrence Sugar Refineries, Ogilvie Flour, the Montreal Star and the Montreal Herald. McConnell's rapid rise in financial circles, his large-scale speculations in securities and commodities, and his astuteness and longevity led Black to cite him as being the probable "doyen, in wealth and influence, of the Canadian Pacific-Bank of Montreal-Royal Trust group by the end of the First World War," and to opine that he was "rivalled only by Sir Herbert Holt and Samuel Bronfman as the greatest Canadian businessman of his era."[31]

Politically, McConnell had been a Tory while Sir Robert Borden and Arthur Meighen ran the Conservative party, but he did not particularly like R.B. Bennett and was indifferent to the rise of Maurice Duplessis in the 1930s. Indeed, so annoyed was he with the premier's sensational election call in 1939, that McConnell did much to bankroll the victory of Adélard Godbout's Liberals. McConnell and Duplessis quickly became adversaries and, until the end of Mackenzie King's life, the industrialist maintained a close friendship with the Liberal leader, prompting Onésime Gagnon to refer to

McConnell as " a conservative leaf turned red."[32] Thus it was not until McConnell saw "the true face of Duplessis" that a warm and very rewarding relationship developed between the two men. In as much as he remained a conservative at heart, McConnell was, like others within the highest ranks of industry, impressed by the strength of the premier's conservative ideology, his ostentatious anti-communism, strenuous hostility to labour disorder, and his championship of free enterprise. Yet if the intimate friendship that was to build between Duplessis and McConnell was, as Black avers, "strenuously, if furtively, decried in some circles," theirs were nevertheless "the relations of patriarchs, and like all arrangements between powerful friends, they endured to the benefit of both parties, and in this case to the overall benefit of the province." To be sure, there had not, in the more modest budgets or circumstances of Taschereau, Godbout, or the pre-war Duplessis term, been any discrimination against English institutions. However, from 1946 to 1959, during the life of the Duplessis-McConnell arrangement, "the largesse of the provincial government flowed in a river, as never before and not since." For his part--as a philanthropist "[without] peer in Canadian history"[33]--McConnell reciprocated in kind.

Indeed, a section of the McConnell Foundation was given over to the benefit of French-Canadian charities and institutions. These funds, totalling close to three-quarters of a million dollars per year throughout the 1950s, were left at the complete disposition of Duplessis. In 1955, the premier earmarked $285,000 of the McConnell money alone to the construction of a boys' club and recreation centre in Trois Rivières, Duplessis's home riding. At the premier's recommendation, moreover, the Hôtel-Dieu in Quebec City and the St. Joseph's of Trois Rivières were the first and second French-language hospitals in the province to receive a cobalt bomb, both of which McConnell himself donated. Through it all, however, both parties strove as far as was possible to maintain low profiles. Attempting not to appear too closely allied to Duplessis in the eyes of Quebec's English community, McConnell set anonymity as a condition of his gift to the youth of Trois Rivières. Similarly, in 1953, Duplessis did not want to arouse the bishops of the French universities by making public any knowledge of a special grant to Sir George Williams University.[34]

Still, McConnell's generous gifts to French charities of all kinds paled in comparison with the tens of millions of dollars he lavished on his favoured projects--McGill University and the Montreal General and Royal Victoria hospitals in particular. For his part, Duplessis's more than forthcoming official and unprecedented support for these and other English-language causes championed by his friend served as principal, though not the only *quid pro quo* McConnell sought for the attention he paid the premier. For instance:

> When a combination of rising demand and mechanical problems created a newsprint shortage in early 1951, McConnell asked Duplessis's intervention to assure continued full tonnage to the Star and an additional 2,000 tons of newsprint in the balance of the year. Not for the last time, Duplessis bullied the paper companies into acceding to his request, with the threat of reduced or cancelled exploitation limits, increased royalties, or outright cancellation of stumpage permits. Within 48 hours of requesting Duplessis's good offices, McConnell was assured by the Premier that the newsprint was forthcoming.35

This somewhat eccentric and personalized method of government, characterized by the dispensation of generous subsidies, favourable concessions of timber and minerals, and a determination to maintain "labour peace," made the Duplessis regime highly popular among the anglophone corporate elite. The Union Nationale's overall subscription to a laissez-faire philosophy led to the enjoyment by business leaders of full freedom from government intrusion in the mamagement of their enterprises, as well as from intrusion by overly aggressive or intransigent union leaders for that matter. Yet while this business-government alliance was, as noted earlier, founded on a strong mutual respect for the ability of the other to control affairs firmly within its particular sphere of influence, its tacit nature remained that of mutual benefit. Here Black documents how, owing to his dislike of discrimination in general, and his strong resentment of what he took to be the less than fair treatment accorded French minorities outside Quebec in particular, Duplessis went out of his way to accommodate

English Montreal and its institutions. While he was, ironically, often vindictive toward those francophone counties that voted against him, Duplessis maintained his generous disposition toward the English, despite the fact that their middle and upper-class districts invariably voted against the Union Nationale after 1936. Duplessis was thus seen to have been motivated by a desire for a good reputation with anglophone financial interests, from whom he sought capital investment and campaign funds. Indeed, since the Union Nationale did not stage public fund-raising drives, it relied on and obtained financing from various corporations, usually in exchange for government contracts, licences, and natural resource concessions. Clearly instrumental in the party's electoral successes, these funds were estimated to have reached $5 million and $9 million, respectively, for the 1952 and 1956 campaigns. Needless to say, J. W. McConnell's election contributions were substantial and, according to Black, "unique in several ways": "They arrived within 48 hours of the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly in 1952 and 1956 and consisted of from $50,000 to $100,000 in wads of fresh bank notes delivered in cartons for the Prime Minister's own attention."[36]

Had Maurice Duplessis and J.W. McConnell survived beyond 1959 and 1963, respectively, would the era of close, interpersonal relations between Quebec government and business have survived along with them? In other words, given the social and political circumstances at the time, could the Union Nationale have added 1960 to its record of spectacular electoral victories? Based on his reading of the situation, Herbert Quinn, as one close observer, would perhaps have answered these questions in the negative. For even while the Union Nationale was busily amassing its victories in the 1940s and 1950s, dissatisfaction with the party's economic conservatism and its alliance with the industrialists was brewing within a number of francophone economic, religious and political groups in the province. Clearly, the death of Duplessis less than a year before the election of 1960 was a factor in the defeat of the Union Nationale. Still, the loss of a party leader, even one so dominant as was Duplessis, does not usually spell disaster for that party; that is, unless there is a strong opposition party ready and waiting to take over. At the start of the new decade, as Quinn found, "conditions were indeed approaching this readiness and it is quite possible that the Union Nationale would have been defeated even if Duplessis had not died." Thus it was by way of appealing to these discontented elements with its policies and strategies for social and economic reform that the Liberal party was "returned to power after sixteen years in the political wilderness."[37]

In the 1960s, the larger French-Canadian polity in Quebec was to become less committed to maintaining the system as it had existed for two centuries prior to that time. Intent upon putting to rest la partitocratie of "political entrepreneurs" (led by a wary and aging social and economic conservative) and destroying what remained of la dictature économique (which resulted from the control exercised over the wealth and natural resources of the province by "foreign" capital),[38] francophone political elites now began to act in terms of majoritarian principles, thus weakening the consociational relationship between French and English in Quebec. While these majoritarian currents were to find their most explicit embodiment in the enactment in the 1970s of Bill 22 and Bill 101, their genesis can be traced back to the era of reform--particularly in the realm of education--begun in the early 1960s.

The analysis in the preceding section made apparent the signal importance of the educational system to the maintenance of accommodation and diversity in Quebec. Without a doubt, this relationship has borne profound implications, especially in terms of the survival of the province's anglophone minority. Indeed, since education is the medium by way of which cultural values are transmitted from one generation to another, the Anglo-Protestant community has always guarded jealously the autonomy of its school system. The anglophones' protective attitude toward their schools is perhaps best understood in the light of the close links between the world of business and commerce and the largely Montreal-centred network of schools, crowned by McGill University. It is, again, to call forth the notion of a "cultural division of labour" to note that, for the English community, the school system provided the training ground for Canadian business and pfofessional leaders. Thus to ensure that the schools remained oriented towards the community's traditi- tional economic role in Quebec and Canada, the English financial sector has always committed itself to an involvement in school administration. In point of fact, Pierre Fournier, in his analysis of the board of directors of the Protestant School Board of Greater Montreal (PSBGM), found very close links between that organization and business community, and especially the Montreal Board of Trade.[39]

The wholly integral nature of the educational system to the viability of the English community in Quebec can, moreover, be gleaned from the fact that any interference with the autonomy of the schools was generally perceived as an attempt to interfere with the autonomy of the subculture itself. Such was taken to be the case when the government of Jean Lesage embarked upon its program of educational reform. Although the Liberal leader had personally assured the electorate that his administration would not establish a provincial Ministry of Education, his change in position in 1964--influenced by the persistence of Paul Gérin-Lajoie, who would become the Ministry's first incumbent--now moved education from the relatively safe sidelines to the more vulnerable centre of political discussion. Still, while the Liberals' scheme to standardize funding for the Protestant and Catholic school boards caused a great deal of apprehension within the English community, it was not until 1969--when the Union Nationale government under Jean-Jacques Bertrand proposed a law recognizing the various school systems on the Island of Montreal by region rather than by language and religion--that the Anglo-Protestant school system was considered to have been attacked directly.

Since socioeconomic cleavages between rich and poor in Montreal corresponded largely to the ethnic cleavages between English and French, respectively, it was the English community that had, potentially, the most to lose from the reorganization of jurisdictions and the standardization of funding and assorted other school services. The proposed reforms had evolved from the recommendations of a royal commission of inquiry, whose mandate it was to study all aspects of the organization and financing of education in Quebec. Established in 1961, and under the direction of Msgr. Alphonse-Marie Parent, vice-rector of Université Laval, the commission noted substantial inequalities in the services offered by the more than 40 independent school commissions operating throughout Montreal. What the commissioners were met with, in other words, was a situation which involved the perpetuation of the city's "class structure," primarily by way of the ability within the more affluent districts to provide a better educational product than their less advantaged neighbours. With the view of redressing this imbalance, the Parent Report (1963) suggested that the number of regional school boards be reduced to seven and that they be unified. Further, the Report recommended the establishment of a special island council, which would be charged with co-ordinating the activities of the commissions, pooling all resources and equiptment and, most important, redistributing all school taxes.

Based on these and other recommendations, Bill 62, introduced by the Bertrand administration, was supported by most French-language newspapers, by labour unions, and by many of Montreal's French or predominantly French groups, including the Montreal Catholic School Commission (MCSC), the Superior Council of Education, and the Alliance des Professeurs. The bill also receivced some support in the English-speaking community, particularly from English Catholics, and even the Montreal Star expressed approval for the bill's primary aim: "The government's foremost objective in any new education legislation should be the removal of existing inequalities in facilities, taxation, and suffrage."[40] For their part, however, English Protestants were steadfastly opposed to this legislation, which they considered an encroachment upon their autonomy and, by extension, a threat to their cultural survival. Most vociferous here were, not surprisingly, the Anglo-Protestant educational and business groups, notably the PSBGM and the Montreal Board of Trade. Indeed, in presenting its objections to the committee of the National Assembly studying the proposed legislation, the PSBGM sought to illustrate how the English community perceived of its cultural, principally economic vocation:

> The economy of Quebec is seriously threatened by the failure of Bill 62 to ensure the free and full survival of the English language tradition. The presence in Quebec of a strong English-speaking sector having close ties with the rest of Canada and the United States has contributed greatly to the economic welfare of all Quebeckers. It is vital, therefore, not only for English-speaking Quebeckers, but for their French-speaking compatriots as well, that in the public educational system, adequate provision be made for the curriculum and course of study available to the English-speaking students to be as similar as possible to practices observed in the rest of Canada and North America.41

Similarly, in its brief to the government, the Board of Trade, an association of English-speaking businessmen, couched its objections to the bill in terms which acknowledged, implicitly, the cultural division of labour, and which alluded to the Board's desire apparently to maintain well-defined French and English domains as well as the economic elitism of the last:

> The attitudes of the anglophone are generally better adapted to purely economic goals than those of francophones into which considerations of another order tend to be introduced. . . . These differences stem mainly from education. Consequently, the educational systems must necessarily differ in certain fundamental aspects such as teaching methods, guiding principles, etc. . . . To create a totally unified educational system, at this time, would have a substantial retardant effect on the economic growth of Montreal and the province of Quebec. . . . The educational structure which Bill 62, in its present form, proposes will not serve the economic needs of the business community.42

Although the support Bill 62 received within the French community and among English Catholics might have been sufficient for it to pass in the Assembly, the Union Nationale government instead withdrew this and other controversial legislation and called an election for April 1970. Having promised, during the campaign, to re-introduce the schools legislation following its election, the new Liberal government found greater success in the area of reorganization than did the previous administration, largely as a result of its more concerted efforts at appeasing dissentient groups. In point of fact, the new legislation, introduced as Bill 28 in July 1971, represented substantial concessions to the English business and educational groups. While still maintaining unified school boards, the legislation, in accordance with one of the recommendations of the Board of Trade and contrary to Bill 62, weakened the ability of the island council to ensure the rational, efficient and egalitarian use of school resources by transferring the property and administration of buildings and equiptment to the local school boards. Having achieved these and other objectives, however, the PSBGM still pressured for linguistic boards, and the Board of Trade requested the bill be held back to allow for a study of its constitutionality. Besides contributing to the tension and controversy these concessions wrought, the government's withdrawal of the legislation in December 1971 prompted allegations of untoward parliamentary practices. While the

Montreal Star held that "adverse feeling among some sections of the English community obliged the government to postpone the presentation of the bill,"[43] La Presse countered with these claims:

> According to trustworthy sources, there are currently in the halls of government some strong pressures to amend this legislation again, even though it is already drafted and even though it has been submitted to cabinet. . . . These pressures, which come from the financial circles and from the upper levels of the English educational hierarchy, also originate from many cabinet ministers who represent constituencies in the west end of Montreal. The latter have apparently succeeded, in the cabinet, to further delay the presentation of the bill.[44]

That the English business and educational groups held privileged positions in their negotiations with the Quebec government is confirmed by Fournier, who documents the experiences of a key player in the Bill 28 affair. On April 14, 1971, K. D. Sheldrick, vice-president of Bailey Meter and president of the Lachine Protestant School Board, claimed to have received a copy of Bill 28 through the courtesy of Guy St. Pierre, then Minister of Education. Arrangements were made for a discussion of the legislation to take place the following week between Mr. Sheldrick, M. St. Pierre and officials of the department of education. It was not until three months later, however, that the legislation was made public, and only then were the heads of the MCSC made aware of its contents. What was more, as Fournier learned from another source, was that, earlier in 1971, St. Pierre had asked the PSBGM to draft Bill 28 to its liking, making sure to maintain the principle of unified school boards. As alluded to earlier, the government accepted most of the PSBGM's proposals.[45] By way of addressing himself to the particular claims of La Presse concerning influence and representation within the cabinet and other branches of government, Fournier concludes:

> The English educational and business groups were probably helped in their pressure campaign by several spokesmen within the Quebec government. After the 1970 election, the English community was better represented within the Quebec cabinet and in the National Assembly. Victor Goldbloom, MNA for d'Arcy McGee, was appointed Minister of State for Education, second in command behind St. Pierre. Also, two businessmen with no previous educational experience [sic] were named to key jobs in the education department. M. H. Dinsmore, formerly of General Electric, became assistant deputy minister, and J. N. Rutherford, of the Chambly Industrial Development Commission, became special adviser to the minister.46

With the adoption of Bill 71, legislation on school reorganization finally took effect on December 18, 1972. While it did provide for the regrouping of Montreal's 33 school boards into eight denominational boards--six Catholic and two Protestant--the law further weakened the school council by failing to provide adequate guidelines for the alleviation of regional disparities and for the redistribution of wealth among the local boards. What was more, the new legislation now made the school council a creation of the boards, which contributed ostensibly to the underrepresentation of the weaker socioeconomic areas on the council itself. Specifically, of the 17 members on the council, 14 were chosen by the boards and three by the government. Further, the MCSC, which was responsible for most of the less affluent districts in Montreal, had only a 35 per cent representation on the council despite the fact that it oversaw 56 per cent of the population. As we have shown, these results were influenced significantly by the successful supporting role English business played in pressuring the Quebec government into taking into account the demands of the Anglo-Protestant community--especially against substantial opposition from the French community and English Catholics. Still, while he himself supports this claim, Fournier is convinced that the school reorganization issue, like the language question in Quebec, "was probably not considered vital by the business community, and probably involved the middle levels of business more than it did senior executives." To support his contention, Fournier refers to the results of survey research. Here, when asked if they agreed with and supported Bill 71, 55 per cent of all business respondents replied in the affirmative. Fournier found this to represent a lower degree of approval than for other governmental measures businessmen were asked to evaluate. Moreover, the fact that a further 26 per cent of the respondents did not answer the question or were not well enough informed as to the particulars of the legislation seemed "to suggest that some senior-level businessmen did not feel much concern towards the school reorganization issue."[47] When, why and at what levels, then did senior executives become involved directly in the negotiations between business and government?

As was the case in the Duplessis era, business-government relations in the 1960s and 1970s were based primarily on the principle of mutual benefit. By nature, such arrangements were characterized by close symbiotic ties, whereby, for example, the ability of business to obtain contracts and concessions, as well as to influence the drafting of legislation favourable to its interests, rested on, among other things, its ability to provide electoral finance and to fill the government's need to borrow on the financial market. As a result, as the Bill 28 episode demonstrated, business interests can assume a vast potential for behaviour of political significance, behaviour which governmental decision-makers must take into account when formulating policy. Clearly, if we follow Fournier in treating the particular business interests involved in the reorganization issue as a "middle-level elite," one will find that the receptivity on the part of government to the demands of business rises exponentially--that is, with the wealth and economic power of the interests concerned--as one ascends into the higher councils of industry and commerce.[48]

What the Bill 28 affair also illustrated was the extent to which relations between business and government leaders are, in the language of the consociational theorists, characterized by "overarching" co-operation. There the economic power and influence of English business served to elevate its dialogue with the Quebec government to a level which transcended that of the mass population. In general, business and other elites can enter into such overarching arrangements with government via a number of significant and effective access points. Among these are the level of informal or "personal" contact; the level of formal access, through advisory boards and other government organizations, for example; and by way of the personnel links between state and corporate elites.

On the basis of his in-depth analysis of business-government relations in Quebec, which utilizes a substantial body of empirical data compiled for the period 1960 to 1974, Fournier was able to validate the general hypothesis that "business, especially big business, has privileged access to the upper echelons of government, including cabinet ministers and senior bureaucrats." What was more, he found, was that businessmen, both French and English, not only enjoyed substantial access to cabinet ministers and senior civil servants, "but also usually succeed[ed] in dealing with whom ever they chose in the government."[49] Indeed, when asked if they had "reasonably quick access" to those in the highest levels of government, 94 per cent of the senior executives of the one hundred major companies in Quebec answerd affirmatively, and 85 per cent claimed direct access to cabinet ministers. Further, of the methods of approach employed in gaining access to and influencing the government, Quebec businessmen cited "personal contact" as being the most effective means. Here it was determined that, of a sample of 138 businessmen, 78 per cent of those listed as senior executives of large corporations approached the government in this manner. By comparison, 69 per cent of the executives in "secondary" companies made contact on an informal basis. Also, when asked to indicate which individuals or groups they dealt with and those they deemed to be most crucial in the decision-making process, 82 per cent of senior corporate officials (of a total sample of 133) pointed to the upper echelons of government. More specifically, this proportion included 46 per cent who dealt with cabinet ministers or the premier, 36 per cent with deputy ministers, and 11 per cent made governmental contacts with "other civil servants." The fact that the figures for those in secondary companies were 28 per cent, 31 per cent, and 34 per cent, respectively, would seem to suggest that either their access to the ministerial levels was more limited, or that they felt their demands would not receive the attention usually accorded their counterparts in the larger corporations.

In order most effectively to facilitate their relations with the government, many companies set up special departments of governmental affairs, headed by executive-level officials, or delegated personnel from the top ranks of management to deal with government on a full-time basis. From the responses to a questionnaire circulated among Quebec businessmen during the early 1970s, Fournier ascertained that 28 per cent of large and 15 per cent of secondary companies maintained such sections or departments. Moreover, some corporations, such as the Aluminum Company of Canada and Domtar, went so far as to establish internal hierarchies which corresponded to those in government. On this basis, senior executives would most often deal with cabinet ministers or the premier, middle executives conferred with deputy ministers or their assistants, and lower level executives or managers dealt with lower echelon civil servants. Still, the primary responsibility for government relations rested with senior executives. Indeed, senior officers, often the president or chairman of the board of directors, at the Royal Bank of Canada, the Bank of Montreal, Royal Trust, Montreal Trust, Consolidated-Bathurst, and Canada Cement Lafarge, among others firms, dealt with government officials at the ministerial level. Furthermore, these executives seemed generally satisfied with the nature and degree of their accessibility to government, as Fournier learned during interviews conducted in May of 1973:

> The chairman of the board of a large corporation claimed he knew a lot of cabinet ministers and had "no trouble getting appointments with Bourassa, [Labour Minister Jean] Cournoyer, and [Minister of Education and later Minister of Industry and Commerce Guy] St. Pierre." His vice-president also had good contacts: the vice-president for labour relations, for example, had close ties with Cournoyer. He said relations with the Union Nationale government (1966-70) and other preceding governments were just as satisfactory and effective as those with the Bourassa government.

> In the 1970-74 period, Bourassa, Finance Minister Raymond Garneau, and St. Pierre were considered particularly accessible and receptive to the business point of view.

Indeed, as the president of a chemical firm noted:

> "Our relations with the present [Bourassa Liberal] government are working well. People of our own kind are much more numerous in government, and this makes it easier to deal with the government." One of the senior executives of a trust company claimed: "The Quebec government sees our point most of the time" and that "our relations with them are not tinctured with nationalism or biculturalism."50

Finally, we have seen where the more significant contacts between business and government during the Duplessis era took place at the top level. While not much had changed, fundamentally, in succeeding years, those relations did appear on the whole to have become somewhat more de-personalized in the 1960s and 1970s. The reason for this is two-fold. First, the increase in the size and scope of government activity no longer made it practical or feasible for the premier to handle all relations with senior executives. Hence cabinet ministers and senior civil servants were called upon to play a more active role. Second--and perhaps more important for the purposes of the present study--increasing tensions between the subcultures, which resulted in part from the adverse reaction of the anglophone community to both the new, primarily cultural and economic initiatives of the francophone middle-class and the introduction of restrictive legislation in the areas of language and education, made it far more politic for the Quebec government to appear not too closely allied with English business interests. Although secrecy had always been a mainstay of the business-government dialogue, it became increasingly more important in these later years.

At the formal level, advisory boards provided business concerns with an effective means of access to government. By way of government initiative, a handful of advisory boards were established in 1969 for the express purpose of "working out a consensus" between the various social groups, including business, labour and education. One such group was the Quebec Planning and Development Council, which, it should be noted, was set up in July 1968 through the initiative of business, although its membership was not made up exclusively of businessmen. Specifically, the QPDC was composed of 35 government appointees. Among the ex-officio members of the Council were 11 representatives of the Regional Development Council, the mayors of Montreal and Quebec City, the president of the General Council of Industry (GCI), three representatives of the Conseil du Patronat (an employers' federation which co-ordinates business associations), and three union representatives. Initially at least, the Planning and Development Council maintained a "bicultural" executive; indeed, Pierre Côté, president of Laiterie Laval, and Conrad F. Harrington, chairman of the board and chief executive officer of Royal Trust and a member of the GCI, were sworn in as chairman and vice-president, respectively, in 1971. Under the umbrella of the Quebec Planning and Development Bureau, the Planning and Development Council was, as its name would suggest, charged with advising "the Bureau on any matter which the Bureau submits to it respecting the development of Quebec and the plans, programs and projects for economic, social and territorial development prepared by the Bureau."[51]

Another board, arguably the most powerful advisory board to emerge in Quebec in the 1970s, was the General Council of Industry. According to Paul Ouimet, legal counsel to the Iron Ore Company of Canada and the first president of the GCI, the idea for the creation of the Council was first broached by him in conversation with the Union Nationale premier, Daniel Johnson, and his Minister of Industry and Commerce, Jean-Paul Beaudry. As Ouimet noted to La Presse: "Je leur ai fait observer que le Québec avait besoin d'un groupe important d'hommes d'affaires pour assister le gouvernement dans l'establissement d'un meilleur climat au Québec."[52]

As stated in the Quebec government statute which established the GCI in Feburary 1969, the Council was mandated to serve as a source of information for the government in general, and for the department of industry and commerce in particular; to advise the minister of Industry and Commerce on the evolution of opinion within Quebec's business community regarding provincial economic affairs; to suggest ways and means by which this opinion, especially if adverse, could be modified; to make concrete proposals about government economic policy; and to assist the government in its industrial promotion outside the province. Owing, perhaps, to its capacity as an "official" advisory board, the GCI, in its information brochure, found it necessary to make clear that it was "apolitical" and that "its members are chosen without regard to political sympathies."[53] Internally, the GCI counted among its membership of 60 or so senior businessmen such powerful executives as G. A. Hart, chairman of the board and president of the Bank of Montreal; W. Earle McLaughlin, chairman and president of the Royal Bank of Canada and a director of Power Corporation; Robert C. Scrivener, president of Bell Canada and on the boards of Power and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce; Alfredo F. Campo, chairman and chief executive officer of Petrofina Canada and also a director of Power Corporation; N. R. Crump, chairman of the board of Canadian Pacific; and Paul Desmarais, chairman and CEO of Power. Also represented on the GCI were various other English-Canadian and French-Canadian corporate interests, including Royal Trust, Dominion Textiles, Domtar, the Iron Ore Company of Canada, Price Brothers, Steinbergs, Bombardier Ltd., Rolland Paper, and Dupuis Frères.

During interviews held with members of the GCI, Fournier learned that, in its dealings with the Quebec government, the Council was not only active, but effective and influential, to a degree which far exceeded the purely advisory role it was intended to play. In the main, the GCI's activities in the 1970s involved four or five meetings, which were held with members of the Quebec cabinet, most notably Premier Bourassa, Gérard D. Lévesque (Minister of Industry and Commerce until 1971 and vice-premier), Guy St. Pierre, Jean Cournoyer, and a few senior civil servants. While economic problems were indeed the priority on the agenda, these meetings covered the whole spectrum of Quebec politics, from labour problems and foreign investment, for example, to education and the language issue. What was more, however, was that, in what became for them a highly privileged position, members of the GCI were informed of and often wound up influencing government policies and legislation before they reached the National Assembly or were otherwise made public. Such was the case, Fournier avers, during a meeting held in April 1973, when the findings of the Gendron Commission on language in Quebec and the government's forthcoming legislation in that area were the topics of discussion between business and government officials. As it turned out, this legislation only became public in May of 1974. Not surprisingly, Fournier found the comments of the GCI members he interviewed to be representative of the degree of satisfaction felt by most members towards the overall effectiveness of the Council vis-à-vis the government of Quebec:

> According to a senior executive and member of the GCI, the Council "plays a key role. I go out of my way to attend meetings. Ministers are prepared to listen; we feel our presence is effective." A bank president said: "The GCI has done extremely good work and is most useful." He maintained that "the government has been quite receptive" and that "Bourassa picked up enthusiastically on the GCI after his election in 1970." Another executive said the Council "has helped improve business contacts with government." Finally, an executive of a business association expressed satisfaction with the important impact on government policy of the GCI document on economic development.[54]

Although not as direct as either the formal or informal means of business access to government, personnel links and interchanges contribute no less effectively to breaking down the barriers between the two systems of power. Using Quebec as his test case, Fournier sought to verify Ralph Miliband's hypothesis that "the world of administration [political] and the world of large scale enterprise are now increasingly linked in terms of almost interchanging personnel."[55] Here Fournier found that, soon after he was elected in 1970, Robert Bourassa announced his intention to appoint, on a temporary basis, senior businessmen to high-level posts in the civil service. Among the executives Bourassa recruited were Pierre Côté, who, it will be recalled, was president of Laiterie Laval and was made chairman of the Quebec Planning and Development Council; Gérard Plourde, chairman of UAP, Inc., who was appointed part-time president of Quebec's Industrial Development Agency; Pierre Shooner, a former director of the Chambre de Commerce du District de Montréal, and who was named associate deputy minister of Industry and

Commerce; Michel de Grandpré, assistant vice-president of Power Corporation, who was loaned to the department of industry and commerce; and Pierre Delagrave, a vice-president of Domtar, who was appointed special adviser to the department of industry and commerce. During his three years at industry and commerce, M. Delagrave, for example, functioned as a liason between government and some specific industrial sectors, including pulp and paper and textiles. According to one of his colleagues at Domtar, M. Delagrave helped to make government more aware of the problems of industry by involving himself in specific problem areas such as pollution control and forest reform legislation, not to mention helping to defend Domtar's position on the language question.[56]

The flow of "executives" in the opposite direction has presented some interesting examples. Here cases usually involve politicians who, upon leaving parliament or their cabinet posts, become involved--sometimes controversially--in business positions, often as members of boards of directors. One of the better-known cases is that of Jean Lesage, Quebec Premier from 1960 to 1966. With political connections clearly valued in the economic elite, Lesage, upon retirement, was made a director of eight corporations, including Montreal Trust, Reynolds Aluminum, and Campbell Chibougameau Mines. At the same time, as Maurice Giroux observed, Lesage "occupe maintenant des fonctions importantes dans des grandes enterprises, tout en continuant de conseiller à l'occasion le gouvernement de M. Bourassa."[57] Indeed, Lesage was the government's representative in its lengthy and controversial negotiations with International Telephone and Telegraph-Rayonnier. Interestingly enough, Marcel Piché, the ITT representative who was Lesage's "opponent" in the negotiations, also sat on the board of directors of Reynolds Aluminum. Another "function" Lesage performed was that of legislative counsel to the government, in which capacity he read all legislation prior to it being submitted to the National Assembly. Although his integrity went unquestioned, a conflict of interest clearly did exist, insofar as the companies on whose boards Lesage sat could quite easily benefit from advance knowledge of legislation. When questioned about this situation, his successor, Bourassa, said simply that Lesage was a "very responsible man."[58] This from an individual who is himself related by marriage to one of Quebec's wealthiest and most influential families. Premier Bourassa is son-in-law to Arthur Simard, who was chairman of Marine Industries, as was his father Joseph before him, and a director of Power Corporation.[59]

Minister of Transport in the federal Liberal government from 1954 to 1957, George Marler distinguished himself as "the [Quebec] government's link with the financial community on St. James Street"[60] when he served as minister without portfolio during the period 1960 to 1965. Following his resignation from cabinet, Marler was named chairman of the board of Canada Cement Lafarge and director of, among other companies, Royal Trust and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce. Given his extensive political contacts, Marler's involvement with Canada Cement Lafarge left the company in a particularly advantageous potition. Indeed, since government was one of the principal buyers of cement, Marler, as one executive of the company explained, was given the task of maintaining good relations with the department of roads.[61]

Finally, additional dependency links between business and government are created by the need for political parties to obtain funds in order to campaign for elective office and to maintain their organizations between elections. Similarly, these links are fostered by the need for governments to borrow on the money markets, with the aim of financing their long- and short-term activities. First, since the media coverage, public relations and advertising that are part and parcel of contemporary election campaigns have made such endeavours extremely expensive, none but the parties with the largest financial reserves stand a reasonable chance of victory, all other things being equal. What this has caused is an increase in the dependence of the parties on their financial backers. This, in turn, has increased the influence of major contributors over the affairs of the parties themselves. Indeed, one analyst makes tha claim that the more generous contributors "have assured access to the decision-making authorities in party and government."[62]

Given, as we have seen, that business-government relations are founded on the basis of mutual advantage, it follows that the parties (later governments) which are most favourable to business objectives are those which receive the greatest financial assistance. For his part, Fournier found the Quebec Liberal Party to be a good case in point. Here, with reference to interview data, he illustrates how contributions to the Liberal Party helped improve access to those government decision-makers who held office during the 1970s. What is more, the responses to his questions appeared to Fournier to "cast some doubt on Bourassa's contention that the Liberal Party was in no way bound by electoral contributions from business":[63]

> According to the president of a cement company, "We get access to top men by funding them." Another senior executive claimed that a provincial fund collector "promised special favours and access to cabinet ministers and civil servants in return for contributions."[64]

To be sure, the Liberal Party, and the Bourassa regime in particular, were not alone in feeling obliged to accommodate big business in this respect. For instance, Jerôme Proulx, a former Union Nationale MNA, claimed to have been under considerable pressure from within his party to accord specific favours to companies and individuals who were known to have supported the Union Nationale while in office in the late 1960s.[65] Likewise, René Lévesque recalled that, as Minister of Natural Resources from 1960 to 1966, he had been under pressure to "come through" for those large corporations which had been generous to the Lesage Liberals. In 1960, for example, he was told to keep Perini Enterprises on a public contract as a reward for their contributions to the party. Besides considering this to be outside the public interest, Lévesque also felt dissatisfied with the "marée quotidienne de recommandations dont on nous inondait en faveur des grosses firmes que nous avions baptistés les 'ministrielles,' i.e., celles qui donnent aux caisses et partant sont toujours au pouvoir."[66]

The dependence of governments on access to financial markets adds substantially to the political power wielded by business in general, and by the larger financial institutions in particular. One of the principal ways in which financial institutions help to secure major lines of credit for governmennt and corporate borrowers is by underwriting bond issues. Established in the 1930s, the "financial cartel" or "syndicate" headed by the Bank of Montreal and A. E. Ames and Company, a Toronto-based brokerage firm, was charged with the exclusive responsibility of distributing Quebec government bonds on the Canadian and American markets. Accepting the risks inherent in buying for resale large amounts of bonds, sometimes totalling in the hundreds of millions of dollars, the Quebec syndicate, as Jacques Parizeau observed, is "a political lobby of first importance, a means to pressure the Quebec government to orient some of its policies."[67]

Indeed, maintaining "particular economic sympathies" for Shawinigan Water and Power Company, the Bank of Montreal-Ames cartel refused, in the early 1960s, to lend the government the $500 million it needed in order to finance the purchase and nationalization of Quebec's privately owned power companies, of which Shawinigan was the most important. However, when the government was able to secure a $350 million line of credit from a New York-based brokerage house, the cartel relented somewhat, allowing First Boston Corporation, a member of the Bank of Montreal-Ames group to act as intermediary for the loan. This episode, as well as pressures to broaden its syndicate arrangement, especially in terms of accommodating more francophone brokers, forced the government to break up the existing Ames-Bank of Montreal monopoly. This was accomplished in 1963 when, under the direction of Eric Kierans, a former president of the Montreal Stock Exchange and then Minister of Revenue, a new syndicate was formed. For a time thereafter, the Quebec government's market affairs were managed by two groups: one headed by the old group, the Bank of Montreal, A. E. Ames and Lévesque Beaubien; and the new group led by the Royal Bank, Banque Canadianne Nationale, Greenshields and René T. Leclerc.[68]

Another and perhaps more significant breach in the control of the syndicate over the finances of the Quebec government took place in the mid-1960s, the result of various circumstances. In 1966, the syndicate once again attempted to influence policy by pressuring the government into increasing the monetary terms of its grants to McGill University. In that same year, English-Canadian financial circles became frightened by the nationalism of the new Union Nationale government and by Premier Johnson's call for "egalite ou indépendance." These financial interests were to express their alarm by attempting to boycott Quebec government bonds. In a move which proved a harbinger of things to come, the Caisse de dépôt et de placement du Québec, a state-owned investment fund, came to the rescue of the government by making substantial bond purchases in order to support the price. Created in 1965, the Caisse was to play a similar role during the October Crisis of 1970, helping to stabilize the price of government securities and those of private Quebec-based companies by way of its purchasing power. Thus in coming to the assistance of the Quebec government during times of difficult political and social circumstance, the Caisse and other francophone institutions like it have enabled the government to gain its independence from the dominant financial syndicate.[69] More important, perhaps, is that the initiative and resourcefulness of these institutions has helped to guarantee for French Quebeckers as a whole a measure of their own long-awaited economic independence.

D. Summary and Conclusions

On November 15, 1976, French-English relations in Quebec took a turn for the worse. So it has been perceived; but just how valid is this perception?

Of course, the election of the Parti Québécois, a political organization whose professed aim was "sovereignty-association" with the rest of Canada or, barring that, national independence for Quebec, did induce a number of English-Canadian corporations and their executives, among others, to seek the haven of other urban centres presumed to be more economically, politically and socially congenial to their interests. Circulated among those who stayed, however, was the argument that, given the nature of political parties, the exigencies of electoral politics and the needs of governments generally, the PQ "would have to face the same economic facts of life as other governments and could not change the environment very much."[70] To be sure, the "economic facts of life" would remain unchanged, but what anglophone businessmen perhaps failed to consider when making this assessment was the fact that social realities had and would continue to change significantly. Now, unlike before, its was English business that had to make its peace with a more autonomous and hegemonic francophone economic elite.

In the context of the historical tradition of accommodation and diversity outlined in Chapter III, and in view of the notion of a cultural division of labour and the pattern of segmented social structure elaborated in Chapter IV, this chapter has sought to examine the nature and extent of "overarching" elite co-operation in Quebec. We have attempted to show how and why, within the forty-year period under consideration, this pattern of behaviour deteriorated from a high point in 1936 to the low noted above. In the main, we conclude here that the nature of business-government relations--indeed the factor determining whether such relations were entered into at all--was perhaps dictated more by the ideological and socioeconomic compatibility of the respective elites than by the dynamic social forces which separated their constituents. In other words, the success or failure of business-government arrangements when they did occur depended in large part on the extent to which the parties to the dialogue spoke in terms that the other could understand.

For instance, owing to his ideological conservatism, Maurice Duplessis was, as Conrad Black opines, "especially popular with conservative businessmen":

> As a general rule it is probably fair to state that the wealthier the businessman, at least in this era, the more conservative he was. So Duplessis was more popular the higher the rung of the business pecking order one ascended, even unto J. W. McConnell _et_ _al_.[71]

Yet while the Liberal Party was probably even more closely linked with business interests, the wartime Godbout administration nevertheless managed to raise the ire of the anglophone financial community by way of the nationalization of Montreal Light, Heat and Power, which was a highly profitable enterprise on its own and fiercely opposed to the scheme. Very much indicative of their orientation here was the vigerous way in which Duplessis and his opposition party denounced the nationalization as "bolshevistic."[72] Again, in the early 1960s, the Liberal Party--now composed primarily of strongly nationalist, middle-class elements, and engaged in an ideological revolution which, at the expense of the English-Canadian bourgeoisie, involved the long-avoided reconciliation of French-Canadian society with social and economic development--caused a broader disruption of inter-subcultural relations in Quebec. The *rattrapage* that was now the consuming goal of French-Canadian nationalists, and their continuing desire to make *Québécois* "*Maîtres chez nous*," were amplified by the Johnson administration's call for a greater measure of provincial self-determination.

Owing in part to the strong divisions between the "ultra-nationalist" and more "moderate" elements in its midst, the Union Nationale government that held power after Premier Johnson's death failed in its bid to continue his tradition. Significant also was the fact that the actions of Jean-Jacques Bertrand, the party's new leader, were fashioned somewhat by a conservatism reminiscent of Duplessis, by a desire for compromise and conciliation. The return to power of the Liberals in 1970 represented a hiatus for the strong nationalism introduced a decade earlier. Under a new leader, the Liberal Party picked up where the moderate wing of the preceding administration left off, and succeeded in forging with English business the type of accommodation not seen in Quebec since the Duplessis years. Helping largely to facilitate the revival of the bonne entente between business and government were the major changes the Liberal leadership had undergone in the last half of the 1960s. No longer present were most of the dynamic figures of the Quiet Revolution--Jean Lesage, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, Eric Kierans, Georges-Emile Lapalme, and, perhaps most significantly, René Lévesque and his "technocratic" faction. Now in their place was a leadership peopled with individuals concerned less with continuing the implementation of programs of political and social modernization for Québécois generally. Rather, they were disposed more toward the creation of an economic, political and social climate favourable to Anglo-Canadian and American investment. Thus a realignment had taken place at the elite level of Quebec politics, on the basis of which, as McRoberts and Posgate declare, "the Bourassa regime became much more fully identified than had been the Lesage regime with private [francophone and anglophone] economic elites, and the restricted role which they assigned to the state."[73]

If, as it has been argued, francophone participation in the upper levels of Quebec's economic structure held a lower priority for the Bourassa government than did aggregate economic growth,[74] the emphasis changed once the Parti Québécois came to power. It will be recalled that, beginning in the 1960s, such French-Canadian financial institutions as the Caisse de dépôt made it possible for the Quebec government to come out from under the control of the Canadian bourgeoisie. When the reaction of Canadian economic institutions to the aims and orientation of the PQ involved boycotting Quebec bonds, Quebec-based institutions took it upon themselves to purchase large stocks of government securities. In 1976, for instance, the Caisse itself made bond purchases worth $395 million from the Quebec government, $50 million from Hydro-Québec, and $30 million form Sidéurgie Québécoise (SIDBEC), a government-sponsored steel company whose aim it was to break Quebec's dependence on the mills in Hamilton, Ontario. In 1977, moreover, the Caisse included within its $841 million portfolio (the single most important portfolio of shares in Canadian companies in Canada) $560 million worth of bonds issued or guaranteed by the Quebec government.[75]

Clearly, at least vis-à-vis the Quebec government, the traditional anglophone economic elite was beginning to be supplanted by a new, largely French-speaking group. Unlike its predecessor, however, this new elite was primarily middle-class in origin, an origin consistent with that of the membership of the party and state apparatus in which it was able to secure opportunity and mobility. Given the long-standing obstacles to its entry into the Quebec corporate world, this bureaucratic elite saw its role as that of defender of the power and authority of the Quebec state and its institutions. To these, the elite assigned a mandate and role which transcended those of big business and the union movement. In return the advancement of this new elite and that of its counterpart in the business sector would be secured by way of such measures as Bill 101, the new language law designed to make French the language of business in Quebec. A direct and significant consequence of the confidence these measures instilled in French Canadians was the way in which business schools such as Montreal's Ecole des Hautes Etudes Commerciales (HEC), those at University of Québec campuses throughout the province, and even those at McGill and Concordia universities began to be inundated with applications from young francophones who had turned away from Quebec's *collège classique* tradition.[76] French-Canadian society had with assurance begun to engage in a new and exciting cultural experiment.

What does all of this bode for French-English relations in the 1980s and beyond? First, as enrollments in Quebec's business schools continue to increase and as the dominant value system continues to shift away from the collectivity toward a greater emphasis on the individual, more and more francophones will find themselves among Quebec's corporate elite. Still, as the director of the business school at l'Université du Québec à Montréal has emphasized, francophones cannot consider taking over as the business elite in the province without language mobility outside the province:

> Anglophones are more bilingual now and they will remain the elite in business in Montreal . . . until francophones realize they have to learn English. . . . [Because of Bill 101 and the Parti Québécois], I guess they perceive there is no need any more in the large corporations to know English.77

What this also makes clear is that, although French-speaking businessmen find themselves in a much more advantaged position economically than they did, say, a generation ago, they should not underestimate the continuing strengths and importance of their English-speaking counterparts. Indeed, at a January 1979 meeting in Montreal of the largely anglophone Canadian Club, Pierre Laurin, then director of HEC explained:

> [It is] my deep conviction that you are an integral and irreplaceable part of the prosperity and dynamism of Quebec. Without you, Quebec would not only lose creative engines of its economic activity . . . but also yet untapped advantages of its unique heterogeneity in America. The French culture is solid enough not to feel threatened by your presence. . . . My voice is representative of a majority of Québécois who want you here and who do not see any problem with that and being proud to be French-speaking Québécois in this country.78

During the last decade, as the English have adjusted to being more of a distinct minority group in Quebec, there seems to have taken place somewhat of a reversal in the cultural division between the subcultures. Where once they relied on a strong and influential economic elite to convey their views and demands to the francophone majority, the English-speaking community has now assumed for itself a genuinely more political stance. While viewing its constituents as an essential component of Quebec society, the community's main political force, Alliance Québec, is seeking a *rapproachement* with the province's francophone population.

Founded in 1982 in the recognition that the old order had passed and that something new was on the way, the avowedly non-partisan Alliance, with more that 40,000 members, 18 chapters and five regional English-rights associations, emphasizes the constructive opposition to--or, indeed, reasoned co-operation with--government policies. Like its bilingual name, the Alliance's slogan, *For a Future Together/Vers l'avenir ensemble*, suggests strongly the organization's objective of promoting harmony not only between Quebec's francophone majority and anglophone minority, but unity as well among the various factions within the English-speaking community, traditionally divided along religious, cultural and socioeconomic lines. One criticism levelled against the Alliance, however, is that it now risks losing touch with its general membership insofar as it has become centralized and bureaucratized, with a leadership made up mostly of professionals who are out of touch with, in particular, the working class and some of the off-Island associations.[79] When confronted with this claim, one senior executive with the organization acknowledged the existence of traditional cultural and geographical barriers, but was adamant in maintaining that the Alliance's 40-member board of directors makes every effort possible to represent the English-speaking community as a whole. He also emphasized that one of the aims of the Alliance is to encourage the autonomization of cultural groups and regional councils, and thereby to foster a greater measure of political participation at the local and municipal levels.[80]

It is argued, finally, that Bill 101 was mild, especially compared with laws enacted by other provinces.[81] In 1930, for example, the Saskatchewan government outlawed any instruction in French in its public schools, even outside of school hours. For its part, Bill 101 left intact the highly developed network of schools, colleges, universities, hospitals, social services and cultural institutions that function in English. This moved René Lévesque to remark proudly, "We uphold the privileges and rights--more than for any other minority in the world--of our anglophone citizens."[82] What Bill 101 did do, however, was create the impression that the government of Quebec defined citizenship in linguistic terms, and left many English-speaking Quebeckers ("_les_ _anglais_, _les_ _autres_") feeling unwelcome in their own land. Still, to illustrate its genuine goodwill and desire for an "ideal," pan-Canadian linguistic and cultural duality, the Alliance took it upon itself to intervene elsewhere in the country on behalf of French-Canadian minority groups. In moves which would have been unthinkable only a decade ago, and which, it is claimed, were more than the product of self-serving cynicism, designed to curry favour in Quebec, the organization, in 1983, urged the Manitoba legislature to accept provincial bilingualism. Likewise, in 1984, it supported the right of franco-Ontarians to control their own schools, and, in early 1985, it backed the demands of Acadians that institutional bilingualism be entrenched in New Brunswick. As one observer has noted, the group has been equally as forthright in its by no means blissful relations with the PQ government:

> Alliance Québec has successfully co-ordinated the English-speaking community's responses to the Parti Québécois government's language law, Bill 101, responses that were initially knee-jerk and piecemeal. It has extracted tangible concessions from the government, having pressed succesfully to get Bill 101 amended to entrench the right of English schools, hospitals, social services and other institutions to exist.83

If our earlier premise proves valid, English elites may well expect similar significant concessions to be forthcoming, not to mention an easier rapport between themselves and their French counterparts, now that the Bourassa Liberals have been returned to power in Quebec. Much to the consternation of the opposition péquistes, the Liberals have already shown themselves to be much less draconian than was the previous regime in terms of implementing the provisions of the French-language charter. Indeed, the government's attempts to reduce the "coercive dimensions" of Bill 101 would seem to be influenced by a number of factors, the foremost being the anglophones' traditional identification with both the Quebec and federal Liberal parties. Another factor than can be cited with equal facility is the leverage the English maintain by way of their ability to compete for French positions in the marketplace. This, as we have seen, owes much to their increased bilingualism. Perhaps of greater significance, however, will be the ability of strong extra-parliamentary associations to effect a broader representation and articulation of the common interests shared by English-speaking Quebeckers. Just as francophone initiatives in the economic sector have led to greater representation and decision-making influence in the board rooms of large corporations, so too may the politicization of anglophones lead to the securing of a greater number of positions in the Quebec cabinet and other important government institutions. A more direct "politics of accommodation" would, by extension, seem to be inevitable.

E. Notes

1. Quoted in Joseph Levitt, ed, *Henri Bourassa on Imperialism and Biculturalism, 1900-1918* (Toronto, 1970), p. 170, as cited in Kenneth McRae, "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System," in Mcrae, ed *Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1974), pp. 257-58.

2. Arend Lijphart, "Typologies of Democratic Systems," *Comparative Political Studies* 1 (1968): 21 (italics added). As was the case in the two preceding chapters, the theoretical explication that follows here is, unless noted otherwise, drawn primarily from McRae, "Introduction," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 8-10.

3. Lijphart, "Consociational Democracy," in McRae, *Consociational Democracy*, p. 80.

4. Gerhard Lehmbruch, "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon," in McRae, *Comsociational Democracy*, pp. 93-94.

5. See, for example, Richard J. Ossenberg, "Social Pluralism in Quebec: Continuity, Change and Conflict," in Ossenberg, ed., *Canadian Society: Pluralism, Change, and Conflict* (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1971), pp. 103-23, and also the references cited on p. 106.

6. See Garth Stevenson, *Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity*, Revised Edition (Toronto: Gage Publishing Limited, 1982), pp. 87-88; see also *Report of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism*, Vol. 3 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969), pp. 43, 54, 56; and Raymond Breton, Jeffrey G. Reitz, and Victor Valentine, *Cultural Boundaries and the Cohesion of Canada* (Montreal: Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1980), table on p. 149.

7. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, trans. by Talcott Parsons (New York: Scribners, 1958), p. 38. The discussion here is based on John Porter's reading of Weber's work. See his *The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada* (Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1965), pp. 98, 99.

8. Ossenberg, "Social Pluralism in Quebec," p. 106. Objective evidence of these internal French-Canadian social class differences is presented in Jacques Dofny and Muriel Garon-Audy, "Mobilités professionnelles au Québec," *Sociologie et Sociétés* 1, no. 2 (November, 1969): 277-301; and Dofny and Marcel Rioux, "Social Class in French Canada," in Rioux and

Yves Martin, French-Canadian Society (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1964), pp. 307-18.

9. See the findings of the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, University Student Expenditure and Income in Canada, 1956-57 (Ottawa, 1959), as cited in Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, pp. 190-91.

10. L'Organization et les besoins de l'enseignement collège classique dans le Québec, Brief of the Federation of Classical Colleges to the Royal Commission on Constitutional Problems (Ottawa, 1954), p. 197, as quoted by Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, p. 191.

11. See Kenneth McRoberts and Dale Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, Revised Edition (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980), pp. 29, 54, 55.

12. William Tetley, "Language and Education Rights in Quebec and Canada (A Legislative History and Personal Political Diary)," Law and Contemporary Problems 45, 4 (Autumn 1982): 192-93. This article is reproduced in French as Publication B-152 of Le centre international de recherche sur le bilinguisme (Québec, 1986). Also see Tetley, "The English and Language Legislation: A Personal History," in Gary Caldwell and Eric Waddell, eds., The English of Quebec: From Majority to Minority Status (Québec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1982), pp. 379-97.

13. Gerald Clark, Montreal: The New Cité (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982), p. 91. Peter C. Newman gives an interesting account of the quirks and eccentricities of some of the more prominent "Square Milers" in his The Canadian Establishment, Volume 1 (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), pp. 262-67.

14. Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, p. 289.

15. Ibid., p. 290.

16. John R. Seeley, R. Alexander Sim, and Elizabeth W. Looseley, Crestwood Heights (Toronto, 1956), p. 295, as quoted by Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, p. 305. "Crestwood Heights" is an upper middle class community in "Big City," Canada. See also Weber, "The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism," in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, eds, and trans., From Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1958), pp. 305-311.

17. Wallace Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), p. 247.

18. Newman, The Canadian Establishment, p. 372. The Club has since burned down. The whole of Chapter 12 of this volume is dedicated to an interesting appraisal of club life in Canada. Also see Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, pp. 304-305.

19. For an extensive list of these individuals, see, The Canadian Establishment, pp. 194-95. Also see Jorge Niosi, Canadian Capitalism: A Study of Power in the Canadian Business Establishment, trans. by Robert Chodos (Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1981), Chapter 3; and Pierre Fournier, "The New Parameters of the Quebec Bourgeoisie," Studies in Political Economy 3 (Spring 1980): 84-87.

20 See Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, pp. 303, 304.

21. Donald V. Smiley, "French-English Relations in Canada and Consociational Democracy," in Milton J. Esman, ed., Ethnic Conflict in the Western World (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977), p. 198.

22. Jean Hamelin et Louise Beaudoin, "Les cabinets provinciaux, 1867-1967," Recherches sociographiques 8 (septembre-décembre, 1967): 305; also see McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, p. 73.

23. As quoted by Hamelin and Beaudoin, "Les cabinets provinciaux," p. 305.

24. The Gazette, 15 janvier 1930, as cited in ibid., p. 306; see also Ronald Rudin, The Forgotten Quebecers: A History of English-Speaking Quebec, 1759-1980 (Québec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1985), p. 276

25. A debt is acknowledged here to Professor Garth Stevenson for making available a list of those Anglo-Quebeckers who held cabinet posts during the period 1867 to 1976.

26. Rudin, The Forgotten Quebecers, p. 277.

27. Interview held at Toronto, Ontario, September 1986.

28. Conrad Black, Duplessis (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977), p. 316.

29. Ibid., pp. 615, 624; see also pp. 613, 616.

30. Ibid., pp. 611, 640, 641.

31. Ibid., pp. 604, 611. See also Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, p. 479; and Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite, p. 315.

32. Budget speech of Onésime Gagnon, 1945, p. 12, as quoted by Black, Duplessis, p. 605.

33. Black, Duplessis, pp. 607, 611; also see pp. 605, 621.

34. Ibid., pp. 606, 607.

35. Ibid., p. 609.

36. Ibid., p. 606, from personal correspondence with Mlle. Auréa Cloutier, M. Duplessis's personal secretary of 36 years. See also pp. 304, 612; McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, pp. 74, 75; and Porter, The Vertical Mosaic, pp. 92, 311. For his part, Herbert F. Quinn estimates the Union Nationale campaigns in the 1950s involved expenditures between $3 million and $4 million. See his The Union Nationale:Quebec Nationalism from Duplessis to Lévesque, Second Edition (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), p. 142, note 27.

37. Quinn, The Union Nationale, p. 152. In Chapter VIII of this volume Quinn documents the gradual rise and strategies of the opposition elements, which included a small but influential group of radical, reform-minded nationalists, the greater part of the union movement, important sections of the Roman Catholic Church, and two minor political movements--the Union des Electeurs and La Ligue d'Action Civique.

38. See McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, pp. 77-79, 90-93. The term "partitocratie" was coined by Robert Boily. See his "Les hommes politiques du Québec, 1867-1967," Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique française 21 (décembre, 1967): 626.

39. See Pierre Fournier, The Quebec Establishment: The Ruling Class and the State, Second Edition (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1976), pp. 139-40, note 69. Also see Sheila McLeod Arnopoulos and Dominique Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, Second Edition (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984), p. 83.

40. Montreal Star, "School Reforms," editorial, 1 August 1970, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 127. See also p. 126; Quinn, The Union Nationale, p. 190; and Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, pp. 83, 84.

41. See Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, p. 84; Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 127; idem, "A Political Analysis of School Reorganization in Montreal," M.A. thesis, McGill University, 1971; and Pierre Beaulieu, Montreal Organizations and Bill 22 and Bill 28: An Analysis of Their Ideological Approaches (Montreal: Montreal Island School Council, 1975).

42. Montreal Board of Trade, Memoir of the Standing Committee on Education (Montreal: Board of Trade, 1970), p. 4, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, pp. 127-28; and Arnopoulos and Clift, The English Fact in Quebec, pp. 84-85.

43. David Allnutt, "Bill 28 Under the Microscope," Montreal Star, 12 April 1971, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 128.

44. Lysiane Gagnon, "Bill 28, la minorité aurait de garanties," La Presse, 12 mai 1971, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, pp. 128-29.

45. See Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 129.

46. Ibid., p. 140, note 77.

47. Ibid., p. 130 (italics added); see also p. 129; and the questionnaire reproduced as Appendix C at pp. 230-34. On the involvement of business in the language issue in the Quebec of the late 1960s and early 1970s, see ibid., pp. 116-25; and Tetley, "The English and Language Legislation," in Caldwell and Waddell, The English of Quebec, pp. 386-97.

48. See Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 69; and Edward Epstein, The Corporation in American Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), pp. 196, 199.

49. Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 70 and p. 94, note 4.

50. Ibid., pp. 78, 80, 81.

51. Quebec National Assembly, National Assembly Debates (Québec: Editeur Officiel du Québec, 1968), Chapter 14, p. 125, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 89; see also p. 88.

52. Paul Ouimet, "Le climat d'investissement au Québec s'est amélioré," La Presse, 15 août 1969, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 85.

53. General Council of Industry, The General Council of Industry (Montreal: The General Council of Industry, 1971), p. 1, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 85.

54. Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 87, from interviews conducted in May 1973.

55. Ralph Miliband, The State in Capitalist Society (London: Camelot Press, 1969), p. 125, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 83.

56. See Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, pp. 83-84, from interviews held in May 1973.

57. Maurice Giroux, "Que fait Jean Lesage? Il pantoufle!" La Presse, 15 avril 1971, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 83.

58. From Jacques Keable's interview with Robert Bourassa, "Notre marge de manoeuvre est trés mince," Québec-Presse, 23 janvier 1972, as cited in Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 83. See also Keable, "Lesage, chef non élu, divise le parti libéral et domine Bourassa," Québec-Presse, 18 avril 1971.

59. See Wallace Clement, The Canadian Corporate Elite, p. 265; and Newman, The Canadian Establishment, pp. 195-97.

60. L. Chislom, "Just What is Mr. Lesage Doing in Quebec?" Financial Post, 23 September 1961, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 83.

61. See Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 83, from interviews held in May 1973.

62. Khayyam Zev Paltiel, Political Party Financing in Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill of Canada, 1970), p. 161, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 91; see also Hugh G. Thorburn, "Politics and Business in Canada," in Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada (Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), p. 153.

63. Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 91; also see Gérard Leblanc, "Bourassa se tient loin de la caisse," Le Devoir, 27 septembre 1973.

64. See Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 91, from interviews conducted in May 1973. Also see p. 97, note 114.

65. Jerôme Proulx, Le Panier de crabes (Montréal: Parti Pris, 1971), as cited in Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 91.

66. "Les caisse electorales ça ne presse jamais," Le Devoir, 2 décembre 1971, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, p. 97, note 112.

67. Jacques Parizeau, "Le syndicat financier," Québec-Presse, 16 septembre 1971, as quoted by Fournier, The Quebec Establishment, pp. 93-94.

68. See Douglas H. Fullerton, The Dangerous Delusion: Quebec's Independence Obsession (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978), Chapter V; also see Ian Rodger, "Politics or Finance First in Quebec?" Financial Post, 16 October 1971.

69. See Fournier, "The New Parameters of the Quebec Bourgeoisie," pp. 78-79; Parizeau, "Claude Prieur, un grand commis de l'etat," Québec-Presse, 15 avril 1973; and idem, "La Caisse de dépôt notre grande inconnue," ibid., 26 mars 1972.

70. A comment attributed to an anglophone "chairman of a large corporation," interviewed by Fournier in May 1973. See The Quebec Establishment, p. 94, note 23.

71. Black, Duplessis, pp. 621-22.

72. Montreal Gazette, 11 December 1944, as cited in Quinn, The Union Nationale, p. 83; see also McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, pp. 73-74; and Robert Rumilly, Histoire de la province de Québec, XL (Montréal: Fides, 1969), pp. 253-56.

73. McRoberts and Posgate, Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, p. 164; also see pp. 95-111.

74. See ibid., p. 165.

75. See Fournier, "The New Parameters of the Quebec Bourgeoisie," pp. 78-79.

76. See Lawrence Martin, "New Francophone Business Class Booming," The Globe and Mail, 16 February 1985; and McRoberts and Posgate Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis, pp. 206-07.

77. Prosper Bernard, as quoted by Martin, "New Francophone Business Class Booming."

78. Quoted by Ramsay Cook, "Quebec's New Revolutionaries," Saturday Night, vol. 96, no. 11 (December 1981), p. 20.

79. Cited by Lynn Herzeg, "The New Quiet Revolution," The Canadian Forum, vol. 64, no. 741 (August/September, 1984), p. 6.

80. Interview held at Montreal, Quebec, August 1986.

81. See Mark Abley, "The Lévesque Effect," Saturday Night, vol. 100, no 6 (June 1985), p. 17.

82. Quoted by Abley, "The Lévesque Effect," p. 18.

83. Herzeg, "The New Quiet Revolution," p. 6. See also Abley, "The Lévesque Effect," pp. 17, 18, 19.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books

Ake, Claude. A Theory of Political Integration. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1967.

Apter, David A. The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Sudy of Bureaucratic Nationalism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961.

Arnopoulos, Sheila McLeod and Clift, Dominique. The English Fact in Quebec. Second Edition. (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1984.

Bakvis, Herman. Federalism and the Organization of Political Life: Canada in Comparative Perspective. Kingston, Ont.: Brown and Martin, 1981.

Balthazar, Louis. "Quebec at the Hour of Choice." In Entering the Eighties: Canada in Crisis, pp. 60-75. Edited by R. Kenneth Carty and W. Peter Ward. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1980.

Beaulieu, Pierre. Montreal Organizations and Bill 22 and Bill 28: An Analysis of Their Ideological Approaches. Montreal: Montreal Island School Council, 1975.

Black, Conrad. Duplessis. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1977.

Bonenfant, Jean-Charles. "Quebec and Confederation: Then and Now." In Quebec Society and Politics: Views from the Inside, pp. 52-67. Edited by Dale C. Thomson. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973.

Brunet, Michel. Canadians et Canadiens, Etudes sur l'histoire et la pensée de deux Canadas. Montréal et Paris: Fides, 1955.

Brunet, Michel. Québec-Canada Anglais, Deux itineraries un affrontement. Montréal: Editions H.M.H., 1968.

Caldwell, Gary. A Demographic Profile of the English-Speaking Population of Quebec, 1921-1971. Quebec: International Centre for Research on Bilingualism, Publication B-51, 1974.

Caldwell, Gary. "People and Society." In The English of Quebec: From Majority to Minority Status, pp. 57-71. Edited by Gary Caldwell and Eric Waddell. Québec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1982.

Clark, Gerald. Montreal: The New Cité. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1982.

Clement, Wallace. The Canadian Corporate Elite: An Analysis of Economic Power. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, The Carleton Library, No. 89, 1975.

Clift, Dominique. Quebec Nationalism in Crisis. Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1982.

Cook, Ramsay. Canada and the French-Canadian Question. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1967.

Cook, Ramsay. French-Canadian Nationalism: An Anthology. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1969.

Cook, Ramsay. "The Paradox of Quebec." In Entering the Eighties, pp. 46-59. Edited by Carty and Ward.

Cornell, Paul G.; Hamelin, Jean; Ouellet, Fernand; and Trudel, Marcel (Editors). Canada: Unity in Diversity. Toronto-Montreal: Holt, Rinehart and Winston of Canada Limited, 1967.

Coupland, Sir Reginald. The Durham Report: An Abridged Version With an Introduction and Notes. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1945.

Daalder, Hans. "On Building Consociational Nations: The Cases of the Netherlands and Switzerland." In Consociational Democracy: Political Accommodation in Segmented Societies, pp. 107-24. Edited by Kenneth D. McRae. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, The Carleton Library, No. 79, 1974.

Dahl, Robert A. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971.

Deutsch, Karl W. Political Community at the International Level. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday Publishers, 1954.

Diamant, Alfred. "Austria: The Three Lager and the First Republic." In Consociational Democracy, pp. 150-56. Edited by McRae.

Easton, David. A Systems Analysis of Political Life. New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1965.

Eckstein, Harry. Divisions and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966.

Engelmann, Frederick C. "Austria: The Pooling of Opposition." In *Political Opposition in Western Democracy*, pp. 266-83 Edited by Robert A. Dahl. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966.

Engelmann, Frederick C., and Schwartz, Mildred A. *Canadian Political Parties: Origin, Character, Impact*. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1975.

Esman, Milton J. "Introduction." In *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*, pp. 11-15. Edited by Milton J. Esman. Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977.

Fournier, Pierre. *The Quebec Establishment: The Ruling Class and the State*. Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1976.

Fullerton, Douglas H. *The Dangerous Delusion: Quebec's Independence Obsession*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978.

Gadbois, Louis (Editor). *Les clientèles de l'école secondaire privée: Rapport d'une enquête sur les familles des élèves inscrits dans les institutions de l'A.I.E.S.* Montréal: Centre d'animation, de développement et de recherche en éducation, 1976.

Gérin, Léon. "The French-Canadian Family--Its Strengths and Weaknesses." In *French-Canadian Society*. Vol. 1, pp. 32-57. Edited by Marcel Rioux and Yves Martin. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, The Carleton Library, No. 18, 1973.

Guindon, Hubert. "Two Cultures: An Essay on Nationalism, Class and Ethnic Tension in Contemporary Canada." In *Contemporary Canada*, pp. 33-59. Edited by Richard H. Leach. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1967.

Henripin, Jacques. "Quebec and the Demographic Dilemma of French-Canadian Society." In *Quebec Society and Politics*, pp. 155-66. Edited by Thomson.

Hueglin, Thomas O. *Federalism and Fragmentation: A Comparative View of Political Accommodation in Canada*. Kingston, Ont.: Institute of Intergovernmental Relations, Discussion Paper No. 19, 1984.

Hughes, Everett C. *French Canada in Transition*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963.

Joy, Richard. *Languages in Conflict: The Canadian Experience*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, The Carleton Library, No. 61, 1972.

Kwavnick, David (Editor). The Tremblay Report: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, The Carleton Library, No. 64, 1973.

Laponce, Jean A. "Ruling Elites in a Multilingual Society: Quebec Within Canada." In Political Elites and Social Change: Studies of Elite Roles and Attitudes, pp. 39-63. Edited by Moshe M. Czudnowski. Chicago: Northern Illinois University Press, 1983.

Laporte, Pierre. The True Face of Duplessis. Montreal: Harvest House, 1960.

Lehmbruch, Gerhard. "A Non-Competitive Pattern of Conflict Management in Liberal Democracies: The Case of Switzerland, Austria and Lebanon." In Consociational Democracy, pp. 90-96. Edited by McRae.

Levitt, Joseph (Editor). Henri Bourassa on Imperialism and Biculturalism, 1900-1918. Toronto, 1970.

Lijphart, Arend. The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968.

Lijphart, Arend. "Consociational Democracy." In Consociational Democracy, pp. 70-89. Edited by McRae.

Lijphart, Arend. Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Perspective. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.

Lijphart, Arend. "Political Theories and the Explanation of Ethnic Conflict: Falsified Prediction and Plausible Postdictions." In Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, pp. 46-64. Edited by Esman.

Linz, Juan J. "Early State-Building and Late Peripheral Nationalism Against the State: The Case of Spain." In Building States and Nations: Analyses by Region, Vol. 2, pp. 32-116. Edited by Shmuel N. Eisenstadt and Stein Rokkan. London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers, 1973.

Lorwin, Val R. "Segmented Pluralism: Ideological Cleavages and Political Cohesion in Smaller European Democracies." In Consociational Democracy, pp. 33-69. Edited by McRae.

Meisel, John. Cleavages, Parties, and Values in Canada. Professional Papers in Contemporary Sociology, No. 06-003. London and Beverly Hills: Sage Publishers, 1974.

Milner, Henry. *Politics in the New Quebec*. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978.

Monet, Jacques. *The Last Cannon Shot: A Study of French-Canadian Nationalism, 1837-1850*. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1976.

McCollum, Watt Hugh. *Who Owns Canada? An Examination of the Facts Concerning the Concentration of Ownership and Control of the Means of Production, Distribution and Exchange in Canada*. (Regina, Sask.: C.C.F. Research Bureau, 1935.

McRae, Kenneth D. "The Structure of Canadian History." In *The Founding of New Societies*, pp. 219-74. Edited by Louis Hartz. New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1965.

McRae, Kenneth D. "Empire, Language, and Nation: The Canadian Case." In *Building States and Nations*, pp. 144-76. Edited by Eisenstadt and Rokkan.

McRae, Kenneth D. "Introduction." In *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 2-27. Edited by McRae.

McRae, Kenneth D. "Consociationalism and the Canadian Political System." In *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 238-61. Edited by McRae.

McRae, Kenneth D. "Epilogue." In *Consociational Democracy*, pp. 300-2. Edited by McRae.

McRoberts, Kenneth and Posgate, Dale. *Quebec: Social Change and Political Crisis*. Second Edition. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1980.

Newman, Peter C. *The Canadian Establishment*, Vol. 1. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975.

Niosi, Jorge. *Canadian Capitalism: A Study of Power in the Canadian Business Establishment*. Translated by Robert Chodos. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1981.

Nish, Cameron. (Editor and Translator). *Quebec in the Duplessis Era, 1935-59: Dictatorship or Democracy*. Toronto: Copp Clark, 1970.

Noel, S.J.R. "Political Parties and Elite Accommodation: Interpretations of Canadian Federalism." In *Canadian Federalism: Myth or Reality*, Third Edition, pp. 64-83. Toronto: Methuen, 1971.

Noel, S.J.R. "Consociational Democracy and Canadian Federalism." In Consociational Democracy, pp. 262-68. Edited by McRae.

Nordlinger, Eric A. Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies. Occasional Papers in International Affairs, No. 29. Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972.

Ormsby, William. "The Province of Canada: The Emergence of Consociational Politics." In Consociational Democracy, pp. 269-74. Edited by McRae.

Ossenberg, Richard J. "Social Pluralism in Quebec: Continuity, Change and Conflict." In Canadian Society: Pluralism, Change, and Conflict, pp. 103-23. Edited by Richard J. Ossenberg. Scarborough, Ont.: Prentice-Hall of Canada, Ltd., 1971.

Porter, John. The Vertical Mosaic: An Analysis of Social Class and Power in Canada. Toronto and Buffalo: University of Toronto Press, 1965.

Presthus, Robert V. Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1973.

Quinn, Herbert F. The Union Nationale: Quebec Nationalism from Duplessis to Lévesque. Second Edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979.

Rioux, Marcel. Quebec in Question. Updated Edition. Translated by James Boake. Toronto: James Lorimer & Company, Publishers, 1978.

Rudin, Ronald. The Forgotten Quebecers: A History of English-Speaking Quebec, 1759-1980. Québec: Institut québécois de recherche sur la culture, 1985.

Simeon, Richard. Federal-Provincial Diplomacy: The Making of Recent Policy in Canada. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1972.

Smiley, Donald V. The Canadian Political Nationality. Toronto and London: Methuen, 1967.

Smiley, Donald V. Canada in Question: Federalism in the Seventies. Second Edition. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976.

Smiley, Donald V. "French-English Relations in Canada and Consociational Democracy." In Ethnic Conflict in the Western World, pp. 179-203. Edited by Esman.

Stanley, George F.G. "The Federal Bargain: The Contractarian Basis of Confederation." In Consociational Democracy, pp. 275-87. Edited by McRae.

Staples, Janice. "Consociationalism at Provincial Level: The Erosion of Dualism in Manitoba, 1870-1890." In Consociational Democracy, pp. 288-99. Edited by McRae.

Stein, Michael B. "Changing Anglo-Quebecer Self Consciousness." In The English of Quebec, pp. 107-25. Edited by Caldwell and Waddell.

Steiner, Jürg. "The Principles of Majority and Proportionality." In Consociational Democracy, pp. 98-106. Edited by McRae.

Steiner, Jürg. Amicable Agreement versus Majority Rule: Conflict Resolution in Switzerland. Revised Edition. Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1974.

Stevenson, Garth. Unfulfilled Union: Canadian Federalism and National Unity. Revised Edition. Toronto: Gage Publishing, 1982

Stevenson, J.T. "Consociationalist Models for Canada." In Philosophers Look at Canadian Confederation, pp. 245-53. Edited by Stanley G. French. Montreal: The Canadian Philosophical Association, 1979.

Stiefbold, Rodney P. "Segmented Pluralism and Consociational Democracy in Austria." In Politics in Europe: Structures and Processes in Some Postindustrial Democracies, pp. 147-55. Edited by Martin O. Heisler. New York: David McKay, 1974.

Tetley, William. "The English and Language Legislation: A Personal History." In The English of Quebec, pp. 379-97. Edited by Caldwell and Waddell.

Thomson, Dale C. Jean Lesage and the Quiet Revolution. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1984.

Trudeau, Pierre E. Federalism and the French Canadians. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968.

Van Loon, Richard J. and Whittington, Michael S. The Canadian Political System: Environment, Structure & Process. Second Edition. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1976.

Waddell, Eric. "Place and People." In The English of Quebec, pp. 27-55. Edited by Caldwell and Waddell.

Wade, Mason (Editor). Canadian Dualism: Studies of French-English Relations/La Dualité Canadienne: Essai sur les relations entre Canadiens français et Canadiens anglais. Toronto/Québec: University of Toronto Press/Les Presses de l'Université Laval, 1960.

Wade, Mason. The French Canadians, 1700-1967. Revised Edition, Two Volumes. Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1968.

Waite, P.B. "Introduction." In The Confederation Debates in the Province of Canada/1865. Edited by P.B. Waite. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1963.

Weber, Max. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Translated by Talcott Parsons. New York. Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958.

Whittaker, Reginald A. "The Quebec Cauldron." In Canadian Politics in the 1980s. Edited by Michael S. Whittington and Glen Williams. Toronto: Methuen Publications, 1981.

Academic Journals and Periodicals

Almond, Gabriel. "Comparative Political Systems." Journal of Politics 18, 3 (August 1956): 391-409.

Barry, Brian. "Review Article: Political Accommodation and Consociational Democracy." British Journal of Political Science 5, 4 (October 1975): 477-505.

Barry, Brian. "The Consociational Model and its Dangers." European Journal of Political Research 3, 4 (December 1975): 393-412.

Boily, Robert. "Les hommes politiques du Québec, 1867-1967." Revue d'histoire de l'Amérique français 21 (décembre 1967).

Bourque, Gilles and Laurin-Frenette, Nicole. "Social Classes and Nationalist Ideologies in Quebec, 1760-1970." Socialisme Québécois 20 (1970): 186-210.

Brunet, Michel. "The British Conquest: Canadian Social Scientists and the Fate of the Canadiens." Canadian Historical Review (June 1959): 93-107.

Cairns, Alan C. "The Governments and Societies of Canadian Federalism." Canadian Journal of Political Science 10, 4 (December 1977): 695-725.

Coleman, William D. "From Bill 22 to Bill 101: The Politics of Language Under the Parti Québécois." Canadian Journal of Political Science 14, 2 (September 1981): 459-485.

Daalder, Hans. "The Consociational Democracy Theme: A Review Article." World Politics 26, 4 (July 1974): 604-21.

Dion, Gérard. "Secularization in Quebec." Journal of Canadian Studies 3 (1968): 35-44.

Engelmann, Frederick C. "Haggling for the Equilibrium: The Renegotiation of the Austrian Coalition, 1959." American Political Science Review 56 (1962): 651-62.

Engelmann, Frederick C. and Schwartz, Mildred A. "Partisan Stability and Continuity of a Segmented Society: The Austrian Case." American Journal of Sociology 79 (1974): 948-66.

Fournier, Pierre. "The Parti Québécois and the Power of Business." Our Generation (Spring, 1978): 3-15.

Fournier, Pierre. "The New Parameters of the Quebec Bourgeoisie." Studies in Political Economy 3 (Spring, 1980): 67-92.

Greene, B.M. (Editor). Who's Who in Canada 23 (1934-1935).

Guindon, Hubert. "The Social Evolution of Quebec Reconsidered." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 25 (1960): 533-51.

Guindon, Hubert. "Social Unrest, Social Class and Quebec's Bureaucratic Revolution." Queen's Quarterly 71 (1964): 150-62.

Guindon, Hubert. "The Church in French-Canadian Society." Canadian Dimension 4 (March-April, 1967): 29-31.

Hargrove, Erwin C. "Nationalist, Values, and Change: Young Elites in French Canada." Comparative Politics 2 (1970): 473-99.

Hartz, Louis. "Violence and Legality in the Fragment Cultures." Canadian Historical Review 50 (1969): 123-40.

Heintzman, Ralph. "The Political Culture of Quebec, 1840-1960." Canadian Journal of Political Science 16, 1 (March 1983): 3-59.

Henripin, Jacques. "From Acceptance of Nature to Control: The Demography of French Canadians Since the Seventeenth Century." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 23, 1 (February 1957): 10-19.

Herzeg, Lynn. "The New Quiet Revolution." The Canadian Forum 64, 741 (August/September, 1984): 6-11.

Hughes, Terry; Fraser, Hugh; and Whelpton, Terry M. (Editors). Who's Who in Canada 64 (1975-1976).

Kwavnick, David. "The Roots of French-Canadian Discontent." Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science 31 (1965): 509-23.

Lehmbruch, Gerhard. "Consociational Democracy in the International System." European Journal of Political Research 3, 4 (December 1975): 377-91.

Lijphart, Arend. "Typologies of Democratic Systems." Comparative Political Studies 1, 1 (April 1969): 3-44.

Lijphart, Arend. "Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration." Canadian Journal of Political Science 4 (March 1971): 1-14.

Lustick, Ian. "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control." World Politics (1979): 325-44.

Minville, Esdras. "Economic and Social Tendencies of French Canada." University of Toronto Quarterly 19 (1950): 141-57.

Mitchell, B.R. (Editor). European Historical Statistics, 1750-1970 (1976).

McRoberts, Kenneth. "Internal Colonialism: The Case of Quebec." Ethnic and Racial Studies 2 (July 1979): 293-318.

Niosi, Jorge. "The New French-Canadian Bourgeoisie." Studies in Political Economy 1 (Spring, 1979): 113-61.

Pappalardo, Adriano. "The Conditions for Consociational Democracy: A Logical and Empirical Critique." European Journal of Political Research 9 (1981): 365-90.

Richert, Jean-Pierre. "Political Socialization in Quebec." Canadian Journal of Political Science 6, 2 (June 1973): 303-13.

Roberts, Charles G.D. and Tunnell, Arthur Leonard (Editors). The Canadian Who's Who: A Handbook of Canadian Biography of Living Characters 2 (1936-1937).

Simeon, Richard and Elkins, David. "Regional Political Cultures in Canada." Canadian Journal of Political Science 7, 3 (September 1974).

Simpson, Kieran (Editor). Canadian Who's Who, 1979 14 (1979).

Stein, Michael B. "Federal Political Systems and Federal Societies." World Politics 20, 4 (July 1968).

Steinberg, S.H. and Paxton J. (Editors). The Statesman's Yearbook (1960/61 to 1975/76).

Taylor, Charles. "Nationalism and the Political Intelligentsia: A Case Study." Queen's Quarterly 72 (1965): 150-68.

Tetley, William. "Language and Education Rights in Quebec and Canada (A Legislative History and Personal Political Diary)." Law and Contemporary Problems 45, 4 (Autumn, 1982): 177-219.

White, Graham; Millar, Jack; and Gagne, Wallace. "Political Integration in Quebec During the 1960s." Canadian Ethnic Studies 3, 2 (December 1971): 55-84.

Reports and Public Documents

Cabinet Formation and Bicultural Relations: Seven Case Studies. Edited by Frederick W. Gibson. Report Prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Ottawa, 1970.

Canadian Parliamentary Guide, volumes for the years 1935-1976.

Census of Canada, selected years 1861-1981.

Dominion Bureau of Statistics, University Student Expenditure and Income in Canada, 1956-1957. Ottawa, 1959.

La situation de l'enseignement du Québec. Québec: Centrale de l'enseignement du Québec, juin, 1975.

Lieberson, Stanley. "Linguistic and Ethnic Segregation in Montreal." Report Prepared for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism. Ottawa, 1966.

L'Organization et les besoins de l'enseignement classique collèges dans le Québec. Brief of the Federation of Classical Colleges to the Royal Commission on Constitutional Problems. Ottawa, 1954.

Rosenberg, Louis. "Changes in the Geographical Distribution of the Jewish Population of Metropolitan Montreal in the Decennial Periods from 1901 to 1961 and the Estimated Possible Changes During the Period from 1961 to 1971: A Preliminary Study." Bureau of Social and Economic Research, Canadian Jewish Congress Research Papers. Series A, No. 7. Montreal, 1966.

Newspapers and Magazines

Miscellaneous

Abley, Mark. "The Lévesque Effect." Saturday Night 100, 6 (June 1985).

Cook, Ramsay. "Quebec's New Revolutionaries." Saturday Night 96, 11 (December 1981).

Fraser, Graham. "PM Shows He is a True Son of Pro-U.S. Province." The Globe and Mail. 23 March 1985.

Fraser, Graham. "Cultural Identity a Problem With a Name." The Globe and Mail. 11 May 1985.

Martin, Lawrence. "Montreal Adapts to a More Modest Destiny." The Globe and Mail. 23 February 1985.

Martin, Lawrence. "Montreal Clubs Bending for New Elite." The Globe and Mail. 6 February 1985.

Martin, Lawrence. "New Francophone Business Class Booming." The Globe and Mail. 16 February 1985.

Newman, Peter C. "Canada's Biggest Big Businessmen." Maclean's Magazine 70, 21 (12 October 1957).

Newman, Peter C. "The New Corporate Champions." Maclean's 98, 24 (17 June 1985).

Unpublished Material

Close, David. "The Quebec National Assembly and Language Legislation." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, 1 June 1979.

Irvine, William P. "Cultural Conflict in Canada: The Erosion of Consociational Politics." PH.D. dissertation, Yale University, 1971.

Laponce, Jean A. "Bilingualism and the Bilingual City: The Case of Montreal." Paper presented to the Urban Networks Seminar, Brazilia, 20-23 June 1977.

Laponce, Jean A. "Relating Linguistic to Political Conflicts: The Problem of Language Shift in Multilingual Societies." Paper presented to the meetings of the International Political Science Association, 1973.

Laponce, Jean A. "The City Centre as a Factor of National Disintegration: The Case of Montreal." Paper prepared for the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, London, Ontario, 1978.

Lijphart, Arend. "Cleavages in Consociational Democracies: A Four-Country Comparison." Paper presented at the Symposium on Comparative Analysis of Highly Industrialized Societies, Bellagio, 1971.

Lijphart, Arend. "Linguistic Fragmentation and Other Dimensions of Cleavage: A Comparison of Belgium, Canada, and Switzerland." Paper presented at the Montreal Congress of the International Political Science Association, 1973.

McRoberts, Kenneth. "Mass Acquisition of a Nationalist Ideology: Quebec Prior to the Quiet Revolution." Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1975.

Pinard, Maurice. "Ethnic Segmentation, Loyalties, and Constitutional Options in Quebec." Paper presented at the twinned workshop organized by the Canadian Political Science Association and the Israel Political Science Association at Sde Boker, Israel, December 1979.

Stein, Michael B. "The Politics of Multi-Ethnicity in Quebec: Majority-Minority Group Consciousness in Transition." Paper presented to the Conference of Multi-Ethnic Polities, Columbia University, April 14, 1980.

Wolinetz, Steven B. "The Politics of Non-Accommodation in Canada: Misapplications of Consociational Models and Their Consequences for the Study of National Integration and Political Stability." Paper presented to the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, London, Ontario, 1978.

Interviews

Arnopoulos, Sheila McLeod. Montreal, Quebec. 20 March 1986.

Cheasley, C. Stephen. Martineau Walker, Montreal, Quebec, 6 August 1986.

Clark, Gerald. Montreal, Quebec. 7 August 1986.

Clift, Dominique. Montreal, Quebec. 20 March 1986.

Dowie, Vaughan. Alliance Québec, Montreal, Quebec. 6 August 1986.

Goldbloom, Michael. Martineau Walker, Montreal, Quebec. 6 August 1986.

Goldbloom, Victor. Canadian Association of Christians and Jews, Toronto, Ontario. 15 September 1986.

Tetley, William. McGill University, Montreal, Quebec. 20 March 1986.